70 research outputs found
Economic Consequences of Unfunded Vested Pension Benefits
This paper examines the relationship between unfunded vested pension liabilities and the market value of a firm's shares. This relationship has important implications for the mechanism by which private pensions influence aggregate savings. Attention is paid to modeling the institutional determinants of this relation implied by ERISA legislation. These considerations require a nonlinear regression model with very special properties which are developed and discussed. Estimation results suggest that ERISA has had an important effect on the relation between unfunded benefits and firm value that previous investigations have neglected.
A Theory of Expropriation and Deviations From Perfect Capital Mobility
This paper develops a theory of capital movements in the presence of potential expropriation. The threat of expropriation is derived from utility maximizing behavior by host countries. Potential investors, anticipating this behavior, modify their investment plans to avoid expropriation. When- ever the host country faces competitive foreign investors expropriation represents part of a time-consistent but suboptimal plan of the type discussed by Kydland and Prescott (1977). The consequent equilibrium may be characterized by a number of distortions. In the simplest model we analyze, a host country faces a large number of potential, competitive foreign investors. We explore the implications of the threat of expropriation for shadow pricing in the host country and for the optimal technology choice by potential investors. We consider variants of the model in which the potential investor is in a monopoly position vis-a-vis the host country, in which the foreign investment project is subject to risk which is unresolved at the time of the expropriation decision, and in which factors affecting the optimality of expropriation by the host country are unresolved at the time of the investment decision. The larger the penalty incumbent on the host country in the event of expropriation, the greater its welfare in the simple, competitive model. When the foreign investor is a monopolist, however, this result is reversed.
Cyclical and Equilibrium Relations among Variables in Dynamic Models: The Phillips Curve and the Real Wage
The economic control of infectious diseases
Despite interesting work on infectious diseases by such economists as Peter Francis, Michael Kremer, and Tomas Philipson, the literature does not set out the general structure of externalities involved in the prevention, and care of such diseases. The authors identify two kinds of externality. First, infectious people can infect other people, who in turn can infect others, and so on, in what the authors call the pure infection externality. In controlling their own infection, people do not take into account the social consequence of their infection. Second, in the pure prevention externality, one individual's preventive actions (such as killing mosquitoes) may directly affect the probability of others becoming infected, whether or not the preventive action succeeds for the individual undertaking it. The authors provide a general framework for discussing these externalities, and the role of government interventions to offset them. They move the discussion away from its focus on HIV (a fatal infection for which there are few interventions), and on vaccinations (which involve plausibly discrete decisions), to more general ideas of prevention, and cure applicable to many diseases for which interventions exhibit a continuum of intensities, subject to diminishing marginal returns. Infections, and actions to prevent, or cure them entail costs. Individuals balance those parts of different costs that they can actually control. In balancing costs to society, government policy should take individual behavior into account. Doing so requires a strategy combining preventive, and curative interventions, to offset both the pure infection externality, and the pure prevention externality. The relative importance of the strategy's components depends on: 1) The biology of the disease - including whether an infection is transmitted from person to person, or by vectors. 2) The possible outcomes of infection: death, recovery with susceptibility, or recovery with immunity. 3) The relative costs of the interventions. 4) Whether interventions are targeted at the population as a whole, the uninfected, the infected, or contacts between the uninfected, and the infected. 5) The behavior of individuals that leads to the two types of externalities.Disease Control&Prevention,Economic Theory&Research,Environmental Economics&Policies,Decentralization,Poverty Impact Evaluation,Economic Theory&Research,Environmental Economics&Policies,Poverty Impact Evaluation,Health Monitoring&Evaluation,Agricultural Knowledge&Information Systems
The Pure Theory of Country Risk
This paper attempts to survey, and to put into perspective, recent lterature that has analyzed the nature of credit relations between developed and developing countries.This analysis has made use of recent advances in the economics of information and strategic interaction. Traditional concepts of solvency and liquidity are of little help in understanding problems of soverign debt. Creditors do not have the means to seize the assets of a borrower in default. Hence the borrower who is expected eventually to repay his debts should be able to borrow to meet any current debt-service obligations. A problem that is essential to a theory of international lending is that of enforcement. The difficulty is one of ensuring that the two sides of a loan contract adhere to it, in particular that the borrower repays the lender and the lenders can commit themselves to penalize the borrower if he does not.
International Volatility and Economic Growth: The First Ten Years of The International Seminar on Macroeconomics
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