The effects of causal uncertainty, causal importance, and initial attitude on attention to causal persuasive arguments

In two studies, we examined how individual differences in causal uncertainty (CU), causal importance (CI), and initial attitudes affected the processing of a persuasive message that contained causal or non-causal arguments. We predicted that high CU individuals' doubts about their causal understanding of events would be activated when they were presented with counterattitudinal arguments. When these individuals also placed a high value on causal understanding (high CI), they should scrutinize any available causal explanations. As a result, they should be more persuaded by strong compared to weak causal arguments. In support of these predictions, we found in two studies that high CU/high CI participants were more persuaded by strong compared to weak counterattitudinal causal arguments. Mediational analyses in Study 2 revealed that high CU/high CI participants were more persuaded by strong causal arguments because they were more confident in them. Implications for the CU model and persuasion processes are discussed

Causal uncertainty and correction of judgments

We examined whether raising uncertainty about the causes of one\u27s judgments motivates correction. Specifically, we examined whether activating chronically accessible causal uncertainty (CU) beliefs with a conditional warning about possible bias enhances correction of weather judgments for tropical weather primes and of word frequency judgments for the availability bias. In two studies we showed that activating chronic beliefs led to careful correction of target judgments. Moreover, Study 2 revealed that chronically high-CU individuals who received a conditional warning felt more uncertain than did other participants, but that this uncertainty was suppressed somewhat by adjusting for the bias

An on-line look at automatic contrast and correction of behavior categorizations and dispositional inferences

The current study examined on-line behavior recategorization as a mechanism underlying corrections for contextual influences in dispositional inferences. After watching an initial comparison video that portrayed either a successful or unsuccessful performance on a spatial ability task, cognitive load and no load participants watched and made real-time ratings of a target performance. The comparison video was expected to exert a contrastive influence on participants' automatic impressions of the performance (behavior categorizations) and the child's intelligence (dispositional inferences). Load participants' on-line and post-video performance and ability ratings showed this expected effect, as did no load participants' initial on-line performance ratings. However, no load participants' later on-line and post-video ratings did not. These findings support the notion that corrections for contextual influence can occur at the level of behavior identification as perceivers encode behavioral cues

The Influence of Chronic Control Concerns on Counterfactual Thought

The present study investigated relationships between counterfactual thinking, control motivation, and depression. Mildly depressed and nondepressed participants described negative life events that might happen again (repeatable event condition) or probably will not happen again (nonrepeatable event condition) and then made upward counterfactuals about these events. Compared to nondepressed participants, depressed participants made more counterfactuals about controllable than uncontrollable aspects of the events they described, and this effect was mediated by general control loss perceptions in the repeatable event condition. Making more counterfactuals about controllable than uncontrollable aspects also enhanced retrospective control perceptions, but only in the repeatable event condition. Functional and dysfunctional implications of making counterfactuals about controllable features of events are discussed

Chronic and temporarily activated causal uncertainty beliefs and stereotype usage

In 3 studies, we examined the hypothesis that the effects of stereotype usage on target judgments are moderated by causal uncertainty beliefs and related accuracy goal structures. In Study 1, we focused on the role of chronically accessible causal uncertainty beliefs as predictors of a target's level of guilt for an alleged academic misconduct offense. In Study 2, we examined the role of chronic causal uncertainty reduction goals and a manipulated accuracy goal; in Study 3, we investigated the role of primed causal uncertainty beliefs on guilt judgments. In all 3 studies, we found that activation of causal uncertainty beliefs and accuracy concerns was related to a reduced usage of stereotypes. Moreover, this reduction was not associated with participants' levels of perceived control, depression, state affect, need for cognition, or personal need for structure. Results are discussed in terms of their implications for the model of causal uncertainty and, more generally, in terms of the motivational processes underlying stereotype usage

The role of contextual constraints and chronic expectancies on behavior categorizations and dispositional inferences

The authors examined the roles of chronic expectancies and other contextual information in the dispositional inference process within the domain of ability judgments. Prior to viewing a videotaped performance under either cognitive load or no load, participants in Studies 1 and 2 were given additional information designed to constrain their categorizations of the performance. In Study 2, chronic future-event expectancies also were assessed. Analyses revealed that when under cognitive load, participants' ability inferences were assimilated to the constraint information (Studies 1 and 2) and to chronic expectancies (Study 2). Furthermore, Study 2 analyses revealed that these effects were mediated by participants' behavior categorizations. Evidence suggestive of a proceduralized form of correction for task difficulty (Studies 1 and 2) and an effortful, awareness-based correction for the constraint information and for chronic expectancies also was found. Results are examined in light of recent models of the dispositional inference process

Roles of the availability of explanations, feelings of ease, and dysphoria in judgments about the future

This study investigated the process by which individuals with and without dysphoria judge the likelihood that specific negative events will happen to them. More specifically, it examined whether the positive relationship usually found between dysphoria and pessimism is mediated by how easy it feels to imagine reasons why such events would happen to the self. We manipulated the number of reasons that participants imagined (two vs. five) as an additional predictor of ease. Regression analysis indicated that both the number of reasons imagined and dysphoria predicted feelings of ease. Moreover, dysphoria and feelings of ease predicted likelihood judgments. Finally, feelings of ease partially mediated the relationship between dysphoria and likelihood judgments. We discuss the results in terms of the availability heuristic, the simulation heuristic, and ease of recall (e.g., Schwarz et al., 1991), as well as possible moderators of depressed individuals\u27 judgments of future events

Causal uncertainty and correction of judgments

We examined whether raising uncertainty about the causes of one\u27s judgments motivates correction. Specifically, we examined whether activating chronically accessible causal uncertainty (CU) beliefs with a conditional warning about possible bias enhances correction of weather judgments for tropical weather primes and of word frequency judgments for the availability bias. In two studies we showed that activating chronic beliefs led to careful correction of target judgments. Moreover, Study 2 revealed that chronically high-CU individuals who received a conditional warning felt more uncertain than did other participants, but that this uncertainty was suppressed somewhat by adjusting for the bias. Results are discussed in light of recent models of judgment correction (e.g., Wegener & Petty, 1997), and the causal uncertainty model (Weary & Edwards, 1996). © 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved

Integrations of clinical and social psychology

xi, 318 p.; 21 cm