"Words Gone Sour?"

In this paper, I highlight some important implications of a non-individualistic account of derogatory words. I do so by critically examining an intriguing claim of Jennifer Hornsby‘s: that derogatory words – words that, as she puts it, ―apply to people, and that are commonly understood to convey hatred and contempt‖ – are useless for us. In their stead, she maintains, we employ neutral counterparts: words ―that apply to the same people, but whose uses do not convey these things. I argue that Hornsby‘s distinctions – between derogatory words and neutral counterparts, and them (speakers who have use for the former) and us (who do not) – is not sustainable. I begin by considering examples that suggest that some of the words that some of us have use for are indeed derogatory. I then offer reasons for thinking that words that would presumably be identified as acceptable counterparts to derogatory words are not, in general, neutral

Truth and Reference in Fiction

Fiction is often characterized by way of a contrast with truth, as, for example, in the familiar couplet “Truth is always strange/ Stranger than fiction" (Byron 1824). And yet, those who would maintain that “we will always learn more about human life and human personality from novels than from scientific psychology” (Chomsky 1988: 159) hold that some truth is best encountered via fiction. The scrupulous novelist points out that her work depicts no actual person, either living or dead; nonetheless, we use names from fiction in ways that suggest that we take these names to refer. Philosophers who investigate fiction aim to reconcile such apparently incompatible phenomena, and, in general, to account for the myriad ways that we talk, think, and feel about fiction

Revisiting “Can Frege Pose Frege’s Puzzle?”

In this paper, I revisit themes from my paper “Can Frege Pose Frege’s Puzzle?” I begin by discussing our connection to the proper names that we use, and I explain why I continue to think that the epistemic status of true name-containing identity sentences is not puzzling. I conclude with some remarks about why I think that adherents of the direct reference conception of names should accept this position.En este artículo reviso temas de mi artículo “¿Puede Frege formular el Puzzle de Frege?”. Comienzo discutiendo nuestra conexión con los nombres propios que empleamos, y explico por qué continúo pensando que el estatus epistémico de las oraciones verdaderas de identidad que contienen nombres no es enigmático. Concluyo con algunas observaciones respecto de por qué pienso que los defensores de la concepción de la referencia directa de los nombres deberían aceptar esta posición