Bonding, Structure and the Stability of Political Parties: Party Government in the House

The public policy benefits that parties-deliver are allocated by democratic procedures that devolve ultimately to majority rule. Majority-rule decision making, however, does not lead to consistent policy choices; it is unstable. In this paper, we argue that institutions - and thereby policy coalitions -- can be stabilized by extra-legislative organization. The rules of the Democratic Caucus in the U.S. House of Representatives dictate that a requirement for continued membership is support on the floor of Caucus decisions for a variety of key structural matters. Because membership in the majority party’s caucus is valuable, it constitutes a bond, the posting of which stabilizes the structure of the House, and hence the policy decisions made in the House. We examine the rules of the House Democratic Caucus and find that they do in fact contain the essential elements of an effective, extralegislative bonding mechanism

Why Did The Incumbency Advantage In U.S. House Elections Grow?

In the last twenty years, scholars have scrutinized the electoral advantages conferred by incumbency-both at the federal and at the state level-more than perhaps any other factor affecting U .S. legislative elections.1 Much of the literature focuses on explaining why the incumbency advantage in U .S. House elections grew so substantially, starting in the mid-1960s. The dominant contenders in the literature are two, one emphasizing resources of various kinds (Mayhew 1974) and opportunities to perform constituency services (Fiorina 1977; 1989), one emphasizing partisan dealignment (Erikson 1972; Burnham 1974; Ferejohn 1977). While not incompatible, these explanations do point to significantly different factors as key, and neither has emerged as a clear winner. In this paper, we suggest a new approach to measuring the incumbency advantage, one that disaggregates the total value of incumbency into three components. By examining the trends over time in these three components we find evidence suggesting that much of the growth in the incumbency advantage at the federal level cannot be accounted for by resource growth; rather, some version of the dealignment story will have to be employed

Agenda Control in the Bundestag, 1980-2002

We find strong evidence of monopoly legislative agenda control by government parties in the Bundestag. First, the government parties have near-zero roll rates, while the opposition parties are often rolled over half the time. Second, only opposition parties’ (and not government parties’) roll rates increase with the distances of each party from the floor median. Third, almost all policy moves are towards the government coalition (the only exceptions occur during periods of divided government). Fourth, roll rates for government parties sky- rocket when they fall into the opposition and roll rates for opposition parties plummet when they enter government, while policy movements go from being nearly 100 per cent rightward when there is a rightist government to 100 per cent leftward under a leftist government

A Ham Sandwich Theorem for General Measures

The "ham sandwich" theorem has been proven only for measures that are absolutely continuous with respect to Lesbeque measure. We prove a generalized version of the ham sandwich theorem which is applicable to arbitrary finite measures, and we give some sufficient conditions for uniqueness of the hyperplane identified by the theorem

The development of party-voting in England: 1832-1918

Gegenstand des Beitrags ist die historische Entwicklung des Systems der repräsentativen Demokratie in Großbritannien. Im Mittelpunkt steht dabei die Rolle von Wahlen in diesem System und die Frage, wie sich diese Rolle im Laufe der Zeit von 1832 bis 1918 gewandelt hat. Auf die Frage, seit wann die Wähler eher der Partei und nicht mehr dem Kandidaten die Stimme geben, finden sich in der Literatur verschiedene Antworten. (1) Die erste Position datiert die Entwicklung des parteiorientierten Wahlverhaltens in die Zeit nach 1885. (2) Nach Ansicht der zweiten Position wird dieses Wahlverhalten nach 1867 signifikant. (3) In der dritten Position wird die explosive Zunahme der Zeitungen nach 1856 als Ursache für eine massive Entwicklung der Parteiloyalität angesehen. Ein zweiter Schwerpunkt ist es, auf eine systematische und quantitative Weise den Einfluß der Wähler auf ihre Parlamentsmitglieder zu erforschen. In dem Beitrag wird gezeigt, daß ein substantieller Wandel im Wählerverhalten in England stattgefunden hat, bei dem die Wähler ihre Entscheidung zunehmend an der Partei orientiert haben. (KW

Seniority-Based Nominations and Political Careers

This paper investigates party use of seniority systems to allocate nominations for elected and appointed offices. Such systems, which can regulate party members’ access to offices at multiple levels of their careers, are defined by two main rules or norms: an incumbent re-nomination norm and a seniority progression norm. Using comprehensive electoral and candidate data from Norwegian local and national elections from 1945 to 2019, we find systematic patterns consistent with these two norms. Our work illuminates an institutional aspect of candidate selection that the current literature has ignored while noting some of the important consequences of seniority-based nominations for party cohesion and stability.acceptedVersio

La organización de las legislaturas democráticas

Artículo origina

Measuring the Competitiveness of Elections

The concept of electoral competition plays a central role in many subfields of political science, but no consensus exists on how to measure it. One key challenge is how to conceptualize and measure electoral competitiveness at the district level across alternative electoral systems. Recent efforts to meet this challenge have introduced general measures of competitiveness which rest on explicit calculations about how votes translate into seats, but also implicit assumptions about how effort maps into votes (and how costly effort is). We investigate how assumptions about the effort-to-votes mapping affect the units in which competitiveness is best measured, arguing in favor of vote-share-denominated measures and against vote-share-per-seat measures. Whether elections under multimember proportional representation systems are judged more or less competitive than single-member plurality or runoff elections depends directly on the units in which competitiveness is assessed (and hence on assumptions about how effort maps into votes).acceptedVersio

Ethnicity, voter alignment and political party affiliation - an African case: Zambia

Conventional wisdom holds that ethnicity provides the social cleavage for voting behav-iour and party affiliation in Africa. Because this is usually inferred from aggregate data of national election results, it might prove to be an ecological fallacy. The evidence based on individual data from an opinion survey in Zambia suggests that ethnicity matters for voter alignment and even more so for party affiliation, but it is certainly not the only factor. The analysis also points to a number of qualifications which are partly methodology-related. One is that the degree of ethnic voting can differ from one ethno-political group to the other depending on various degrees of ethnic mobilisation. Another is that if smaller eth-nic groups or subgroups do not identify with one particular party, it is difficult to find a significant statistical correlation between party affiliation and ethnicity - but that does not prove that they do not affiliate along ethnic lines.Wahlverhalten und Mitgliedschaft in politischen Parteien Afrikas ist nur wenig untersucht worden. Gewöhnlich wird argumentiert, dass Ethnizität als soziale Konfliktlinie das Wahlverhalten und die Parteienmitgliedschaft strukturiert. Da dieses Argument auf hoch aggregierten Wahldaten beruht, kann hier ein ökologischer Fehlschuss vorliegen. Die vorliegende Analyse beruht deshalb auf individuellen Umfragedaten aus Sambia. Das Ergebnis ist, dass Ethnizität tatsächlich eine Rolle für das Wahlverhalten und die Parteienmitgliedschaft spielt, aber keineswegs den einzigen Erklärungsfaktor darstellt. Die Analyse offenbart zudem eine Reihe von Einschränkungen und Qualifizierungen, die teilweise methodischer Natur sind. Eine ist, dass ethnisches Wahlverhalten und Parteienmitgliedschaft von einer ethnischen Gruppe zur anderen unterschiedlich ist, dass, wenn sich kleinere ethnische Gruppen oder Untergruppen mit keiner Partei identifizieren, es schwierig wird, statistisch signifikante Korrelationen zu finden - was indessen noch nicht beweist, dass Ethnizität keine Rolle spielt