Inversión extranjera directa en México: comparación entre la inversión procedente de los Estados Unidos y del resto del mundo

¿Hay diferencias entre la inversión extranjera directa (ied) que México recibe de los Estados Unidos y del resto del mundo? Este trabajo describe la ied que este país recibió entre 1999 y 2013, individualizando las particularidades de ésta, según su origen. Se analizan los flujos de ied hacia México en su conjunto y hacia las entidades estatales. Se identifican diferencias en patrones temporales y espaciales de la ied, así como en sus factores determinantes. Este análisis permite entender mejor la ied que México recibió entonces, identificar vulnerabilidades regionales e informar de la toma de decisiones destinadas a la promoción y retención de inversiones

It’s (Almost) Always the Economy: Economic Performance and Political Realignments In Argentina

This article analyzes the last year of the Mauricio Macri’s administration in Argentina, and the accession of Alberto Fernández to power. We present a survey of the economic situation in 2019, the most important issues in the political agenda, and the political developments around the presidential election. We argue that the inability of the government to deliver on the economic front, and a realignment in the opposition, marked by Cristina Fernandez unexpectedly stepping down as presidential candidate, explain why Mauricio Macri was unable to get reelected

Actitudes ante la inversión extranjera: el caso de México

Este artículo analiza las encuestas de México, las Américas y el Mundo entre los años 2004 y 2012 para describir las opiniones de los mexicanos sobre cuáles son los efectos de la inversión extranjera para México, qué tan importante es la atracción de ella como objetivo de política exterior y en qué sectores de la economía debería permitirse la inversión extranjera. El análisis permite identificar patrones temporales en las opiniones hacia la inversión extranjera, marcadas diferencias regionales e inconsistencias en las opiniones. Sugerimos que la influencia de condiciones objetivas está mediada por factores subjetivos, lo que provoca inconsistencias entre opiniones sobre los beneficios asociados con la inversión extranjera y las preferencias de política relacionadas con ella

More Effective than We Thought: Central Bank Independence and Inflation in Developing Countries

This study examines the effect of legal central bank independence on inflation in developing countries. In spite of the policy consensus suggesting that central bank independence is an effective tool to control inflation, the evidence is still limited, particularly for developing countries. Using a novel dataset, we analyze the effect of central bank independence on inflation for a sample of 118 developing countries between 1980 and 2013. We find that higher central bank independence is associated with lower inflation rates. This effect on inflation is stronger the more democratic a country is, but it is also present in non-democratic countries. Our results are robust to different specifications and methodologies. Furthermore, we find that all dimensions included in the measurement of central bank independence (objectives, personnel, policy, and financial independence) contribute to curb inflation. Our results shed light on which types of reforms may be more effective at fighting inflation in developing countries

Determinants of Central Bank Independence in Developing Countries: A Two-Level Theory

This dissertation answers the following question: What are the determinants of central bank independence (CBI) in developing countries? I argue that in developing countries CBI is the product of vulnerable governments trying to attract foreign investors and creditors. Incumbents' vulnerability increases when they experience need for capital. I define need for capital as the presence of growth problems, coupled with losses of FDI or high levels of foreign debt. Countries needing capital have to either attract investment or borrow funds in the international market. Because developing countries cannot rely on their reputation to attract capital, they need to signal their commitment to stable economic policy. I argue that CBI is one of the principal signals that international investors and lenders ask for. Therefore, I expect that as the need for capital increases, developing countries will accommodate the demands of international actors. This occurs independently of the preferences of domestic actors. However, the capacity of a government to respond to international incentives and pressures through CBI is determined by an institutional context that makes institutional change more or less costly. Focusing on presidential systems, I expect that two factors condition the elasticity of governments' responses to international incentives: the capacity of the actors in the inter-institutional bargaining (president and congress), and the preference distance between the two branches of government.I present evidence suggesting that need for capital has the opposite effect in developed and developing countries' changes in CBI. Developing countries respond to need for capital with CBI increases. Changes in CBI are also affected by the expected credibility of the signal. The findings with regard to the domestic level of the theory are mixed: although presidential powers, congress capabilities and preference distance affect the likelihood of central bank reform, they do not affect it in the direction that was expected by the theory. Finally, the case studies provide a closer look at the process of central bank reform in Argentina and Brazil. An analysis of the reforms affecting CBI, and of instances of lack of reform, provides qualitative evidence of incumbents' motivations for and obstacles against central bank reform

Análisis institucional del Mercosur

Concibiendo a la integración como proceso de “formación y desarrollo de instituciones, a través del cual ciertos valores se distribuyen autoritariamente para un cierto grupo de agentes o unidades políticas”, y en el marco del análisis de la revisión de la estructura del Mercosur, se presenta un análisis institucional de su estructura orgánica, teniendo en cuenta el conjunto de las fuentes jurídicas de esta organización. En este trabajo se destacan algunas contradicciones en el diseño institucional y algunas deficiencias de técnica legislativa que se evidencian en las fuentes, las cuales abren una serie de interrogantes para su interpretación o tienden a dificultar un funcionamiento satisfactorio, conforme al principio de seguridad jurídica. Por otra parte, se tiene especialmente en cuenta el margen que el diseño institucional proporciona para la actuación de entes subnacionales

Independencia de los bancos centrales: La "sabiduría convencional" a la luz de nuevos datos.

Este artículo utiliza la base de datos más exhaustiva sobre independenciade bancos centrales para ilustrar inconsistencias entre la “sabiduría convencional”y la evidencia empírica en relación con estas institucionesmonetarias. Datos descriptivos muestran que la dinámica reformista delos bancos centrales no es un proceso exclusivo de la década de los noventay que, aunque la mayoría de las reformas incrementan la delegaciónde política monetaria a los bancos centrales, ha habido también importantesrevocaciones de la independencia de los bancos centrales.Asimismo, los países en vías de desarrollo en general y los regímenesautoritarios en particular, exhiben interesantes dinámicas en el diseñoinstitucional de sus bancos centrales. Estas dinámicas habían sido ignoradashasta el presente y abren nuevas vías de investigación para el futuro. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.22529/sp.2016-2017.40.0

Regulatory Lags, Liberalization, and Vulnerability to Systemic Banking Crises

What factors make countries vulnerable to banking crises? Particularly, how do reforms in regulation affect the likelihood of banking crises’ onset? Several recent articles describe the “anatomy” of banking crises. However, the economic indicators that precede these crises do not necessarily imply causality. Furthermore, the broader literature on financial crises finds a set of institutional causal factors to be important for financial crises, but these factors likely do not apply to banking crises. In the last 20 years banking crises have affected countries that should be impervious to them, while countries at risk have been surprisingly resilient. I argue that differences in vulnerability to banking crises are a result of the asymmetry between financial market evolution and regulation update. Although regulation tends to follow the developments in the financial market everywhere, lags in regulation have different effects at different levels of financial market liberalization. This paper analyzes the interactions between financial market liberalization and regulation update on a world-wide sample between 1973 and 2006

International Capital and Subnational Politics: Partisanship and Foreign Direct Investment in Mexican States

Do foreign investors have subnational political preferences? The political economy of foreign direct investment (FDI) involves not only choosing among host countries, but also the subnational location of the assets. However, factors affecting investors’ decisions about subnational location likely differ from the ones affecting international investment. This paper studies the effect of state-level partisanship on new FDI inflows to Mexican states. I argue that investors prefer states ruled by left-wing governors because they are more likely to invest in human capital. Statistical analyses using new data on subnational allocation of FDI in Mexican states between 1999 and 2017 support the main hypothesis. Given the persistence of authoritarian enclaves in Mexico, I also disentangle the effects of partisanship from subnational democratization. The partisan effect is independent from party turnover and political competition at the subnational level, and it is robust to different model specifications and estimation strategies. Additional evidence supports the plausibility of the argued mechanism

Central Banks and Civil War Termination

The ability to finance conflict likely affects the odds of sustaining a war and succeeding in it. Recent literature explores rebel group funding, but far less is known about how states finance their own war efforts. This paper posits that the design of central banks should affect civil war termination. In particular, it argues that central bank independence (CBI) affects civil war termination through two channels. First, financial markets consider CBI as a good signal in terms of macroeconomic stability and debt repayment. In this way, independent central banks enhance the ability of the government to access credit to finance and end a civil war. Second, CBI is associated with lower inflation. Inflation control reduces one source of additional grievances that the civil war may impose on citizens. On a sample of civil wars between 1975 and 2009, CBI is associated with a substantial increase in the likelihood of war termination. When the form of termination is disaggregated, (higher) CBI is associated with a higher probability of government victory, relative to continued conflict and to other outcomes. Additional tests provide support for the argued mechanisms: during civil wars, countries with more independent central banks access international credit markets in better conditions – i.e., they pay lower interest rates, and receive longer grace and maturity periods on new debt. Furthermore, in countries experiencing civil wars, central bank independence is associated with lower inflation