Privatization in oligopoly : the impact of the shadow cost of public funds

The aim of this paper is to investigate the welfare eect of privatization in oligopoly when the government takes into account the distortionary eect of rising funds by taxation (shadow cost of public funds). We analyze the impact of the change in ownership not only on the objective function of the rms, but also on the timing of competition by endogenizing the determination of simultaneous (Nash-Cournot) versus sequential (Stackelberg) games. We show that, absent effciency gains, privatization never increases welfare. Moreover, even when large effciency gains are realized, an ineffcient public rm may be preferred

Mixed duopoly, privatization and the shadow costs of public funds

The purpose of this article is to investigate how the introduction of the shadow cost of public funds in the utilitarian measure of the economywide welfare affects the behavior of a welfare maximizer public firm in a mixed duopoly. We prove that when firms play simultaneously, the mixed-Nash equilibrium can dominate any Cournot equilibria implemented after a privatization, with or without efficiency gains. This can be true both in terms of welfare and of public firm's profit. When we consider endogenous timing, we show that either mixed- Nash, private leadership or both Stackelberg equilibria can result as subgameperfect Nash equilibria (SPNE). As a consequence, the sustainability of sequential equilibria enlarges the subspace of parameters such that the market performance with an inefficient public firm is better than the one implemented after a full-efficient privatization. Absent efficiency gains, privatization always lowers welfare

Privatization in oligopoly : the impact of the shadow cost of public funds

The aim of this paper is to investigate the welfare effect of privatization in oligopoly when the government takes into account the distortionary effect of raising funds by taxation (shadow cost of public funds). We analyze the impact of the change in ownership not only on the objective function of the firms, but also on the timing of competition by endogenizing the determination of simultaneous (Nash-Cournot) versus sequential (Stackelberg) games. We show that, absent efficiency gains, privatization never increases welfare. Moreover, even when large efficiency gains are realized, an inefficient public firm may be preferred

Mixed duopoly, privatization and the shadow costs of public funds : exogenous and endogenous timing

The purpose of this article is to investigate how the introduction of the shadow cost of public funds in the utilitarian measure of the economy wide welfare affects the behavior of a welfare maximizer public firm in amixed duopoly. We prove that when firms play simultaneously, the mixed-Nash equilibrium can dominate any Cournot equilibria implemented after a privatization, with or without efficiency gains. This can be true both interms of welfare and of public firm's profit. When we consider endogenous timing, we show that either mixed-Nash, private leadership or both Stackelberg equilibria can result as subgameperfect Nash equilibria (SPNE). As a consequence, the sustainability of sequential equilibria enlarges the subspace of parameters such that themarket performance with an inefficient public firm is better than the one implemented after a full-efficient privatization. Absent efficiency gains, privatization always lowers welfare

Mixed duopoly, privatization and the shadow cost of public funds

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of privatization in a mixed duopoly, where a private firm competes in quantities with a welfare-maximizing public firm. We consider two inefficiencies of the public sector: a possible cost inefficiency, and an allocative inefficiency due to the distortionary effect of taxation (shadow cost of public funds). Furthermore, we analyze the effect of privatization on the timing of competition by endogenizing the determination of simultaneous (Nash-Cournot) versus sequential (Stackelberg) games using the model developed by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). The latter is especially relevant for the analysis of privatization, given that results and policy prescription emerged in the literature crucially rely on the type of competition assumed. We show that privatization has generally the effect of shifting from Stackelberg to Cournot equilibrium and that, absent efficiency gains privatization never increases welfare. Moreover, even when large efficiency gains are realized, an inefficient public firm may be preferred.mixed oligopoly, privatization, endogenous timing, distortionary taxes.

On Public Inefficiencies in a Mixed Duopoly

The aim of this paper is to investigate the welfare effect of a change in the public firm's objective function in oligopoly when the government takes into account the distortionary effect of rising funds by taxation (shadow cost of public funds). We analyze the impact of a shift from welfare- to profit-maximizing behaviour of the public firm on the timing of competition by endogenizing the determination of simultaneous (Nash-Cournot) versus sequential (Stackelberg) games using the game with observable delay proposed by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). Differently from previous work that assumed the timing of competition, we show that, absent efficiency gains, instructing the public firm to play as a private one never increases welfare. Moreover, even when large efficiency gains result from the shift in public firm's objective, an inefficient public firm that maximizes welfare may be preferred.Mixed oligopoly; Nash equilibria; Endogenous Timing; Distortionary taxes

Mixed duopoly, privatization and the shadow cost of public funds

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of privatization in a mixed duopoly, where a private firm complete in quantities with a welfare-maximizing public firm. We consider two inefficiencies of the public sector : a possible cost inefficiency and an allocative inefficiency due to the distortionary effect of taxation (shadow cost of public funds). Furthermore, we analyze the effect of privatization on the timing of competition by endogenezing the determiantion of simultaneous (Nash-Cournot) versus sequential (Stackelberg) games using the model developed by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). The latter is especially relevant for the analysis of privatization, given that results and policy prescription emerged in the literature crucially rely on the type of competition assumed. We show that privatization has generally the effect of shifting from Stackelberg to Cournot equilibrium and that, absent efficiency gains privatization never increases welfare. Moreover, even when large efficiency gains are realized, an inefficient public firm may be preferred.mixed oligopoly, privatization, endogenous timing, distortionary taxes

Localizzazione 2D di tag RFID in banda UHF mediante tecniche ad array sintetico

In questa tesi si sono valutate le prestazioni di un sistema di localizzazione di tag RFID passivi in banda UHF in ambiente indoor. Il sistema, composto da un reader in movimento che percorre una traiettoria nota, ha come obiettivo localizzare il tag attraverso misure di fase; piu precisamente la differenza di fase tra il segnale di interrogazione,emesso dal reader, e il segnale retro-diffuso dal tag

Firms’ Clustering and SEE Export Performance: Lessons from the Italian Experience

Like all transition economies, South Eastern Europe (SEE) countries stand to gain most from an export-led growth. Unfortunately, though, productive structure in these countries is largely made up of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) that, due to their limited size, may face obstacles to gain access to international markets. A possible way out of the conundrum is for SMEs to cluster together and, by sharing the costs of internationalization, jointly tap foreign markets. This approach has been at the heart of the successful export performance of SMEs clustered within Italy’s industrial districts. In this paper we use historical data on Italian exports (in 1971 and 1961) to quantify the boosting effect due to firms’ clustering. In particular, we use detailed data on export classified by sector and by destination country to estimate a panel gravity model on which we compute the firms’ clustering effect. Next, building on the Italian experience we design four scenarios for firms’ clustering in three SEE economies (Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia). By means of these scenarios and applying the estimated coefficient for firms’ clustering in Italy, we simulate the firms’ clustering effect for the three SEE economies and obtain the gain in export growth over the benchmark case. Results show that an additional export growth between 3% and 11% over a five- year period could be expected.

Currency Crises During the Great Recession: Is This Time Different?

During the 2007-2009 financial crisis the foreign exchange market was characterized by large volatility and wide currency swings. In this paper we evaluate whether during the period of the Great Recession there has been a structural break in the relationship between fundamentals and exchange rates within an early-warning framework. This is done by extending the original data set by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and including not only the most recent period, but also 17 new countries. Our analysis considers two variations of the original early-warning system. First, we propose two new methods to obtain the probability distribution of the early-warning indicator (conditional on the occurrence of a crisis) – one fully parametric and one based on a novel distribution-free semi-parametric approach. Second, we compare the original early-warning indicator with a core indicator that includes only “pseudo-financial variables” (domestic credit/GDP, the real exchange rate, international reserves and the real interest-rate differential) and we evaluate their performance not only for currency crises during the Great Recession, but also for the Asian Crisis. All tests make us conclude that “this time is different”, i.e. early-warning systems based on traditional macroeconomic variables have not only failed to forecast currency crises during the Great Recession, but have also significantly worsened with respect to the period of the Asian crisis.Early Warning Systems; Exchange Rates; Semi-parametric Meth- ods