Moral anger, but not moral disgust, responds to intentionality

We propose that, when people judge moral situations, anger responds to the contextual cues of harm and intentionality. On the other hand, disgust responds uniquely to whether or not a bodily norm violation has occurred; its apparent response to harm and intent is entirely explained by the co-activation of anger. We manipulated intent, harm, and bodily norm violation (eating human flesh) within a vignette describing a scientific experiment. Participants then rated their anger, disgust, and moral judgment, as well as various appraisals. Anger responded independently of disgust to harm and intentionality, while disgust responded independently of anger only to whether or not the act violated the bodily norm of cannibalism. Theoretically relevant appraisals accounted for the effects of harm and intent on anger; however, appraisals of abnormality did not fully account for the effects of the manipulations on disgust. Our results show that anger and disgust are separately elicited by different cues in a moral situation

Anger, disgust, and presumption of harm as reactions to taboo-breaking behaviors

Three experiments investigated the relationship between the presumption of harm in harmfree violations of creatural norms (taboos) and the moral emotions of anger and disgust. In Experiment 1, participants made a presumption of harm to others from taboo violations, even in conditions described as harmless and not involving other people; this presumption was predicted by anger and not disgust. Experiment 2 manipulated taboo violation and included a cognitive load task to clarify the post hoc nature of presumption of harm. Experiment 3 was similar but more accurately measured presumed harm. In Experiments 2 and 3, only without load was symbolic harm presumed, indicating its post hoc function to justify moral anger, which was not affected by load. In general, manipulations of harmfulness to others predicted moral anger better than moral disgust, whereas manipulations of taboo predicted disgust better. The presumption of harm was found on measures of symbolic rather than actual harm when a choice existed. These studies clarify understanding of the relationship between emotions and their justification when people consider victimless, offensive acts.Peer reviewe

From crisis of evidence to a “crisis” of relevance? Incentive-based answers for social psychology’s perennial relevance worries

Current controversies in social psychology have sparked the promotion of new rules for evidence in the field. This “crisis of evidence” echoes prior concerns from the 1970’s about a so-called “crisis of social psychology”, with such issues as replication and statistical significance once more under examination. I argue that parallel concerns about the relevance of our research, raised but not completely resolved in the 1970’s crisis, also deserve a fresh look. In particular, the advances made in the current crisis of evidence came about because of changes in academic career incentives--particularly publishing. Today, many voices in psychology urge greater respect for relevance in topics, methods and communication, but the lack of clear and concrete incentives to do so has stood in the way of answers. I diagnose the current incentive structures, propose partial solutions that are within the reach of journal editors and professional societies, and conclude by discussing the links between relevance and evidence, as well as special challenges to the relevance of social psychology post-2016

Community, Autonomy and Divinity Scale items and coding, English version, 2011: Scale validated in Guerra and Giner-Sorolla (Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 2010)

This document presents the scale items and a revised instruction protocol for this scale, intended to measure endorsement of the three factors in Shweder's CAD model of morality

Ironically Enjoyed Music: An Investigation of the Unique Self-Regulatory Value of Irony as Part of the Enjoyment of Music

Ironic enjoyment occurs when people enjoy music despite or because of it being evaluated as bad. Although initial qualitative results suggest that this phenomenon fulfils a variety of self-regulatory functions that are also found in enjoyed music, to date no research has experimentally tested how important these functions are in ironically enjoyed music, in comparison to naturally enjoyed music. In two between-subjects experiments, participants (N=216 & N=143) were instructed to think back to a recent occasion in which they listened to a piece of music which they either enjoyed ironically, or enjoyed naturally. They then answered questions on the effects this had on them (Study 1 and 2) and on the subjective qualities of the music (Study 2). The results suggested that ironically enjoyed music had less effect on personal identification and on managing positive or negative moods, and was also appreciated less and judged as less novel than naturally enjoyed music. Differences in mood-management functions were associated with lower levels of subjective qualities of ironically enjoyed music, especially appreciation. Novelty was especially related to positive mood-enhancement for ironically enjoyed music. Participants mentioned humour as an additional function of ironically enjoyed music listening

Commentary on Over (2021): Well-taken Points About Dehumanization, But Exaggerated Challenges

We offer a critical appraisal of Over's (2020) seven challenges for dehumanization research in social psychology. While the challenges mainly attack an exaggerated version of the claims that dehumanization research actually makes, the positive suggestions that follow them open up some much-needed questions. By seeing humanity as a prototype-based category, we can address more sensitively how various departures from prototypical humanity relate to each other. We can also ask whether all of these departures are equally necessary or sufficient explanations for the effects of dehumanizing treatment and metaphors in degrading moral consideration of other groups of people

Bad People Alert: The Expression of Disgust Signals Its Target’s Bad Moral Character

Expressions of moral disgust and anger in social situations signal the target’s moral failure to third-party observers. But little is known about whether the two emotions have different communication functions in sociomoral contexts. Based on the literature about social factors that actually distinguish between anger and disgust, two experiments investigated the inferences people make about the social target of an angry or disgusted expression. Primarily, we tested whether disgusted expressions aimed at a person convey the inference that the person has a bad moral character, more than angry expressions which communicate that the person did a thing with bad consequences. Together, these two experiments shed light on the functional differences between angry and disgusted expressions, as much as they co-occur in everyday life

Willingness to use moral reframing: Support comes from perceived effectiveness, opposition comes from integrity concerns

Moral reframing is a communication technique that involves persuading an audience to support an issue they typically oppose on ideological grounds by appealing to concepts and values that align with their moral concerns. Overall, previous research has found that moral reframing can encourage attitude change more so than non-reframed messages. One pending question, though, is whether people would or would not use this technique in the first place (e.g., because it requires embracing values that one might not endorse). This online study (N = 249) tested the willingness of US-based liberals to use a message appealing to conservative values (morally reframed), vs. one appealing to liberal values (not morally reframed), to persuade a hypothetical conservative audience to be more pro-environmental. Reasons behind message choice and feelings about both messages were measured. Results showed that most participants chose to use the morally reframed message (73%). This choice was justified by the message’s perceived persuasive effectiveness, while rejecting it was justified by the need to feel true to one’s own beliefs and values. However, regardless of actual message choice, participants overall reported more positive and less negative integrity feelings for the message that was not morally reframed