Opening remarks : 8th Frankfurt Scientific Symposium: 21st Century Libraries: Changing Forms, Changing Challenges, Changing Objectives ; November 3 - 4, 2008

Opening Remarks at the 8th Frankfurt Scientific Symposium: 21st Century Libraries: Changing Forms, Changing Challenges, Changing Objectives ; November 3-4, 2008: http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/volltexte/2008/6086

Opening and closing remarks : 4th Frankfurt Scientific Symposium, October 4–5, 2004

Opening and Closing Remarks at the Frankfurt Scientific Symposium 2004: "What is literacy? What is information? What is knowledge? Ways of teaching and learning to use information effectively". October 4 & 5 · Universitätsbibliothek Frankfurt am Mai

Generating Jobs through State Employer Tax Credits: Is there a Better Way? (Revised)

Revised April 13, 2010The Governors of Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island and several other states have recently proposed employer tax credits as measures to fight high unemployment in their states. Such policies are also being considered at the federal level. In the Working Paper, Jeff Thompson and Heidi Garrett-Peltier present evidence that such policies, in fact, do little to increase aggregate demand, and instead only modestly reduce the after-tax cost of labor in an economy with high unemployment, falling wages, and weak demand They suggest a more effective approach to creating jobs in the states: increasing spending in labor-intensive sectors and programs that are matched by federal funds, such as Medicaid. These expenditures would be particularly effective if they were financed through temporary high-income tax increases.State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue, state and Local Budget and Expenditures, State and Local Government, Health, Education, and Welfare, Business Taxes and Subsidies,Labor Demand, Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs

Overbooking

We consider optimal pricing policies for airlines when passengers are uncertain at the time of ticketing of their eventual willingness to pay for air travel. Auctions at the time of departure efficiently allocate space and a profit maximizing airline can capitalize on these gains by overbooking ights and repurchasing excess tickets from those passengers whose realized value is low. Nevertheless profit maximization entails distortions away from the efficient allocation. Under regularity conditions, we show that the optimal mechanism can be implemented by a modified double auction. In order to encourage early booking, passengers who purchase late are disadvantaged. In order to capture the information rents of passengers with high expected values, ticket repurchases at the time of departure are at a subsidized price, sometimes leading to unused capacity