Digital world, lifeworld, and the phenomenology of corporeality

The contemporary world is characterised by the pervasive presence of digital technologies that play a part in almost every aspect of our life. An urgent and much-debated issue consists in evaluating the repercussions of these technologies on our human condition. In this paper, I tackle this issue from the standpoint of Husserlian phenomenology. I argue that phenomenology offers a contribution to our understanding of the implications of digital technologies, in the light of its analysis of the essential structures of human experience, and especially of its corporeal grounding. In the light of this analysis, it is possible to investigate the ways in which these essential structures are affected by digital technologies. In particular, it is possible to highlight the ways in which some digital technologies involve a process of disembodiment or simply a superficial embodiment of experience

Color Relationism and Enactive Ontology

In this paper, I present the enactive theory of color that implies a form of color relationism. I argue that this view constitutes a better alternative to color subjectivism and color objectivism. I liken the enactive view to Husserl’s phenomenology of perception, arguing that both deconstruct the clear duality of subject and object, which is at the basis of the other theories of color, in order to claim the co-constitution of subject and object in the process of experience. I also extend the enactive and phenomenological account of color to the more general topic of the epistemological and ontological status of sensory qualities (qualia), outlining the fields of enactive phenomenology and enactive ontology

The Concept of Experience in Husserl's Phenomenology and James' Radical Empiricism

In this paper, I develop a comparison between the philosophies of Husserl and James in relation to their concepts of experience. Whereas various authors have acknowledged the affinity between James’ early psychology and Husserl’s phenomenology, the late development of James’ philosophy is often considered in opposition to Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. This is because James’ radical empiricism achieves a non-dual dimension of experience that precedes the functional division into subject and object, thus contrasting with the phenomenological analysis of the dual structure of intentionality. However, I argue that the later “genetic” development of phenomenology converges with some central aspects of James’ radical empiricism. This is because genetic phenomenology leads us to conceive of the flow of primal impressions as a fundamental dimension of experience that precedes the subject-object duality and is at the base of the process of co-constitution of the subject and the object in reciprocal dependence. At the same time, Husserl conceives of the impressional core of experience as structured by formal conditions that depend on the concrete constitution of an embodied subject. For this reason, I argue that Husserl’s genetic phenomenology can complement James’ radical empiricism, thus leading to the development of the doctrine of pure experience as a form of empirical and not metaphysical realism

Genetic Phenomenology and Empirical Naturalism

Husserl’s phenomenology is developed in explicit contrast to naturalism. At the same time, various scholars have attempted to overcome this opposition by naturalizing consciousness and phenomenology. In this paper, I argue that, in order to confront the issue of the relationship between phenomenology and naturalism, we must distinguish between different forms of naturalism. In fact, Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology is developed in contrast to a metaphysical form of naturalism, which conceives of nature as a mind-independent ontological domain that can be known as it is “in itself”, independently of the cognitive relationship. At the same time, I argue that the genetic development of phenomenology, through the investigation of the temporal structure of experiences, leads to an empirical form of naturalism, which conceives of nature as the objective pole in a process of co-constitution of the subject and the object of experience. Winner of the Philosophy Essay Prize “Vittorio Sainati” XIIth Editio

Phenomenology, Empiricism, and Constructivism in Paolo Parrini's Positive Philosophy

In this work, I discuss the role of Husserl’s phenomenology in Paolo Parrini’s positive philosophy. In the first section, I highlight the presence of both empiricist and constructivist elements in Parrini’s anti-foundationalist and anti-absolutist conception of knowledge. In the second section, I stress Parrini’s acknowledgement of the crucial role of phenomenology in investigating the empirical basis of knowledge, thanks to its analysis of the relationship between form and matter of cognition. In the third section, I point out some lines of development of the phenomenological form of empirical realism as revealed in Parrini’s reflection, through a comparison of Husserl’s genetic phenomenology, Mary Hesse’s network model and the tradition of neutral monism

Epistemology and Ontology of the Quality. An Introduction to the Enactive Approach to Qualitative Ontology

The concept of quality points at a significant philosophical problem. The issue of the ontological status of the qualities of experience and reality leads us to discuss the issues of naturalism and reductionism in philosophy of mind. I argue that a transcendental version of the enactive approach is able to address these issues, thanks to its conception of the relation between subject and object as dependent co-origination. In this way, the enactive approach constitutes an alternative to both the internalism and the externalism about qualities, constituting a process-oriented and relationist framework that can be fruitfully applied to the analysis of different ontological domains. In the conclusive section, I distinguish between an ontological and a metaphysical interpretation of this view, stressing the advantages of the former

Conception and Realization of a Mobile Crowdsensing Application for Support and Empowerment of Diabetes Patients

Diabetes is an increasingly common chronic disease. Not only in the Western World but across the globe. Statistics show, that 10.3% of men and 9.6% of women in the European Union aged 25 or older are forced to live with this disease, and the numbers are rising [1]. It is a chronic disorder of the metabolism, and a number of dangerous complications can arise if the medical treatment is not supervised carefully. These complications can be lethal, and severely reduce the quality of life of every individual patient. Thoroughly following the medical advices requires considerable discipline of the patient. This project aims to help the patients suffering diabetes, by providing a healthcare application to support them in their daily self-care. The application is called Track your Diabetes, and is designed to be a daily companion for the patient. Moreover, it is a mobile crowdsensing application and the collected data can empower researchers to improve the knowledge about the disease. Patient education, empowerment, and practical self-management to help deal with symptoms, is achieved by tracking diabetes related data such as the blood glucose level and weight. Depending on the data, the users can receive automated feedbacks, in order to improve their self-management. The application is questionnaire-based. This means, that the application only tracks data based on the questionnaires published. Patients can then share their data with their medical attendant who, in turn, can use it to improve their treatment methods. Designing this application, and providing prove for its feasibility by implementing it, is the central topic of this thesis. One major requirement was for the application to use the interface of a given RESTful API backend. This backend is planned to be a central database for the relevant data of all users. This work shows, how the application was designed and implemented for the operating system Android

Fenomenologia, empirismo e costruttivismo nella filosofia positiva di Paolo Parrini

In this work, I discuss the role of Husserl’s phenomenology in Paolo Parrini’s philosophical view. In the first section, I highlight the presence of both empiricist and constructivist elements in Parrini’s anti-foundationalist and anti-absolutist conception of knowledge. In the second section, I stress Parrini’s acknowledgement of the crucial role of phenomenology in investigating the empirical basis of knowledge, thanks to its analysis of the relationship between form and matter of cognition. In the third section, I point at some lines of development of phenomenology that are revealed by Parrini’s reflection, through the comparison between Husserl’s genetic phenomenology, Mary Hesse’s network model, and the tradition of neutral monism

Corpo funzionale e corpo senziente. La tesi forte del carattere incarnato della mente in fenomenologia

Riassunto: In questo lavoro distinguo tra due versioni della tesi del carattere incarnato della mente: “debole” e “forte”. Secondo la versione debole, il possesso di stati mentali presuppone l’esistenza di un corpo che si muove ed agisce nell’ambiente, ossia un corpo funzionale. Secondo la versione forte, invece, il possesso di stati mentali presuppone l’esistenza di un corpo non solo funzionale ma anche senziente, ossia: il corpo come sede della sensibilità o coscienza fenomenica. Sostengo che alcuni approcci all’interno della “scienza cognitiva incarnata” implicano la forma debole di embodiment: la robotica di Brooks, l’enattivismo sensomotorio di Noë e O’Regan e l’enattivismo radicale di Hutto e Myin. In contrapposizione a queste prospettive, e basandomi sull’analisi fenomenologica della corporeità vivente e vissuta, difendo la forma forte di embodiment, secondo cui la mente si fonda essenzialmente sul corpo funzionale e senziente.Parole chiave: Fenomenologia; Embodiment; Coscienza fenomenica; Enattivismo; Qualità sensibili Functional body and sentient body. The strong view on the embodied mind in phenomenologyAbstract: In this paper, I draw a distinction between weak and strong versions of the “embodiment thesis”. The weak version claims that mental states are grounded in a body that moves and acts in the environment, i.e., a functional body. The strong version claims that mental states are grounded in a body that is not only functional but also sentient, i.e., a body that is the locus of sensibility or phenomenal consciousness. I argue that some approaches within the “new embodied cognitive science” – Brooks’ robotics, Noë’s and O’Regan’s sensorimotor enactivism, Hutto’s and Myin’s radical enactivism – imply a weak version of the embodiment thesis. In contrast, by drawing on a phenomenological analysis of living and lived corporeality, I argue for the strong version, which claims that the mind is essentially grounded in the functional and sentient body.Keywords: Phenomenology; Embodiment; Phenomenal Consciousness; Enactivism; Sensible Qualitie

School Bonding and Alcohol Use in Italian Early Adolescents: What Comes First?

Previous research has identified school bonding as protective against substance use during adolescence. However, there is still a question as to whether school involvement predicts changes in substance use or if substance use actually predicts changes in level of school bonding. This study investigated the relationship between school bonding and alcohol use, which is commonly recognized as gateway drug, during early adolescence. A three-wave longitudinal analysis was conducted on a sample composed of 161 Italian adolescents (51% boys, 49% girls, mean age = 11.14 years, standard deviation =.40). Associations were analyzed by using crossed-lagged autoregressive models in MPlus. Findings revealed that greater school involvement decreased alcohol consumption from Grade 6 to Grade 7. However, greater alcohol use decreased school involvement from Grade 7 to Grade 8. Findings of this study underlined the importance of choosing the right time for prevention