42 research outputs found
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Blowing Smoke Out of the Bayou: The Battle for Tobacco Control in Louisiana
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The Development and Implementation of Tobacco-Free Movie Rules In India
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The Development and Implementation of Tobacco-Free Movie Rules In India
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Economic Impact of the California Healthcare, Research and Prevention Tobacco Tax Act of 2016: Job creation and economic activity
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Economic Impact of the California Healthcare, Research and Prevention Tobacco Tax Act of 2016: Job creation and economic activity
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The Defeat of Oregon's Tobacco Tax Initiative in 2007
In November 2007, Oregonians defeated Measure 50, an 84.5-cent cigarette tax increase to fund childrenâs health insurance, by a vote of 59% no to 41% yes. This ballot measure would have established the Healthy Kids Program for otherwise uninsured children. Measure 50 revenues would also expand the Oregon Health Plan (Oregonâs health care coverage for low-income residents) and provide additional funding for rural health and safety net clinics. Only 5% of the new revenues were dedicated to tobacco control.Measure 50 was a legislative referral of a bill that failed to pass as a statute during the regular legislative session. The Governorâs Office and health and labor advocates tried several times to secure the three-fifths majority vote needed to pass a revenue-raising measure. Deprived of crucial votes with a Republican lockdown in the House, the Governorâs Office and local contract lobbyist for the American Cancer Society (ACS) decided to support a legislative referral of the Healthy Kids Plan as a constitutional amendment, which only required the approval of a simple majority in the Legislature, to the ballot in the 2007 special election.Campaign spending for Measure 50 was the costliest in Oregonâs history. The Yes on Healthy Kids PAC spent 12.1 million opposing the measure (5.0 million from RJRâs Oregonians Against the Blank Check PAC).From the outset, the Yes campaign faced several issues that put them at a disadvantage: the short timeline of less than five months from referral to election for a public education and media campaign, the unfavorable recourse of amending the constitution, and relatively low initial levels of public support (59% in March, falling to 53% in August).During the campaign, leadership was concentrated among three individuals who had experience in Oregon initiatives and politics, but who lacked the ability to effectively communicate and mobilize other advocates and volunteers involved in the campaign.RJ Reynolds and Philip Morris ran separate campaigns against Measure 50. Their combined $12 million directed at defeating the measure went to paid media and continuous polling that allowed the tobacco companies to define messages and hone in on issues that resonated most with voters throughout the state. The RJ Reynolds campaign had an effective spokesperson who was visible and stayed on message, unlike the Yes on Healthy Kids campaign, which lacked a strong identity with several speakers and changing messages.Measure 50 supporters blamed massive tobacco industry spending for their loss. This conclusion ignored flaws in the legislation itself; its small allocation to tobacco control and amendment to the constitution made it susceptible to attack from the tobacco industry. The Yes campaign also suffered from a lack of communication and cooperation within the campaign and did not learn lessons from other cigarette tax increase initiatives throughout the United States. The tobacco control community will continue to be disappointed with their campaign efforts to increase tobacco taxes until they begin to learn from these repeated past mistakes
Recommended from our members
The Defeat of Oregon's Tobacco Tax Initiative in 2007
In November 2007, Oregonians defeated Measure 50, an 84.5-cent cigarette tax increase to fund childrenâs health insurance, by a vote of 59% no to 41% yes. This ballot measure would have established the Healthy Kids Program for otherwise uninsured children. Measure 50 revenues would also expand the Oregon Health Plan (Oregonâs health care coverage for low-income residents) and provide additional funding for rural health and safety net clinics. Only 5% of the new revenues were dedicated to tobacco control.Measure 50 was a legislative referral of a bill that failed to pass as a statute during the regular legislative session. The Governorâs Office and health and labor advocates tried several times to secure the three-fifths majority vote needed to pass a revenue-raising measure. Deprived of crucial votes with a Republican lockdown in the House, the Governorâs Office and local contract lobbyist for the American Cancer Society (ACS) decided to support a legislative referral of the Healthy Kids Plan as a constitutional amendment, which only required the approval of a simple majority in the Legislature, to the ballot in the 2007 special election.Campaign spending for Measure 50 was the costliest in Oregonâs history. The Yes on Healthy Kids PAC spent 12.1 million opposing the measure (5.0 million from RJRâs Oregonians Against the Blank Check PAC).From the outset, the Yes campaign faced several issues that put them at a disadvantage: the short timeline of less than five months from referral to election for a public education and media campaign, the unfavorable recourse of amending the constitution, and relatively low initial levels of public support (59% in March, falling to 53% in August).During the campaign, leadership was concentrated among three individuals who had experience in Oregon initiatives and politics, but who lacked the ability to effectively communicate and mobilize other advocates and volunteers involved in the campaign.RJ Reynolds and Philip Morris ran separate campaigns against Measure 50. Their combined $12 million directed at defeating the measure went to paid media and continuous polling that allowed the tobacco companies to define messages and hone in on issues that resonated most with voters throughout the state. The RJ Reynolds campaign had an effective spokesperson who was visible and stayed on message, unlike the Yes on Healthy Kids campaign, which lacked a strong identity with several speakers and changing messages.Measure 50 supporters blamed massive tobacco industry spending for their loss. This conclusion ignored flaws in the legislation itself; its small allocation to tobacco control and amendment to the constitution made it susceptible to attack from the tobacco industry. The Yes campaign also suffered from a lack of communication and cooperation within the campaign and did not learn lessons from other cigarette tax increase initiatives throughout the United States. The tobacco control community will continue to be disappointed with their campaign efforts to increase tobacco taxes until they begin to learn from these repeated past mistakes
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The Cost of Caution: Tobacco Industry Political Influence and Tobacco Policy Making in Oregon 1997-2007
Following the passage of Measure 44, which raised the cigarette tax by 3,145,553 on lobbying and campaign contributions to legislators, political parties, and constitutional officers from 1997 to 2006. Republican political action committees (PACs) received nearly five times more than Democratic PACs; tobacco companies spent more than four times more on Republicans than Democrats in the legislature.The tobacco industry attempted to hamper tobacco control efforts through several hospitality and retail organizations, but their most powerful ally was the Oregon Restaurant Association (ORA), which had one of the largest PACs in the state and was a major political player.With an increasing number of local clean indoor air ordinances, the tobacco industry fought tobacco control efforts at the state level, where they had an obvious advantage with campaign contributions and well-connected lobbyists.In 2001, tobacco industry lobbyists attacked TPEP with legislation that attacked TPEPâs credibility, infrastructure, and success passing local clean indoor air ordinances. In this negative policy environment, the ORA cut a deal with the Democratic Governor to enact the Indoor Clean Air Act of 2001, which preempted local governments from passing stronger laws and exempted bars, bar areas of restaurants, bingo halls, and bowling alleys. These exemptions were not removed until 2007 and will not actually be removed until 2009.In another blow to tobacco control during the 2001 legislative session, TPEP was subject to âillegal lobbyingâ allegations, a tobacco industry tactic previously employed in California and elsewhere. The result of these claims was a âbudget noteâ added to the TPEP appropriation by the Legislature that specifically restricted TPEP from lobbying for tobacco control ordinances and requiring local programs to advocate for passing tobacco control ordinances.Among tobacco control advocates, the 2001 budget note initiated a more cautious attitude that outlasted the budget note's applicability to the 2001-03 budget cycle. The passage of the preemptive state law in the same session further limited the advocate's ability to pass effective tobacco control policies.Oregon and 45 other states settled outstanding lawsuits against the four largest tobacco companies with the Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) in 1998. Since the first payment in 1999, no money has been dedicated to tobacco prevention and education in Oregon as of 2007.Tobacco control advocates defeated two ballot measures in 2000 that would have dedicated either none or a minimal amount of the MSAâs revenue stream to tobacco prevention and education.Until 2004, Oregonâs cigarette tax was comprised of a permanent tax and a 0.60 to a total of 2 million.Oregonâs cigarette tax fell to 0.10 temporary tax to Measure 30, a revenue-raising measure that included unpopular personal income and corporate tax increases in the midst of a statewide recession. Measure 30 failed, and Oregonâs cigarette tax decreased.Using the stateâs difficult budget shortfalls as a reason, legislators in the 2003 session completely defunded TPEP, shutting it down in March 2003. (Other programs funded by Measure 44 were cut, but only TPEP was shut down.)Some funding was reinstated in December 2003, with a biennial budget that was 34% of its 2001-03 budget and 17% of the CDCâs minimum for state tobacco control programs. This disruption in funding had serious negative impacts on program staffing and continuity.TPEP operated on a severely reduced budget during the 2003-05 and 2005-07 bienniums because Measure 44 funds were diverted by the state legislature to pay for OHP.Since the significant reductions in TPEPâs budget, per capita cigarette consumption declined at a much slower rate than before, and now appears to have plateaued.TOFCO has often been restrained by other political priorities of its member organizations, and tobacco control advocates have over-relied on contract lobbyists to set policy agendas and steer negotiations.Oregon may be entering a period of resurgence after several setbacks caused the program to fall out of the national spotlight. The tobacco control movement in Oregon needs strong leaders who are less cautious and can mobilize public support throughout the state, not just the metropolitan hubs