Risk Taking by Entrepreneurs

Entrepreneurs bear substantial risk, but empirical evidence shows no sign of a positive premium. This paper develops a theory of endogenous entrepreneurial risk taking that explains why self-financed entrepreneurs may find it optimal to invest into risky projects offering no risk premium. The model has also a number of implications for firm dynamics supported by empirical evidence, such as a positive correlation between survival, size, and firm age.occupational choice, risk taking, firm dynamics, borrowing constraints.

Institutions and Multinational Ownership Strategy

This paper examines the impact of institutions on a multinational firm’s ownership strategy. We develop an international joint venture (IJV) model in which a multinational firm and its local partner both can undertake costly ex post actions to increase their revenue share specified by the ex ante IJV contract. The model captures the effects of two institutional features on the optimal IJV ownership structure: contract enforceability and cronyism. We introduce the IJV model into an industry equilibrium framework to analyze the impact of institutions on a multinational firm’s choice between forming an IJV or setting up a wholly-owned subsidiary. Ce papier examine l'impact des institutions sur la stratégie de propriété d’une entreprise multinationale. Nous développons un modèle de coentreprise internationale dans lequel une entreprise étrangère et son partenaire local peuvent ex post entreprendre des actions coûteuses pour augmenter leur part de revenus indiquée dans le contrat de coentreprise. Le modèle analyse les impacts de deux caractéristiques institutionnelles sur la structure de propriété optimale : le renforcement du contrat et le copinage. Nous introduisons le modèle de coentreprise dans un modèle d'équilibre général pour analyser l'impact des institutions sur le mode d’entrée des entreprises multinationales.liability of foreignness, international joint venture, contract enforceability, cronyism, coentreprise internationale, renforcement du contrat, copinage

Courage to Capital? A Model of the Effects of Rating Agencies on Sovereign Debt Role-over

We propose a model of rating agencies that is an application of global game theory in which heterogeneous investors act strategically. The model allows us to explore the impact of the introduction of a rating agency on financial markets. Our model suggests that the addition of the rating agency affects the probability of default and the magnitude of the response of capital flows to changes in fundamentals in a non–trivial way, and that introducing a rating agency can bring multiple equilibria to a market that otherwise would have the unique equilibrium.Credit rating, Rating agency, Sovereign debt, Global game

Do banks price their informational monopoly?

Modern corporate finance theory argues that although bank monitoring is beneficial to borrowers, it also allows banks to use the private information they gain through monitoring to "hold-up" borrowers for higher interest rates. In this paper, we seek empirical evidence for this information hold-up cost. Since new information about a firm's credit-worthiness is revealed at the time of its first issue in the public bond market, it follows that after firms undertake their bond IPO, banks with an exploitable information advantage will be forced to adjust their loan interest rates downwards, particularly for firms that are revealed to be safe. Our findings show that firms are able to borrow from banks at lower interest rates after they issue for the first time in the public bond market and that the magnitude of these savings is larger for safer firms. We further find that among safe firms, those that get their first credit rating at the time of their bond IPO benefit from larger interest rate savings than those that already had a credit rating when they entered the bond market. Since more information is revealed at the time of the bond IPO on the former firms and since this information will increase competition from uninformed banks, these findings provide support for the hypothesis that banks price their informational monopoly. Finally, we find that while entering the public bond market may reduce these informational rents, it is costly to firms because they have to pay higher underwriting costs on their IPO bonds. Moreover, IPO bonds are subject to more underpricing than subsequent bonds when they first trade in the secondary bond market.Corporate bonds ; Credit ratings

Do banks propagate debt market shocks?

Over the years, U.S. banks have increasingly relied on the bond market to finance their business. This created the potential for a link between the bond market and the corporate sector whereby borrowers, including those that do not rely on bond funding, became exposed to the conditions in the bond market. We investigate the importance of this link. Our results show that when the cost to access the bond market goes up, banks that rely on bond financing charge higher interest rates on their loans. Banks that rely exclusively on deposit funding follow bond financing banks and increase the interest rates on their loans, though by smaller amounts. Further, banks pass the bond market shocks predominantly to their risky borrowers that have access to the bond market and to their borrowers that do not have access to the bond market. These results show that banks propagate shocks to the bond market by passing them through their loan policies to their borrowers, including those that do not use bond financing.Banks and banking ; Banks and banking - Costs ; Bond market