North-south trade and directed technical change

In a world where poor countries provide weak protection for intellectual property rights, market integration shifts technical change in favor of rich nations. Through this channel, free trade may amplify international income differences. At the same time, integration with countries where intellectual property rights are weakly protected can slow down the world growth rate. A crucial implication of these results is that protection of intellectual property is most beneficial in open countries. This prediction, which is novel in the literature, finds support in the data on a panel of 53 countries observed in the years 1965-1990.Economic Growth, North-South Trade, Intellectual Property Rights, Cross-Country Income Differences

Globalization, Divergence and Stagnation

In a world where poor countries provide weak protection for intellectual property rights, market integration will systematically shift technical change in favor of rich nations. For this reason, free trade can increase international income differences. At the same time, integration with countries where intellectual property rights are weakly protected can have a large adverse effect on the world growth rate. These results provide a strong rationale for global regulations, critical in a system of interdependent economies for sustaining innovation and reducing income inequality. Supportive empirical evidence is presented.Economic Growth; North-South Trade; Intellectual Property Rights; Cross-Country Income Differences; Innovation Diversion

Increasing returns, imperfect competition and factor prices

We show how, in general equilibrium models featuring increasing returns, imperfect competition and endogenous markups, changes in the scale of economic activity affect income distribution across factors. Whenever final goods are gross-substitutes (gross- complements), a scale expansion raises (lowers) the relative reward of the scarce factor or the factor used intensively in the sector characterized by a higher degree of product differentiation and higher fixed costs. Under very reasonable hypothesis, our theory suggests that scale is skill-biased. This result provides a microfoundation for the secular increase in the relative demand for skilled labor. Moreover, it constitutes an important link among major explanations for the rise in wage inequality: skill-biased technical change, capital-skill complementarities and international trade. We provide new evidence on the mechanism underlying the skill bias of scale.Endogenous Markups, Pro-competitive E¤ect, Income Distribution, Trade Models with Imperfect Competition, Wage Inequality

The Political Cost of Reforms

This paper formalizes in a fully-rational model the popular idea that politicians perceive an electoral cost in adopting costly reforms with future benefits and reconciles it with the evidence that reformist governments are not punished by voters. To do so, it proposes a model of elections where political ability is ex-ante unknown and investment in reforms is unobservable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other, politicians make too little reforms in an attempt to signal high ability and increase their reappointment probability. Although in a rational expectation equilibrium voters cannot be fooled and hence reelection does not depend on reforms, the strategy of underinvesting in reforms is nonetheless sustained by out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, uncertainty makes reforms more politically viable and may, under some conditions, increase social welfare. The model is then used to study how political rewards can be set so as to maximize social welfare and the desirability of imposing a one-term limit to governments. The predictions of this theory are consistent with a number of empirical regularities on the determinants of reforms and reelection. They are also consistent with a new stylized fact documented in this paper: economic uncertainty is associated to more reforms in a panel of 20 OECD countries.Elections, Reforms, Asymmetric Information, Uncertainty.

Technological change and the wealth of nations

We discuss a unified theory of directed technological change and technology adoption that can shed light on the causes of persistent productivity differences across countries. In our model, new technologies are designed in advanced countries and diffuse endogenously to less developed countries. Our framework is rich enough to highlight three broad reasons for productivity differences: inappropriate technologies, policy-induced barriers to technology adoption, and within-country misallocations across sectors due to policy distortions. We also discuss the effects of two aspects of globalization, trade in goods and migration, on the wealth of nations through their impact on the direction of technical progress. By doing so, we illustrate some of the equalizing and unequalizing forces of globalization.Barriers to Technology Adoption, Directed Technology Adoption, Endogenous Growth, Globalization, Human Capital, Inappropriate Technologies, Market Power, Political Economy, Skill-biased Technical Chan

Trade, markup heterogeneity and misallocations

We argue that the procompetitive effect of international trade may bring about significant welfare costs that have not been recognized. We formulate a stylized general equilibrium model with a continuum of imperfectly competitive industries to show that, under plausible conditions, a trade-induced increase in competition can actually amplify monopoly distortions. This happens because trade, while lowering the average level of market power, may increase its cross-sectoral dispersion. Using data on US industries, we document a dramatic increase in the dispersion of market power overtime. We also show evidence that trade might be responsible for it and provide some quantifications of the induced welfare cost. Our results suggest that, to avoid some unpleasant effects of globalization, trade integration should be accompanied by procompetitive reforms (i.e., deregulation) in the nontraded sectors.Markups, Dispersion of Market Power, Procompetitive Effect, Trade and Welfare

Global imbalances revisited: The transfer problem and transport costs in monopolistic competition

We study the welfare effects of trade imbalances in a two-sector model of monopolistic competition. As in perfect competition, a trade surplus involves an income transfer to the deficit country and possibly a terms-of-trade deterioration. Unlike the conventional wisdom, however, trade imbalances do not impose any double burden on surplus countries. This is because of a production-delocation effect, which leads to a reduction in the local price index. In the presence of intermediate goods, new results arise: A trade surplus may lead to an appreciation of the exchange rate, to a terms-of-trade improvement and even to a welfare increase. Numerical simulations show that, under realistic assumptions about preferences and technology, the beneficial price-index effect can significantly reduce the direct cost of the transfer

Offshoring and Directed Technical Change

To study the short-run and long-run implications on wage inequality, we introduce directed technical change into a Ricardian model of offshoring. A unique final good is produced by combining a skilled and an unskilled product, each produced from a continuum of intermediates (tasks). Some of these tasks can be transferred from a skill-abundant West to a skill-scarce East. Profit maximization determines both the extent of offshoring and technological progress. Offshoring induces skill-biased technical change because it increases the relative price of skill intensive products and induces technical change favoring unskilled workers because it expands the market size for technologies complementing unskilled labor. In the empirically more relevant case, starting from low levels, an increase in offshoring opportunities triggers a transition with falling real wages for unskilled workers in the West, skill-biased technical change and rising skill premia worldwide. However, when the extent of offshoring becomes sufficiently large, further increases in offshoring induce technical change now biased in favor of unskilled labor because offshoring closes the gap between unskilled wages in the West and the East, thus limiting the power of the price effect fueling skill-biased technical change. The unequalizing impact of offshoring is thus greatest at the beginning. Transitional dynamics reveal that offshoring and technical change are substitutes in the short run but complements in the long run. Finally, though offshoring improves the welfare of workers in the East, it may benefit or harm unskilled workers in the West depending on elasticities and the equilibrium growth rate.We thank Lorenzo Caliendo, Arnaud Costinot, Gene Grossman, Esteban Rossi-Hansberg, Mathias Thoenig, Jonathan Vogel and seminar participants at many institutions and conferences for useful comments. Gino Gancia acknowledges financial support from the Barcelona GSE, the Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación (ECO2011- 25624) and the ERC Grant GOPG-240989. Fabrizio Zilibotti acknowledges financial support from the ERC Advanced Grant IPCDP 229883. MIT and CIFAR. Email: [email protected] CREI, Barcelona GSE and CEPR. Email: [email protected]. University of Zurich and CEPR. Email: [email protected]