Outsourcing migration management: EU, power, and the external dimension of asylum and immigration policy

The present paper explores the growing link between EU’s migration priorities and its foreign policy agenda. As part of the evolving EU acquis on asylum and immigration issues, particular priority has been given to cooperation with third countries and efforts to extend EU’s possibilities for regulating migration flows well beyond its borders. As an emerging foreign policy issue, this paper asks how EU’s migration priorities have translated into policies vis-à-vis third countries, what objectives these policies serve, and how this affects EU’s overall foreign policy agenda and relations with countries of origin and transit? Using Joseph Nye’s conceptualisation of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power, it is argued that EU is taking on a hegemonic position when initialising cooperation with third countries. As these countries are becoming more reluctant to take upon them the responsibility for preventing migration from reaching Europe, the EU is playing on a combination of ‘attraction’ and direct conditionality to ensure compliance. Yet, as the stakes are getting higher, ensuring cooperation may prove too costly, both financially and to EU’s self-image

EU’s umulige grænsekontrol

Europas grænsekontrol er i en brydningstid:EU’s engagement i opbygning af stærkere fælles kontrol ved de ydre grænser er slående, men medlemsstaterne er fortsat ansvarlige for at varetage kontrollen.&nbsp

Non-Refoulement in a World of Cooperative Deterrence

Developed states have what might charitably be called a schizophrenic attitude towards international refugee law. Determined to remain formally engaged with refugee law and yet unwavering in their commitment to avoid assuming their fair share of practical responsibilities under that regime, wealthier countries have embraced the politics of non-entrée, comprising efforts to keep refugees away from their territories but without formally resiling from treaty obligations. As the early generation of non-entrée practices — visa controls and carrier sanctions, the establishment of “international zones,” and high seas deterrence — have proved increasingly vulnerable to practical and legal challenges, new forms of non-entrée predicated on interstate cooperation have emerged in which deterrence is carried out by the authorities of the home or a transit state, or at least in their territory. The critical question we address here is whether such cooperation-based mechanisms of non-entrée are — as developed states seem to believe — capable of insulating them from legal liability in ways that the first generation of non-entrée strategies were not. We show that three evolving areas of international law — jurisdiction, shared responsibility, and liability for aiding or assisting — are likely to stymie many if not all of the new forms of non-entrée. Powerful states are thus faced with a trade-off between the efficiency of non-entrée mechanisms and the ability to avoid responsibility under international refugee law. If, as we believe probable, the preference for more rather than less control persists, legal challenges are likely to prove successful. Law will thus be in a position to serve a critical role in provoking a frank conversation about how to replace the duplicitous politics of nonentrée with a system predicated on the meaningful sharing of the burdens and responsibilities of refugee protection around the world