On cooperation and trust in strategic games : Behavioral Evidence from the Middle East and Europe

This thesis is about selected issues of cooperation and trust in strategic games. This first chapter paper investigates the impact of game presentation on cooperation dependent on subject-pool affiliation. Two cooperation games representing the same logical and strategical decision problem are introduced. Accomplishing a cross-cultural experimental study involving subjects from Abu-Dis (West Bank), Chengdu (China), Helsinki (Finland), and Jerusalem (Israel) we test for a strategic presentation bias applying these two conditions. Subjects in Abu-Dis and Chengdu show a substantially higher cooperation level in the positive externality treatment. In Helsinki and Jerusalem no presentation effect is observed. The same findings hold for associated first-order beliefs. Critically discussing our results, we argue that comparisons across subject-pools might lead to only partially meaningful and opposed conclusions if only one treatment condition is evaluated. In chapter two three studies predict and find that the individual's conformism values are one determinant of whether behavior is guided by other personal values or by social norms. In study one, pro-gay law reform participants are told they were either in a minority or a majority in terms of their attitude towards the law reform. Only participants who are high in conformism values conform to the group norm on public behavior intentions. In studies two and three, participants play multiple choice prisoner's dilemma games. Only participants who consider conformism values to be relatively unimportant show the expected connections between universalism values and cooperative behavior. Study three also establishes that the moderating effect of conformism values on the relation between universalism values and cooperative behavior is mediated through experienced sense of moral obligation. In chapter three we study the influence of ethnocentrism on both trusting and reciprocity behavior. We find levels of trust, and partly of reciprocity, to differ significantly in the three subject pools with high Palestinian and low Israeli transfer amounts. The most startling result is the fact that players' beliefs match well the actual behavior of their counterparts from their own country but that they are wrong in predicting the behavior of players located in other countries. Moreover, only slight discrimination among involved cultural groups is found. The data presented support the view that a conflict might not only be triggered by discrimination but may also be enforced by the specific social standards within different societies and ethnocentric biases in beliefs and actions. In chapter four we experimentally investigate whether job seekers or employees holding a criminal record are less trusted and expected to be less trustworthy compared to not previously convicted workers. In addition, we compare employers' discriminative behavior against ex-offenders with their attitudes against other potential target groups of discrimination as foreigners, women, or elder workers. Our results give substantial support for a clear disadvantage of previously convicted and foreign employees who are less preferred for employment and paid significantly lower wages. However, we find associated beliefs about convicted and foreign employees' reciprocity not to play a primary role in interactions with them. We can also show that employers' discrimination against ex-felons is mainly taste based or avoidance driven. Contrary, foreign workers are basically avoided by employers. For females and males the evidence is mixed: Employers slightly preferred females for hire and paid them higher wages. We suggest investing in prison inmates' education, its certification, as well as signalling it adequately

Experimentally Induced Empathy Has No Impact on Generosity in a Monetarily Incentivized Dictator Game

In a monetarily incentivized Dictator Game, we expected Dictators’ empathy toward the Recipients to cause more pro-social allocations. Empathy was experimentally induced via a commonly used perspective taking task. Dictators (N = 474) were instructed to split an endowment of 10€ between themselves and an unknown Recipient. They could split the money 8/2 (8€ for Dictator, 2€ for Recipient) or 5/5 (5€ each). Although the empathy manipulation successfully increased Dictators’ feelings of empathy toward the Recipients, Dictators’ decisions on how to split the money were not affected. We had ample statistical power (above 0.99) to detect a typical social psychology effect (corresponding to r around 0.20). Other possible determinants of generosity in the Dictator Game should be investigated

On the Prevalence of Framing Effects Across Subject-Pools in a Two- Person Cooperation Game

In this experimental study, involving subjects from Abu-Dis (West Bank), Chengdu (China), Helsinki (Finland), and Jerusalem (Israel), we test for a presentation bias in a two-person cooperation game. In the positive frame of the game, a transfer creates a positive externality for the opposite player, and in the negative frame, a negative one. Subjects in Abu-Dis and Chengdu show a substantially higher cooperation level in the positive externality treatment. In Helsinki and Jerusalem, no framing effect is observed. These findings are also reflected in associated first-order beliefs. We argue that comparisons across subject-pools might lead to only partially meaningful and opposed conclusions if only one treatment condition is evaluated. We therefore suggest a complementary application and consideration of different presentations of identical decision problems within (cross-cultural) research on subject-pool differences.framing of decision problems, methodology, subject-pool differences

Presentation Effects in Cross-Cultural Experiments - An Experimental Framework for Comparisons

This paper investigates the impact of game presentation dependent on ethnical affiliation. Two games representing the same logical and strategical problem are introduced. Presented games are continuous prisoner’s dilemma games where decision makers can choose an individual level of cooperation from a given range of possible actions. In the first condition, a positive transfer creates a positive externality for the opposite player. In the second condition, this externality is negative. Accomplishing a cross-cultural experimental study involving subjects from the West Bank and Jerusalem (Israel) we test for a strategic presentation bias applying these two conditions. Subjects in the West Bank show a substantially higher cooperation level in the positive externality treatment. In Jerusalem no presentation effect is observed. Critically discussing our findings, we argue that a cross-cultural comparison leads to only partially meaningful and opposed results if only one treatment condition is evaluated. We therefore suggest a complementary application and consideration of different presentations of identical decision problems within cross-cultural research.Cooperation, presentation of decision problems, framing, methodology, cross-cultural research

The Janus Face of Cooperation - An Intra- and Cross-Cultural Review

This paper introduces a two-sided methodological framework for   studies on cooperation based on a new game design. Presented games are continuous prisoner's   dilemma games with positive and negative presentations of an identically structured   decision problem. Decision makers can choose an individual level of cooperation from a   given range of possible actions. Within a cross-cultural experimental study involving   Palestinian and Israeli subjects we test for a strategic presentation bias applying our   framework. Palestinians show a substantially higher cooperation level in the positive externality   treatment. In Israel no presentation effect is observed. Critically discussing our findings,   we argue that cross-cultural comparison leads to only partially meaningful and opposed results if   only one treatment condition is evaluated. We therefore suggest a complementary   application and consideration of different presentations of identical   decision problems within cross-cultural research.Cooperation , presentation of decision problems, framing, methodology, cross-cultural research

On the Validity of Cost-Saving Methods in Dictator-Game Experiments: A Systematic Test

Motivated by methodological concerns, theoretical considerations, and evidence from previous studies, this paper makes a contribution to conducting dictator-game experiments under resource constraints. Using a holistic and strictly controlled approach, we systematically assess the validity of common cost-saving dictator-game variants. We include five common approaches and compare them to a standard dictator game: involving fewer receivers than dictators; paying only some subjects or decisions; role uncertainty at the time of the transfer decision; a combination of random decision payment and role uncertainty. To test the validity of subjects’ dictator-game decisions, we relate them to complementary individual difference measures of generosity: social value orientation, personal values, and a donation to charity. In line with previous evidence, our data show that dictator behavior is quite sensitive to the applied methods. The standard version of the dictator game has the highest validity. Involving fewer receivers than dictators and not paying for all decisions yields comparably valid results. These methods may, therefore, represent feasible alternatives for the conduct of dictator games under contraints. By contrast, in the dictator-game variants where only some subjects are paid or where subjects face uncertainty about their final player role, the expected associations with other measures of generosity are distorted. Under role uncertainty, generosity is also biased upwards. We conclude that these methods are inappropriate when the researchers are interested in valid individual measures of generosity

Experimenting over a Long Distance - A method to facilitate intercultural experiments

We report a new method for Experimenting over a Long Distance (ELD)allowing to simultaneously run decentralized interactive experiments in geographically separated subject pools. Applying ELD to an intercultural trust experiment with participants from Argentina, China and Germany we found a striking evidence for transcontinental trust behavior. In addition to Chinese senders’ discrimination of Argentinean players no discrimination in trust and reciprocity behavior was observed. Neverthe- less, we found significantly different levels of trust and reciprocity in the different national cultures.interactive intercultural experiments, investment game, trust

On the Validity of Probabilistic (and Cost-Saving) Incentives in Dictator Games: A Systematic Test

Driven by methodological concerns, theoretical considerations, and previous evidence, we systematically test the validity of common dictator-game variants with probabilistic incentives. We include four approaches and compare them to a standard dictator game: involving fewer receivers than dictators; paying only some subjects or decisions; role uncertainty at the time of the transfer decision. We also relate the dictator-game variants to established complementary individual difference measures of pro-sociality: social value orientation, personal values, a donation to charity, and Big Five personality facors. Our data show that dictator behavior is quite sensitive to the applied methods. The standard version of the dictator game has the highest validity. Involving fewer receivers than dictators and not paying for all decisions yields comparably valid results. By contrast, when only some subjects are paid or where subjects face uncertainty about their final player role, the expected associations with complementary pro-sociality are distorted. Under role uncertainty, generosity is biased upwards. We conclude that the validity of the dictator-game outcomes is highly sensitive to the applied methods

On the Validity of Cost-Saving Methods in Dictator-Game Experiments: A Systematic Test

Motivated by methodological concerns, theoretical considerations, and evidence from previous studies, this paper makes a contribution to conducting dictator-game experiments under resource constraints. Using a holistic and strictly controlled approach, we systematically assess the validity of common cost-saving dictator-game variants. We include five common approaches and compare them to a standard dictator game: involving fewer receivers than dictators; paying only some subjects or decisions; role uncertainty at the time of the transfer decision; a combination of random decision payment and role uncertainty. To test the validity of subjects’ dictator-game decisions, we relate them to complementary individual difference measures of generosity: social value orientation, personal values, and a donation to charity. In line with previous evidence, our data show that dictator behavior is quite sensitive to the applied methods. The standard version of the dictator game has the highest validity. Involving fewer receivers than dictators and not paying for all decisions yields comparably valid results. These methods may, therefore, represent feasible alternatives for the conduct of dictator games under contraints. By contrast, in the dictator-game variants where only some subjects are paid or where subjects face uncertainty about their final player role, the expected associations with other measures of generosity are distorted. Under role uncertainty, generosity is also biased upwards. We conclude that these methods are inappropriate when the researchers are interested in valid individual measures of generosity