Elections and Ethnic Civil War

Existing research on how democratization may influence the risk of civil war tends to consider only changes in the overall level of democracy and rarely examines explicitly the postulated mechanisms relating democratization to incentives for violence. The authors argue that typically highlighted key mechanisms imply that elections should be especially likely to affect ethnic groups’ inclination to resort to violence. Distinguishing between types of conflict and the order of competitive elections, the authors find that ethnic civil wars are more likely to erupt after competitive elections, especially after first and second elections following periods of no polling. When disaggregating to the level of individual ethnic groups and conflicts over territory or government, the authors find some support for the notion that ethno-nationalist mobilization and sore-loser effects provoke postelectoral violence. More specifically, although large groups in general are more likely to engage in governmental conflicts, they are especially likely to do so after noncompetitive elections. Competitive elections, however, strongly reduce the risk of conflict. </jats:p

Disarming fears of diversity: ethnic heterogeneity and state militarization, 1988-2002

This study investigates whether ethnic and other forms of social diversity affect militarization of society. Recent scholarship in economics finds that high diversity leads to lower provision of public goods. At the same time, many conflict studies find that highly diverse societies face a lower risk of civil war, as opposed to relatively more homogenous populations. The authors explore whether diversity prompts governments to militarize heavily in order to prevent armed conflict, which would then crowd out spending on other public goods in a `guns versus butter' trade-off. Thus, `preventive militarization' would explain both outcomes. Yet the authors find the opposite: higher levels of ethnic diversity predict lower levels of militarization. If high diversity lowers the hazard of civil war, as many find, then it does not happen via preventive militarization. If diverse societies spend less on public goods, then this is not because they are crowded out by security spending. The results support those who suggest that diversity may, in fact, pose a lower security threat to states, since it is highly likely that states facing potential social strife would prioritize state militarization

Barriers to replication in systematic empirical research on world politics

Statistic

Identity and Conflict: Ties that Bind and Differences that Divide

Conventional wisdom suggests that cultural differences make conflict more likely. Culture can unite and divide, but there exists little agreement among scholars over how identity forms among states, what distinctions are most salient, and when conflict is more likely. Researchers have tended to ‘confirm’ the role of identity in an ex post facto fashion, looking only at actual conflicts with cultural differences, without considering the opportunities for conflict among groups. We address a series of problems with existing conceptions of identity and ethnicity. We distinguish between shared and different culture by religion, language, and ethnicity. Rather than equating states with just the dominant groups, we also consider how relations involving secondary groups present in other states can give rise to conflict. We examine empirically the relationship between cultural similarities and differences and international dispute behavior in the post-World War II era. Our results suggest that culture and identity influence dispute patterns, but in ways that run counter to conventional beliefs. We find little evidence that conflict is more common between states where the dominant groups come from different cultural affiliations. If anything, our results suggest that violence is more likely among states with similar cultural ties, even when controlling for other determinants of conflict. Moreover, dyads where a group is politically privileged in one state but a minority in another tend to be particularly conflict prone. We conclude with suggestions for reorienting the study of identity and conflict in more constructive ways than the clash of civilization thesis. </jats:p

Death penalty: the political foundations of the global trend toward abolition

The death penalty is like no other punishment. Its continued existence in many countries of the world creates political tensions within these countries and between governments of retentionist and abolitionist countries. After the Second World War, more and more countries have abolished the death penalty. This article argues that the major determinants of this global trend toward abolition are political, a claim which receives support in a quantitative cross-national analysis from 1950 to 2002. Democracy, democratization, international political pressure on retentionist countries and peer group effects in relatively abolitionist regions all raise the likelihood of abolition. There is also a partisan effect as abolition becomes more likely if the chief executive’s party is left-wing oriented. Cultural, social and economic determinants receive only limited support. The global trend toward abolition will go on if democracy continues to spread around the world and abolitionist countries stand by their commitment to press for abolition all over the world.