Development of an Early Identification and Response Model of Malpractice Prevention

The dramatic rise in the incidence of malpractice claims over the past thirty years has revealed several problems with the U.S. system of medical dispute resolution. First, the sudden and unexpected increase in claims has created an insurance crisis wherein various medical specialists have had difficulty obtaining affordable insurance coverage. One such crisis occurred in Florida in the mid-1980\u27s, when an inability of many physicians to procure medical malpractice coverage caused some to limit or curtail their practice. This resulted in access problems for the public. This phenomenon has disproportionately befallen physicians practicing obstetric medicine. Second, besides contributing to periodic crises of access, the current medical dispute resolution system is often responsible for long delays in resolving claims and in compensating victims. Third, compensation is sometimes inequitable, encouraging frivolous suits and making the system expensive to operate. Finally, while there is no evidence that the system reduces bad care, it clearly contributes to increased cost by encouraging unjustified defensive medicine

Rethinking Peer Review: Detecting and Addressing Medical Malpractice Claims Risk

A medical center department chair has just been notified that a physician in his department, Dr. G, is being sued for the fifth time in seven years. The CEO of co-defendant hospital wants the chair to solve Dr. G\u27s claims problems. At the chair\u27s request, the hospital peer review committee evaluates Dr. G\u27s malpractice cases. While committee members note some minor concerns in the cases, they conclude that in each circumstance he has met the standard of care. They cannot identify any specific technical or educational need, nor can they supply justification for a disciplinary action. The chair is in a vexing situation. Is Dr. G. the victim of bad luck, or is something more systematic at work? Is there some failure or deficiency other than technical incompetence which is making this physician vulnerable to malpractice suits? If so, is it remediable? In this Article, we analyze the ability of peer review to recognize and reduce physicians\u27 risk of medical malpractice claims. Critics argue that peer review neither consistently identifies substandard physicians, nor ensures their removal, while it unfairly targets colleagues for reasons such as economic competition. They suggest that the solution may be to modify statutes governing privilege and immunity, or to increase penalties for healthcare institutions that violate reporting statutes. Critics\u27 concerns may be misplaced. We will argue that peer review is not deficient in its basic conception, but rather aspects of its design and implementation which often do not directly link it to an institution\u27s risk management activities. We assert that peer review can effectively identify a physician\u27s risk of generating a disproportionate share of medical malpractice claims ex ante, and present a sample methodology which allows peer review to more effectively help physicians address that risk. Part I of this Article discusses the background and authority for peer review. Part II outlines common criticisms of peer review and discusses shortcomings in these analyses. Part III describes background medical malpractice research and introduces the Patient Advocacy Reporting System ( PARSSM ) program for peer review. In Part IV we conclude with a discussion of programmatic elements which, if incorporated into the legal framework for peer review, may allow peer review committees to systematically evaluate, monitor, and, potentially reduce physicians\u27 medical malpractice claims risk