A new 1.6-micron map of Titan’s surface

We present a new map of Titan's surface obtained in the spectral 'window' at ∼1.6 μm between strong methane absorption. This pre-Cassini view of Titan's surface was created from images obtained using adaptive optics on the W.M. Keck II telescope and is the highest resolution map yet made of Titan's surface. Numerous surface features down to the limits of the spatial resolution (∼200–300 km) are apparent. No features are easily identifiable in terms of their geologic origin, although several are likely craters

Titan imagery with Keck adaptive optics during and after probe entry

We present adaptive optics data from the Keck telescope, taken while the Huygens probe descended through Titan's atmosphere and on the days following touchdown. No probe entry signal was detected. Our observations span a solar phase angle range from 0.05° up to 0.8°, with the Sun in the west. Contrary to expectations, the east side of Titan's stratosphere was usually brightest. Compiling images obtained with Keck and Gemini over the past few years reveals that the east-west asymmetry can be explained by a combination of the solar phase angle effect and an enhancement in the haze density on Titan's morning hemisphere. While stratospheric haze was prominent over the northern hemisphere, tropospheric haze dominated the south, from the south pole up to latitudes of ∼45°S. At 2.1 μm this haze forms a polar cap, while at 1.22 μm it appears in the form of a collar at 60°S. A few small clouds were usually present near the south pole, at altitudes of 30–40 km. Our narrowband J,H,K images of Titan's surface compare extremely well with that obtained by Cassini ISS, down to the small-scale features. The surface contrast between dark and bright areas may be larger at 2 μm than at 1.6 and 1.3 μm, which would imply that the dark areas may be covered by a coarser-grained frost than the bright regions and/or that there is additional 2 μm absorption there

Complexity of Manipulative Actions When Voting with Ties

Most of the computational study of election problems has assumed that each voter's preferences are, or should be extended to, a total order. However in practice voters may have preferences with ties. We study the complexity of manipulative actions on elections where voters can have ties, extending the definitions of the election systems (when necessary) to handle voters with ties. We show that for natural election systems allowing ties can both increase and decrease the complexity of manipulation and bribery, and we state a general result on the effect of voters with ties on the complexity of control.Comment: A version of this paper will appear in ADT-201

The open future, bivalence and assertion

It is highly intuitive that the future is open and the past is closed—whereas it is unsettled whether there will be a fourth world war, it is settled that there was a first. Recently, it has become increasingly popular to claim that the intuitive openness of the future implies that contingent statements about the future, such as ‘there will be a sea battle tomorrow,’ are non-bivalent (neither true nor false). In this paper, we argue that the non-bivalence of future contingents is at odds with our pre-theoretic intuitions about the openness of the future. These are revealed by our pragmatic judgments concerning the correctness and incorrectness of assertions of future contingents. We argue that the pragmatic data together with a plausible account of assertion shows that in many cases we take future contingents to be true (or to be false), though we take the future to be open in relevant respects. It follows that appeals to intuition to support the non-bivalence of future contingents is untenable. Intuition favours bivalence

Normative Alethic Pluralism

Some philosophers have argued that truth is a norm of judgement and have provided a variety of formulations of this general thesis. In this paper, I shall side with these philosophers and assume that truth is a norm of judgement. What I am primarily interested in here are two core questions concerning the judgement-truth norm: (i) what are the normative relationships between truth and judgement? And (ii) do these relationships vary or are they constant? I argue for a pluralist picture—what I call Normative Alethic Pluralism (NAP)—according to which (i) there is more than one correct judgement-truth norm and (ii) the normative relationships between truth and judgement vary in relation to the subject matter of the judgement. By means of a comparative analysis of disagreement in three areas of the evaluative domain—refined aesthetics, basic taste and morality—I show that there is an important variability in the normative significance of disagreement—I call this the variability conjecture. By presenting a variation of Lynch’s scope problem for alethic monism, I argue that a monistic approach to the normative function of truth is unable to vindicate the conjecture. I then argue that normative alethic pluralism provides us with a promising model to account for it

A practical solution: the Anthropocene is a geological event, not a formal epoch

The Anthropocene has yet to be defined in a way that is functional both to the international geological community and to the broader fields of environmental and social sciences. Formally defining the Anthropocene as a chronostratigraphical series and geochronological epoch with a precise global start date would drastically reduce the Anthropocene’s utility across disciplines. Instead, we propose the Anthropocene be defined as a geological event, thereby facilitating a robust geological definition linked with a scholarly framework more useful to and congruent with the many disciplines engaging with human-environment interactions. Unlike formal epochal definitions, geological events can recognize the spatial and temporal heterogeneity and diverse social and environmental processes that interact to produce anthropogenic global environmental changes. Consequently, an Anthropocene Event would incorporate a far broader range of transformative human cultural practices and would be more readily applicable across academic fields than an Anthropocene Epoch, while still enabling a robust stratigraphic characterization

Against strong pluralism

Strong pluralists hold that not even permanent material coincidence is enough for identity. Strong pluralism entails the possibility of purely material objects -- even if not coincident -- alike in all general respects, categorial and dispositional, relational and non-relational, past, present and future, at the microphysical level, but differing in some general modal, counterfactual or dispositional repscts at the macrophysical level. It is objectionable because it thus deprives us of the explanatory resources to explain why evident absurdities are absurd. A second objection is to the suggestion that cases involving artefacts can illustrate strong pluralism. This offends against the principle that gien a complex intrinsic microphysical property instantiated in some regiion, the number of material things possessing it in that region cannot depend on the existence and nature of intentional activity taking place outside it

Cognitive behaviour therapy versus counselling intervention for anxiety in young people with high-functioning autism spectrum disorders: a pilot randomised controlled trial

The use of cognitive-behavioural therapy (CBT) as a treatment for children and adolescents with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) has been explored in a number of trials. Whilst CBT appears superior to no treatment or treatment as usual, few studies have assessed CBT against a control group receiving an alternative therapy. Our randomised controlled trial compared use of CBT against person-centred counselling for anxiety in 36 young people with ASD, ages 12–18. Outcome measures included parent- teacher- and self-reports of anxiety and social disability. Whilst each therapy produced improvements inparticipants, neither therapy was superior to the other to a significant degree on any measure. This is consistent with findings for adults