Gainsharing: A Critical Review and a Future Research Agenda

This paper provides a critical review of the extensive literature on gainsharing. It examines the reasons for the fast growth in these programs in recent years and the major prototypes used in the past. Different theoretical formulations making predictions about the behavioral consequences and conditions mediating the success of these programs are discussed and the supporting empirical evidence is examined. The large number of a theoretical case studies and practitioner reports or gainsharing are also summarized and integrated. The article concludes with a suggested research agenda for the future

Do CEOs Ever Lose? Fairness Perspective on the Allocation of Residuals Between CEOs and Shareholders

In this study we introduce a justice perspective to examining the result of bargaining between CEOs and boards over the allocation of firm residuals that ultimately determines CEO compensation. Framing CEO pay as the result of bargaining between CEOs and boards focuses attention on the power of CEOs to increase their share of firm residuals in the form of increased compensation, and the diligence of boards of directors to constrain CEO opportunism. Framing this negotiation through a theory of justice offers an alternative perspective to the search for pay-performance sensitivity. We predict and find that as board diligence in controlling opportunism declines and CEO power increases, CEOs are increasingly able to capture a larger portion of firm residuals relative to shareholders. This finding supports critics who charge that CEO pay violates norms of distributive and procedural justice

Gainsharing and Mutual Monitoring: A Combined Agency-Procedural Justice Interpretation

This study examines the behavioral consequences of gainsharing using a combined theoretical framework that includes elements of agency and procedural justice theory. The hypothesis tested is that gainsharing as a collective form of incentive alignment results in increased mutual monitoring among agents (employees) when the plan is perceived to be procedurally fair. The hypothesis was supported in two separate firms using a quasi-experimental field study. The implications of the study for future extensions of agency theory to examine intraorganizational phenomena are discussed

When is ambivalence good for family firms? : Understanding the impact of family managers' emotional ambivalence on decision making

Peer reviewedPostprin

Socioemotional wealth preservation in family firms

In this article, we review literature on socioemotional wealth. We explain how the concept of socioemotional wealth builds on previous family firm research showing that family-owners derive utility from the nonfinancial aspects of their firm. We also discuss how family firms' need for socioemotional wealth preservation explains behavioral differences between family and nonfamily firms in managerial decision making. Finally, we discuss the current state of socioemotional wealth research and propose potential directions for future research

Can family firms nurture socioemotional wealth in the aftermath of Covid-19? : Implications for research and practice

Funding The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.Peer reviewedPublisher PD

Can institutional forces create competitive advantage? An empirical examination of environmental innovation

We examine institutional pressures as antecedents of environmental innovation. Drawing on institutional theory and a resource-based view of the firm, we argue that regulatory and normative forces influence companies' propensity to innovate in environment-related projects. Furthermore, we suggest that this relationship is contingent on the availability and specificity of the companies' resources. These relationships were tested using environmental patents and citations of 340 publicly-traded companies from polluting industries in the U.S. Results suggest that institutional pressures can be a source of competitive advantage, and regulatory forces are becoming more strongly associated with environmental innovations as the intensity of companies' R&D activities increase.environmental innovation; institutional theory; resource-based view;

The labor productivity of family firms : a socioemotional wealth perspective

In this chapter we examine the relationship between family firms and labor productivity. We focus on labor productivity for two reasons. First, it is an essential component of total factor productivity for which recent analyses have found differences between family and non-family firms. Second, it is directly tied to employees’ attitudes and behavior and therefore is a key indicator to look at in order to further understand people management related issues in family firms. A family firm is a firm controlled by a group of individuals related to each other by ties of blood or marriage. Family ownership is the most common type of ownership form in almost every country (La Porta et al., 1999; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2003). Further, family firms can be found in all economic sectors and size categories, and are also significantly present among publicly held firms (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010). Because of this ubiquity, family firm research in recent years is becoming one of the classic lines of inquiry in the management and economics literature. This literature has gained momentum during the last decade, with significant contributions published in major academic journals

Is nepotism so bad for family firms? A socioemotional wealth approach

This paper focuses on the issue of nepotism or the practice of hiring and managing family members in family firms. Extant research suggests that while nepotism is related to numerous problems, it also offers some unique advantages to family owned firms. We use a socioemotional wealth (SEW) perspective to develop a theoretical framework that explains how nepotism influences firm performance. In doing so, we rely upon a nuanced conceptualization of SEW to clarify why some family firms are more likely to engage in nepotism than others, as well as explain the contingencies under which nepotism may prove beneficial or detrimental for family firms. Finally, we explore how human resource practices might impact the interplay between nepotism, environmental contingencies, and firm performance