Simultaneous Ad Auctions

We consider a model with two simultaneous VCG ad auctions A and B where each advertiser chooses to participate in a single ad auction. We prove the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric equilibrium in that model. Moreover, when the click rates in A are pointwise higher than those in B, we prove that the expected revenue in A is greater than the expected revenue in B in this equilibrium. In contrast, we show that this revenue ranking does not hold when advertisers can participate in both auctions

Oxy-fuel combustion of coal and biomass blends

The ignition temperature, burnout and NO emissions of blends of a semi-anthracite and a high-volatile bituminous coal with 10 and 20 wt.% of olive waste were studied under oxy-fuel combustion conditions in an entrained flow reactor (EFR). The results obtained under several oxy-fuel atmospheres (21%O2–79%CO2, 30%O2–70%CO2 and 35%O2–65%CO2) were compared with those attained in air. The results indicated that replacing N2 by CO2 in the combustion atmosphere with 21% of O2 caused an increase in the temperature of ignition and a decrease in the burnout value. When the O2 concentration was increased to 30 and 35%, the temperature of ignition was lower and the burnout value was higher than in air conditions. A significant reduction in ignition temperature and a slight increase in the burnout value was observed after the addition of biomass, this trend becoming more noticeable as the biomass concentration was increased. The emissions of NO during oxy-fuel combustion were lower than under air-firing. However, they remained similar under all the oxy-fuel atmospheres with increasing O2 concentrations. Emissions of NO were significantly reduced by the addition of biomass to the bituminous coal, although this effect was less noticeable in the case of the semi-anthracite.This work was carried out with financial support from the Spanish MICINN (Project PS-120000-2005-2) co-financed by the European Regional Development Fund. M.V.G. and L.A. acknowledge funding from the CSIC JAE-Doc and CSIC JAE-Pre programs, respectively, co-financed by the European Social Fund. J.R. acknowledges funding from the Government of the Principado de Asturias (Severo Ochoa program).Peer reviewe

Keywords Private-value auctions · Risk aversion · Perturbation analysis

Abstract We study independent private-value all-pay auctions with risk-averse players. We show that: (1) Players with low values bid lower and players with high values bid higher than they would bid in the risk neutral case. (2) Players with low values bid lower and players with high values bid higher than they would bid in a first-price auction. (3) Players ’ expected utilities in an all-pay auction are lower than in a first-price auction. We also use perturbation analysis to calculate explicit approximations of the equilibrium strategies of risk-averse players and the seller’s expected revenue. In particular, we show that in all-pay auctions the seller’s expected payoff in the risk-averse case may be either higher or lower than in the risk neutral case

Journal of Economic Theory 115 (2004) 309–321 Revenue equivalence in asymmetric auctions

The Revenue Equivalence Theorem is generalized to the case of asymmetric auctions in which each player’s valuation is drawn independently from a common support according to his/her distribution function

(www.interscience.wiley.com) DOI: 10.1002/mde.1333 Optimal Price Promotion in the Presence of Asymmetric Reference-price Effects

In this study we demonstrate how a reference price may affect the degree of price rigidity/ flexibility. For this, we construct a model of reference-price formation, which we use to analyze the effect of asymmetric reference price (cut ‘effects’) on the profitability of price promotions. We derive explicit expressions for the additional profits earned during a promotional period due to consumer perception of a ‘gain’, and for the post-promotion loss of potential profits due to consumer perception of a ‘loss’. We show that when effects of losses on demand are greater than effects of gains (‘loss aversion’), price promotions always lead to a decline in profits. When, however, effects of gains are larger than those of losses, price promotions, as well as reverse price promotions (i.e. price increase) can be profitable. In the latter case we calculate the optimal depth and duration of a price promotion. We also show that reference price can affect price rigidity and flexibility. Copyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd