From Rio to Kyoto: A Study of the Involvement of Non-Governmental Organizations in the Negotiations on Climate Change

This Article analyzes the influence of non-governmental actors on the negotiations of the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC or the Convention). In particular, it evaluates the methods employed by NGOs in furthering their substantive agendas, the interaction among various non-governmental actors, and the results of their efforts. This Article considers two kinds of NGOs: business and environmental. Environmental NGOs (ENGOs) are the self-defined representatives of environmental interests. They campaign for the strict reduction of all gases that induce climate change. On the other side, business NGOs (BNGOs) typically represent the interests of those industries that are involved in the industrial cycles that damage the atmosphere. The analysis of the different approaches and actions of these groups during the negotiations is particularly interesting and relevant.· Given the conflicting missions of these two groups, one might believe that ENGOs and BNGOs operate without regard to one another. In reality, business and environmental NGOs are not always completely separate entities. As this Article demonstrates, ENGOs and BNGOs extensively scrutinize one another and frequently engage in official negotiations and discussions on various policy options

Who Decides Who Decides In International Investment Arbitration?

The past twenty years have witnessed a dramatic rise in international adjudication, and especially in international investment arbitration. As international investment arbitration has become more prominent and pervasive, one of its fundamental tenets has come under fire: the practice of having the parties themselves nominate one or more of the arbitrators. Critics contend that party-appointed arbitrators are inherently biased and thus propose eliminating party-appointments altogether. In this article, I argue that moving away from party-appointed arbitrators is unwarranted and unwise, and would too radically transform international investment arbitration. Instead, I propose a simpler solution: adopting stricter arbitrator challenge rules and enlarging the pool of arbitrators. There is no need to gut the arbitration selection system to fix it. Instead, the solution lies in improving the process of deciding who decides the world\u27s international investment disputes

Cross-Fertilisation of Procedural Law Among International Courts and Tribunals: Methods and Meanings

The proliferation of international courts and tribunals has resulted in interesting instances of cross-fertilisation of procedural law among international courts. This chapter provides a framework to assess specific techniques of cross-fertilisation, used in support of specific conclusions reached by the deciding tribunal Techniques used include general references to decisions by other tribunals, specific citations to one or more decisions by other international courts and tribunals and references to a standard adopted by other international courts and tribunals explained in a dissenting or separate opinion and differing from the conclusion supported by the majority of the deciding tribunal. Continuous instances of cross-fertilisation also seem to indicate the initial formation of a common international procedural law applicable to a variety of international courts and tribunals

Introductory Note To The International Court Of Justice: Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic Of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of The Congo) Compensation Owed By The Democratic Republic of The Congo to The Republic Of Guinea

On June 12, 2012, the International Court of Justice ( ICJ or the Court ) ordered the Republic of the Congo ( DRC ) to pay the Republic of Guinea ( Guinea ) U.S. $95,000 in compensation for material and non-material injury to Guinea\u27s national Ahmadou Sadio Diallo. The Judgment is notable for several reasons. First, the mere fact that the Court fixed an amount of compensation owned to Guinea is relevant, as this is only the second time in the history of the Court that such a measure was adopted. Second, in reaching its decision, the Court relied heavily on decisions of other international courts and tribunals to determine the amount of compensation. By doing so, the Court aligned itself with other courts\u27 precedent and marginalized fears of fragmentation in international law. Third, the Court\u27s reasoning to award U.S.$95,000 rather than the twelve million dollars requested by Guinea is also significant

Is the Truth in the Eyes of the Beholder? The Perils and Benefits of Empirical Research in International Investment

Empirical research is the new hot trend in international law. An increasing number of publications include empirical data that aim at strengthening their author\u27s argument. Indeed, empirical data are used to make an argument less fallible, as the author\u27s conclusions are transformed from subjective to objectively proven by the empirical wrap. Professor Catherine Rogers\u27 novel article, The Politics and Empirics of International Investment Arbitrators, highlights important limitations that empirical data may produce in international investment law research.a As such, it is a needed and important contribution to the understanding and development of this type of scholarship, and generally to the study of international investment arbitration. The first part of my commentary evaluates the perils and benefits of empirical research in international investment arbitration, and concludes that - to be useful - empirical research must respect certain standards. In the second part, this paper assesses empirical research based on objective variables to conclude that it can be a useful tool to study and strengthen international investment arbitration, if properly used

Between Flexibility and Stability: Ad Hoc Procedures and/or Judicial Institutions?

The choice between the flexibility offered by ad hoc procedures and the stability proper of established judicial institutions poses many interesting questions for those interested in international dispute resolution. This chapter seeks to assess some of these questions and, possibly, to offer suggestions to future parties and their counsel on how to select the most appropriate resolution mechanism to resolve their international inter-state dispute. To begin with, it is worth noting two important and related trends that characterize contemporary international dispute resolution: first, the increased use of international litigation by diverse international actors, and second, the multiplication of dispute resolution mechanisms

Introductory Note to the International Court of Justice: Request for Interpretation of the Judgment in the Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals

On July 16, 2008, the International Court of Justice ( ICJ or the Court ) issued its Order On the Request for the Indication ofProvisional Measures ( Order ),1 granting Mexico\u27s request demanding the United States, inter alia, to take all necessary measures to ensure that certain named individuals are not executed pending the judgment on the Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America)? This is a complex and interesting decision for several reasons. First, it continues to examine the applicability and enforceability of individual rights under of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. Second, it examines the standard of prima facie jurisdiction in the context of requests for interpretation of a Judgment. Third, it renews the Court\u27s strong stand on the availability and mandatory nature of provisional measures. Finally, it touches upon the relation between international law and domestic law, especially in the context of a federal system

Remarks: Syria and the Arab Spring Symposium

Remarks on Syria and the Arab Spring given at the 2012 University of Baltimore Journal of International Law Symposium on the Arab Spring

The Challenge and Recusal of Judges of the International Court of Justice

The rules and mechanisms to challenge and recuse a judge of the International Court of Justice ( ICJ ) are unique and pertain to the control mechanisms proper to permanent international dispute resolution bodies, characterized by a plurality of representative, elected judges. Indeed, the Statute of the ICJ ( Statute ) provides a series of control mechanisms aimed at ensuring the independence and impartiality of its judges. The drafters of the Statute adopted a multi-tiered approach, relying first on self-control of each judge, and then envisaging a subsidiary control role for the President and the Court as a whole. Third-party requests for recusals are provided for in the Statute, but are extremely rare. The Court relies mostly on a self-regulation system, by which it is for a judge to recuse him or herself when the case so requires. The President of the Court and the Court as a whole only step in to provide a back-up and ensure that the framework is respected. Thus, should reasons exist for which a judge should be removed or not sit in a case, the President and the Court retain the power to take the final decision, sua sponte or as requested by a party, to remove the judge. This chapter first briefly explains how the ICJ judges are elected and nominated. It then explores the issues of relative and functional incompatibilities of judges. Next, it describes and assesses existing mechanisms of control, including resignation, self-recusal and disqualification of judges. Finally, it assesses the three publicly known cases of recusals. The chapter concludes with a brief assessment of the practice

Between Legitimacy and Control: Challenges and Recusals of Arbitrators and Judges in International Courts and Tribunals

Challenges of judges and arbitrators in international courts and tribunals is a vastly understudied subject. To correct this imbalance, this Article makes three novel contributions. First, and for the first time, it details and compares challenge procedures across a variety of international courts and tribunals, including both permanent and ad hoc institutions. Second, it provides unique data on challenges and provides a detailed analysis of their outcomes. Third, it makes two concrete recommendations that should be adopted as baseline requirements to improve and harmonize existing challenge procedures: (1) it proposes that an external or semi-external institution take decisions on challenges, and (2) it proposes adoption of a common standard of review based on a reasonable third party observer. The analysis proceeds as follows: Part I first explains why a comparative analysis of rules from different courts and tribunals is necessary and warranted, and then examines the diverse provisions applicable to challenge procedures in some of the most important international courts and tribunals; Part II assesses new empirical data relating to the number of challenges and the success rate of challenge procedures under some of those rules, and explains some of the reasons for those challenges; Part III builds on these findings and concludes by suggesting ways to strengthen the challenge and recusal rules within the existing procedural systems