EVOLVING ENTITLEMENTS: INTERVENING TO PREVENT A COLLECTIVE HARM

When market transactions generate negative externalities, the injured party may initiate court action to prevent harm or to obtain compensation. The political response, in some cases, has been to broaden the set of agents who can intervene through the court, often by admitting entirely new categories of potential intervenors. We employ an experimental market setting to investigate the effect of an increase in the number of potential intervenors (introduced as admitting an additional class of persons having the necessary standing in law). The results suggest that there will be a substantial increase in the number of actual interventions. The increase means that social resources expended on interventions will increase and there may be a consequent reduction in trading activity in the affected markets.Public Economics,

VALUING THE PROTECTION OF MINIMUM INSTREAM FLOWS IN NEW MEXICO

Currently, New Mexico law does not provide any legal avenue of protecting instream flows. A change in the status quo requires that a prima facie case be made— establishing sufficient evidence of the public benefits from maintaining instream flows to warrant consideration, or standing, in future water policy deliberations. Using the contingent valuation (CV) method, we investigate the nonmarket benefits of protecting minimum instream flows in New Mexico. Results from a dichotomous choice CV telephone survey show significant nonmarket values for protecting instream flows that are sensitive to a change in scope and insensitive to a group-size reminder.Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,

Benefit-Cost Analysis of FEMA Hazard Mitigation Grants

Mitigation ameliorates the impact of natural hazards on communities by reducing loss of life and injury, property and environmental damage, and social and economic disruption. The potential to reduce these losses brings many benefits, but every mitigation activity has a cost that must be considered in our world of limited resources. In principle benefit-cost analysis (BCA) can be used to assess a mitigation activity’s expected net benefits (discounted future benefits less discounted costs), but in practice this often proves difficult. This paper reports on a study that refined BCA methodologies and applied them to a national statistical sample of FEMA mitigation activities over a ten-year period for earthquake, flood, and wind hazards. The results indicate that the overall benefit-cost ratio for FEMA mitigation grants is about 4 to 1, though the ratio varies according to hazard and mitigation type.

EVOLVING ENTITLEMENTS: INTERVENING TO PREVENT A COLLECTIVE HARM

When market transactions generate negative externalities, the injured party may initiate court action to prevent harm or to obtain compensation. The political response, in some cases, has been to broaden the set of agents who can intervene through the court, often by admitting entirely new categories of potential intervenors. We employ an experimental market setting to investigate the effect of an increase in the number of potential intervenors (introduced as admitting an additional class of persons having the necessary standing in law). The results suggest that there will be a substantial increase in the number of actual interventions. The increase means that social resources expended on interventions will increase and there may be a consequent reduction in trading activity in the affected markets

VALUING THE PROTECTION OF MINIMUM INSTREAM FLOWS IN NEW MEXICO

Currently, New Mexico law does not provide any legal avenue of protecting instream flows. A change in the status quo requires that a prima facie case be made establishing sufficient evidence of the public benefits from maintaining instream flows to warrant consideration, or standing, in future water policy deliberations. Using the contingent valuation (CV) method, we investigate the nonmarket benefits of protecting minimum instream flows in New Mexico. Results from a dichotomous choice CV telephone survey show significant nonmarket values for protecting instream flows that are sensitive to a change in scope and insensitive to a group-size reminder