Weather, climate, and the economy: Explaining risk perceptions of global warming, 2001-10

Abstract Two series of national survey datasets (2001-10), supplemented with monthly temperature and precipitation data and unemployment data, are used to examine how weather and climate, economic performance, and individuals\u27 sociodemographic backgrounds and political orientations affect public perceptions of global warming. Consistent with previous studies, political orientations play a key rolein determining public perceptions of global warming. Democrats and liberals are more likely than Republicans and conservatives to see global warming as an immediate and serious problem. Sociodemographic characteristics are also shown to be significant factors, with young people, women, and racial minorities likely to show higher concern about global warming than their counterparts. Moreover, individuals with lower income and higher levels of education tend to be more concerned about global warming. Net of these factors, summer temperature trends over the past 10 years, among other weather and climate measures, are shown to have consistently positive effects on public perceptions of global warming. This suggests that individuals who have experienced increasing summer heat are most likely to perceive immediate impacts and severity of global warming. Surprisingly, macroeconomic conditions - represented by the unemployment rate at the county level - do not appear to influence public perceptions of global warming

Science, scientists, and local weather: Understanding mass perceptions of global warming

Objective: To explore the effects of long-term climate trends and short-term weather fluctuations, evaluations of scientists and science, political predispositions, religious affiliation, the information environment, and demographic attributes on individuals’ views about whether global warming exists and, if so, whether it is a result of natural cycles or human activity. Methods: We use data from the 2009 Pew General Public Science Survey, along with data on long- and short-term patterns of temperature and precipitation in individuals’ home communities. Results: We find that long-term trends in summer temperatures influence perceptions of global warming. Individuals who reside in communities with long-term warming of summer temperatures that are coupled with long-term cooling of spring temperatures are significantly more likely to perceive that global warming exists and is due to human activity. We also find that Americans\u27 attitudes toward scientists and science, political dispositions, evangelical religious affiliation, education, and some demographic attributes all have discernible effects on their perceptions of anthropogenic (man-made) global warming. Conclusion: Individuals’ attitudes toward global warming are influenced by long-term temperature trends in their home communities, as well as a variety of attitudinal and demographic attributes

Positive views of immigration are linked to more favorable views about welfare among Americans.

Whether immigrants to the US are a negative or positive influence on US society has been the source of much debate in recent years. In new research, James Garand, Ping Xu, and Belinda C. Davis examine the relationship between people’s attitudes towards immigration and welfare. Using election data, they find that those who are in favor of immigration are also more likely to support welfare and greater welfare spending. They write that much of this relationship can be explained by the growing “immigrationalization” of welfare attitudes in recent decades due to demographic change and the growing number of immigrants participating in welfare programs

How immigration makes income inequality worse in the US

The past thirty years have seen a dramatic rise in income inequality in the US. While many economists have pointed to the rise of low-skilled immigration as a contributor to income inequality in developed countries, there has been little evidence from the US. In new research, Ping Xu, James C. Garand, Ling Zhu, find that the low-skilled immigration in the US does increase income inequality due to the downward pressure it puts on wages, and immigrants’ lack of access to federal welfare benefits. They write that to reduce inequality, US immigration policy should shift towards admitting more high-skilled immigrants or incorporating existing immigrants into the social welfare system

IMMIGRATION ATTITUDES AND SUPPORT FOR THE WELFARE STATE IN THE AMERICAN MASS PUBLIC

In this article, we explore the relationship between Americans’ attitudes toward immigrants and immigration and their attitudes toward welfare. Using data from the Cumulative American National Election Study from 1992 to 2012, we find ample evidence of the influence of immigration attitudes on both individuals’ attitudes toward welfare recipients and their attitudes toward increased welfare spending. These immigration effects persist even in the face of statistical controls for attitudes toward African Americans and attitudes toward the poor; indeed, in our models, the magnitude of the effects of immigration attitudes surpasses the magnitude of effects of attitudes toward blacks. Further, our findings of immigration effects withstand a range of robustness tests. Our results point to the possible “immigrationalization” of Americans’ welfare attitudes and provide strong evidence that how Americans think about immigration and immigrants is a major factor in how they think about welfare

Imported Inequality? Immigration and Income Inequality in the American States

In this article, we use data from the American states from 1996 to 2008 to explore the effects of immigration on income inequality. Empirical evidence from both static and dynamic models shows that the foreign-born population has a strong positive effect on state-level income inequality, even when we control for a range of federal and state political and economic contextual variables. We also find that the positive relationship between immigration and state income inequality is driven primarily by low-skill immigrants (rather than high-skill immigrants), and we provide some evidence that high-skill immigrants lower income inequality for some segments of the income distribution. We conclude that immigration—particularly low-skilled immigration—has an important effect on income inequality in the American states

PARTISANSHIP, TRUMP FAVORABILITY, AND CHANGES IN SUPPORT FOR TRADE

Why has the relationship between partisan identification and Americans’ trade attitudes shifted in recent years? We suggest that recent shifts in trade attitudes among partisans are driven by Donald Trump, who staked out a position on trade that is at odds with the position on trade traditionally held by Republicans. Using panel data from the Voter Study Group (VSG) surveys from 2011, 2016, and 2017, we conduct cross-sectional analyses showing that the relationship between partisanship and trade attitudes has shifted dramatically from 2011 to 2016/2017; in 2011, Republicans were significantly more supportive of expanded trade, but by 2016/2017 the relationship had reversed, with Democrats significantly more supportive of trade. We link changes over time in trade attitudes with how Americans evaluate Trump: individuals with favorable attitudes toward Donald Trump are significantly more likely to shift their attitudes in an anti-trade direction from 2011-2016. Because so many more Republicans have favorable attitudes toward Trump, the aggregate effect of Trump favorability is to shift Republicans as a group to be less favorable toward trade than Democrats. We suggest that Donald Trump has had a transformative effect on Americans’ trade attitudes, with previous supporters (opponents) of expanded trade now expressing opposing (supporting) attitudes

The “Trump” Effect: Political Elite and Support for Free Trade in America

While previous literature has offered two broad categories of explanation for individual trade preferences: economic self-interest and non-economic factors, we contend that during times of intensified elite discourse on trade, individuals may follow elite opinions to form their opinions on trade. Utilizing data from the 2016 American National Election Survey, we examine the effect of Trump’s protectionist views and rhetoric on public trade opinion. We argue that there was a “Trump effect” on trade attitudes among the mass public in 2016 and this effect went beyond the party line, meaning that Trump supporters, regardless of their partisanship, were more likely to be influenced by his protectionist views and to adopt anti-free trade positions. Moreover, we suggest a conditional effect of political knowledge on the “Trump effect” of trade opinion. Our empirical tests offer strong support for both hypotheses, suggesting a significant “Trump effect” on public trade opinion in 2016

Measuring constituency ideology in U.S. house districts: A top-down simulation approach

One of the most intractable problems associated with studying representation in the U.S. House of Representatives involves the measurement of district-level constituency opinion. In measuring constituency opinion in House districts, scholars have relied on a number of alternative approaches, including the use of demographic variables, small-sample estimates of public opinion, presidential election results, referenda data, and "bottom-up" simulated opinion. In this article we develop an innovative "top-down" simulation of House district opinion that provides more reliable and valid measures of House district ideology. We model state-level ideology (as measured by Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1993) as a function of various demographic and political variables found at both the state and House district levels, and then use the estimates from the state-level model to generate predicted ideology scores for each House district during the 1980s and 1990s. Our findings suggest that the top-down simulated measure is a valid indicator of House district ideology that can be used in a number of research venues. Representation is particularly important to democratic theory. According to Considering the important role that representation plays in democracies, the study of representation has occupied a central place in the field of political science and has long captivated the interest of both theorists and empirical analysts. Although scholars have explored a range of representational behaviors, the focus of much of this research has been on what The concept of policy representation requires at least some level of congruence between the policy views of constituents and the policy behavior of repre

Current status of clinical outcome measures in inclusion body myositis: a systematised review

OBJECTIVES: Sporadic inclusion body myositis (IBM) is a debilitating idiopathic inflammatory myopathy (IIM) which affects hand function, ambulation, and swallowing. There is no approved pharmacological therapy for IBM, and there is a lack of suitable outcome measure to assess the effect of an intervention. The IBM scientific interest group under IMACS reviewed the previously used outcome measures in IBM clinical studies to lay the path for developing a core set of outcome measures in IBM. METHODS: In this systematised review, we have extracted all outcome measures reported in IBM clinical studies to determine what measures were being used and to assess the need for optimising outcome measures in IBM. RESULTS: We found 13 observational studies, 17 open-label clinical trials, and 15 randomised control trials (RCTs) in IBM. Six-minute walk distance, IBM-functional rating scale (IBM-FRS), quantitative muscle testing, manual muscle testing, maximal voluntary isometric contraction testing, and thigh muscle volume measured by MRI were used as primary outcome measures. Twelve different outcome measures of motor function were used in IBM clinical trials. IBM-FRS was the most used measure of functionality. Swallowing function was reported as a secondary outcome measure in only 3 RCTs. CONCLUSIONS: There are inconsistencies in using outcome measures in clinical studies in IBM. The core set measures developed by the IMACS group for other IIMs are not directly applicable to IBM. As a result, there is an unmet need for an IBM-specific core set of measures to facilitate the evaluation of new potential therapeutics for IBM