The new Lisbon Strategy: An estiamtion of the impact of reaching 5 Lisbon targets

The Lisbon strategy could reinvigorate Europe’s economy and boost employment. In 2000 the European leaders agreed to stimulate economic growth and employment and make Europe’s economy the most competitive in the world. If Europe would really reach the goals they set, Europe’s Gross Domestic Product could increase by 12 to 23% and employment by about 11%. This paper draws this conclusion after having analysed five of the most important Lisbon goals: the internal market for services, the reduction of administrative burdens, goals on improving human capital, the 3% target on research and development expenditures, and the 70% target on the employment rate. Using CPB’s general equilibrium model for the world economy we have simulated the consequences for Europe of reaching the Lisbon targets in these fields.Jobs creation; economic growth; Lisbon agenda: general equilibrium model

Assessing subsidiarity

This paper discusses the assessment of subsidiarity in the European Union from a broad fiscal federalism perspective. It incorporates recent insights from political economy analyses of fiscal federalism to arrive at a list of issues that need to be taken into account when considering whether concrete policies should be centralised in the European Union or not. �

Europe's financial perspectives in perspective

The budget of the European Union raises much commotion. Many member states anxiously guard their net payment positions: don't they pay too much for the EU compared to what they receive from the EU? Read also the accompanying press release .Yet, from an economic perspective the subsidiarity principle is much more important: Should the funds be allocated by the Union or by the individual member states? From that angle, a number of fundamental reforms of European agricultural policy and structural actions (support to lagging regions) suggest themselves. These reform options may roughly halve the EU budget. In addition they happen to bring the net payment positions of member states closer together.

Governance of stakeholder relationships: The German and Dutch experience

Countries' governance institutions to a varying degree support stakeholders to invest in relationship-specific assets. The function of governance institutions is to strengthen the commitment of parties to keep to an initial agreement. Thus, international differences in governance institutions affect relationship-specific investments. Two stylized models of stakeholder relationships can be distinguished, the Anglo-American model and the German model. Market orientation and competition characterize the Anglo-American model. Long-term relationships and cooperation are distinctive features of the German model. Strong elements of the Anglo-American model are fast reallocation of financial, physical and human capital through the market. Short-run flexibility facilitates a shift of resources towards innovative emerging technologies, in particular towards start-up firms. The German model is strong with respect to the development of long-term commitment, investments in relationship-specific physical and human capital, and cooperation between companies. This model promotes technological progress and re-allocation of resources within established enterprises. The position of Dutch corporate governance institutions, which govern the relationships between management and financiers, does not stand out as favourable compared to both the German and the Anglo-American models of corporate governance. In the Netherlands, share ownership is dispersed, so that monitoring by block shareholders is largely absent. In this respect the situation in the Netherlands is comparable to that in the United States and the United Kingdom. However, in contrast to the Anglo-American model the market for corporate control is virtually absent in the Netherlands. Cooption of members of the supervisory board and extensive use of juridical anti-takeover defence mechanisms substantially restrict the influence of shareholders on management. Therefore, Dutch corporate governance institutions neither strongly encourage investments in relationship-specific assets, nor strongly enhance flexible reallocation of capital or risk-sharing finance. Recent policy changes will probably lead to a moderate shift to the German model. Dutch work governance institutions, which concern the governance of relationships between management and employees, more closely resemble those in Germany. This implies that worker influence enhances the performance within large established firms, but that external allocation through the labour market is less efficient compared to the functioning of markets in the Anglo-American model. Future policy changes that strengthen Dutch worker influence will be beneficial for performance in established firms, and are in accordance with the gradual shift towards German governance structures.

The new Lisbon Strategy: An estiamtion of the impact of reaching 5 Lisbon targets

The Lisbon strategy could reinvigorate Europe’s economy and boost employment. In 2000 the European leaders agreed to stimulate economic growth and employment and make Europe’s economy the most competitive in the world. If Europe would really reach the goals they set, Europe’s Gross Domestic Product could increase by 12 to 23% and employment by about 11%. This paper draws this conclusion after having analysed five of the most important Lisbon goals: the internal market for services, the reduction of administrative burdens, goals on improving human capital, the 3% target on research and development expenditures, and the 70% target on the employment rate. Using CPB’s general equilibrium model for the world economy we have simulated the consequences for Europe of reaching the Lisbon targets in these fields

The new Lisbon Strategy: An estiamtion of the impact of reaching 5 Lisbon targets

The Lisbon strategy could reinvigorate Europe’s economy and boost employment. In 2000 the European leaders agreed to stimulate economic growth and employment and make Europe’s economy the most competitive in the world. If Europe would really reach the goals they set, Europe’s Gross Domestic Product could increase by 12 to 23% and employment by about 11%. This paper draws this conclusion after having analysed five of the most important Lisbon goals: the internal market for services, the reduction of administrative burdens, goals on improving human capital, the 3% target on research and development expenditures, and the 70% target on the employment rate. Using CPB’s general equilibrium model for the world economy we have simulated the consequences for Europe of reaching the Lisbon targets in these fields

Europe's Financial Perspectives in Perspective. ENEPRI Working Paper, No. 46, 24 April 2006

The budget of the European Union nearly always raises much commotion. Many member states anxiously guard their net payment positions: don’t they pay too much for the EU compared to what they receive from the EU? Yet, from an economic perspective the subsidiarity principle is much more important: Should the funds be allocated by the Union or by the individual member states? From that angle, a number of fundamental reforms of European agricultural policy and structural actions (support to lagging regions) suggest themselves. These reform options may more than halve the EU budget. In addition they happen to bring the net payment positions of member states closer together