Riggs on strong justification

In 'The Weakness of Strong Justification' Wayne Riggs claims that the requirement that justified beliefs be truth conducive (likely to be true) is not always compatible with the requirement that they be epistemically responsible (arrived at in an epistemically responsible manner)1. He supports this claim by criticising Alvin Goldman's view that if a belief is strongly justified, it is also epistemically responsible. In light of this, Riggs recommends that we develop two independent conceptions of justification, one that insists upon the requirement that beliefs be truth conducive and another that insists that they be epistemically responsible. It will then, on his view, be possible to properly evaluate beliefs with regard to each conception of justification. Riggs, however, is mistaken in supposing that the two epistemic requirements are independent. If a belief is responsibly arrived at, it is therefore likely to be true. He is thus also mistaken in supposing that the two epistemic requirements are incompatible. This mistake arises because Riggs assumes that justification is possible or, at least, that it involves standards that are akin to our own. Moreover, once this assumption is made explicit, we can see why a notion of justification that connects epistemic practice with likely truth is significant

Book Review | Labor Arbitration - A Dissenting View by Paul Hays (Storrs Lectures on Jurisprudence 1964)

This book review examines Labor Arbitration - A Dissenting View by Paul Hays (Storrs Lectures on Jurisprudence 1964)

Faculty Collective Bargaining and the Law Schools

Introductory address for a panel discussion at the annual meeting of the Association of American Law Schools

The University and the Liberty of Its Students -- A Fiduciary Theory

The disciplinary power of a university is a force which every student has cause to fear. The exercise, or threat of exercise, of a school’s disciplinary power is felt in every area of campus life. Invocation of disciplinary sanctions against a student whose personal conduct or attitudes contravene standards dear to the school authorities has occurred in such ludicrous cases as the failure of a co-ed to be a “typical Syracuse girl.” In another case, a student was expelled because she refused to pay purported debts which she asserted were properly her husband’s obligations. As insidious as it may be to impose sanctions in such situations, it is in the area of student expression and association that the university’s disciplinary power poses its greatest potential threat to society, to the university itself and possibility to the individual student. In a typical situation demonstrating the menace inherent in the university’s disciplinary power, a group of students planned to march in demonstration against the practice of racial segregation in southern colleges. Acknowledging the students’ right to express their views in peaceful assembly, no obstacles were posed by local police authorities. Instead, the students were told by their university’s spokesman: “My judgment is better than yours and I am substituting my judgment for yours and I say that there will be no march. Furthermore, if there is a march, anyone participating . . . will be expelled.” This incident took place not in the deep South, but in upstate New York. In another case, four students were suspended indefinitely for publishing, in an off-campus magazine, an article which, though admittedly not obscene, was found by a committee of administrative personnel to be “generally objectionable.” On many campuses representatives of unpopular political philosophies are prohibited from addressing student groups, but the problem goes even deeper. One of the nation’s leading universities, for example, has confined the use of a course book on Soviet diplomatic policy to students enrolled in a course in which the “corrective influence” of a professor may be brought to bear. Such a prohibition carries, of course, an implicit threat of disciplinary action against violators. Further, on many occasions students have been disciplined for criticizing school authorities. Censorship techniques of various sorts are often imposed on student publications, both on campus and off. From time to time, students have look to the courts for relief from various alleged abuses of the exercise of a university’s disciplinary power. The result has been the development of a small body of case law dealing with student-university problems. Generally this body of law fails to acknowledge or protect significant student interests. Recently, however, legal writers have begun to take note of the law of student-university conflicts and to recognize that many student interests, both substantive and procedural, merit protection from a university’s disciplinary power. This article will explore one avenue of granting such protection—that of recognizing the university as a fiduciary for its students

Collective Bargaining Without Work Stoppages?

Legal institutions have provided us with numerous spectator sports. The jury trial and its predecessors, including trial by combat, are obvious examples. In the mid-nineteenth century, arguments before the Supreme Court of the United States occasionally attracted crowds of spectators and captured the front pages of the yellow press. In more recent times, proxy fights have been rumored to provide action for the bookmaking set and televised legislative investigations have won top-viewer ratings. Among the perennial spectator sports provided by our legal institutions over the past half-century or more has been the confrontation of labor and management across the collective bargaining table. As with all spectator sports, the main intrigue of collective bargaining is the perpetual air of suspense. Unlike most other sports, however, interest in this one is heightened by the fact that here the participants can shift the rules as well as the play. Analysts have attempted to remove the sport from the collective bargaining process by devising models to explain its operation. They strive, thereby, to bring the process within the realm of science; to substitute predictability for suspense. Some of these theorists use the old-fashioned descriptive analysis approach. Others employ mathematical models, game models and psychodynamic theories. To date, however, probably to the joy of the sport\u27s public and the delight of its practitioners, these analysts have failed in their efforts to transform the collective bargaining process into a predictable series of transactions. Nevertheless, the spectators\u27 enjoyment can be heightened, the participants\u27 skills sharpened and perhaps even the rules of the game improved by attempts at formal and even informal analysis of how the game of collective bargaining has been played and why the players make particular moves. Recognizing that such an attempt remains art, not science, an exercise at analysis of the collective bargaining process is undertaken here not with the somberness of traditional legal scholarship but rather more in the spirit of Monday morning quarterbacking

Lawyer Supply and Demand in Kentucky Over the Next Decade

Projecting future needs is a painstaking and hazardous affair. Avoiding such pain, however, is even more hazardous. There is good reason to attempt to project the next decade\u27s need for, and potential supply of, new lawyers in Kentucky. Adequate legal services are an important ingredient in orderly economic growth and an essential element in preserving a free society. On the other hand, an over-abundance of lawyers can depress the economics of the profession to the point at which its ability to sustain desired standards of ethical conduct and to attract a high caliber of new talent are both threatened. Moreover, it is a poor allocation of personal and public resources to expend the time and costs required for intensive professional training if the services of those trained are not in adequate demand. This study attempts to analyze Kentucky\u27s lawyer-manpower requirements over the next decade. Special emphasis is given to the impact of that projected need upon desired graduating class size at the two in-state law schools

Professor John E. Kennedy: 1934-1989 A Remembrance

This dedication was in recognition of John E. Kennedy’s death. John E. Kennedy was a member of the College of Law faculty

Resorting to External Norms and Principles in Constitutional Decision-Making

Given the very significant role of constitutional law in the American political system and the fact that Supreme Court Justices are appointed through a political process, it is understandable that the appropriate judicial approach to resolving constitutional issues often is the subject of political commentary. Unfortunately, discourse by politicians concerning this issue seldom rises to the deserved level of wisdom. One of President George W. Bush\u27s public mantras is illustrative of political commentary respecting federal judicial appointments: I\u27m going to put strict constructionists on the bench. On its face, and as understood by politically naive audiences, the statement appears to mean that the appointed Supreme Court Justice will interpret the Constitution so as to enforce what is stated in the charter\u27s text; that is, the Justice will resolve all constitutional issues by applying a plain meaning rule. This doubtless sounds reasonable to those who are unfamiliar with constitutional decision-making. Any serious student of that process should recognize, however, that this is a ludicrous promise

Joseph Grodin\u27s Contributions to Public Sector Collective Bargaining Law

The Labor Law Group, established in the early 1950s, is a unique consortium of labor law professors, and usually a practitioner or two, devoted to improving labor and employment law teaching and scholarship. Its primary activities have been publication of course books and sponsorship of conferences on important new developments. All royalty income goes into a trust fund used solely for carrying on the Group\u27s work. By luck more than by merit, I was invited to join the Group around 1969. Because I had practiced labor law for only a few years on the East Coast before entering law teaching in Kentucky and because I have never been a diligent reader of scholarly articles, the name Joseph Grodin was unfamiliar to me when, around 1971 or 1972, the late Professor Benjamin Aaron proposed him for membership in the Labor Law Group. Realizing that most of us were from the east, south and mid-west, Ben, as I recall, explained that his nominee had recently entered law teaching fulltime at Hastings and, though still a young man, had already distinguished himself as a leading California practitioner. Ben most likely also noted his candidate\u27s adjunct teaching experience, a few of his publications, and probably mentioned his doctorate from the London School of Economics. The potential value of this addition to the Group was immediately recognized, and we unanimously invited him into membership with a plea to Ben to persuade him to accept our invitation. About a year later the Group met in Denver. It was there I met Joe and Janet Grodin for the first time and discovered the broad range of their interests and accomplishments as well as their congenial personalities. In time, my wife got to meet them both and we developed a friendship that Ellie and I cherish. The scope and intensity of Joseph Grodin\u27s intellectual drive have resulted in his making important contributions to developments in a variety of areas of law. Because our relationship grew out of a shared interest in labor and employment law, this essay focuses on his work in one subcategory of that field—the law of public sector collective bargaining representation