The Social Multiplier of Tax Evasion: Evidence from Italian Audit Data

We investigate the role of individual interdependencies in tax evasion, arising from congestion on the auditing resources available to local tax authorities. Identification exploits a novel method based on comparison of the variance of individual behavior — concealed income in this case — at different levels of aggregation, within different subpopulations (Graham, 2008). This method allows us to mitigate some of the most severe problems that surround identification of neighbourhood effects, at the cost of identifying restrictions that arise naturally from our model. We employ a unique dataset of tax audits to about 75,000 self-employed individuals in Italy. Surprisingly, this sample is not statistically different from a random sample of taxpayers. We find a social multiplier of about 3, meaning that the equilibrium response to a shock that induces an exogenous variation in mean concealed income — such as tougher or looser tax enforcement — is about three times the initial average responsesocial interactions, social multiplier, tax evasion, tax compliance, excess variance

Law and Behaviours in Social Dilemmas: Testing the Effect of Obligations on Cooperation

Laws consist of two components: the 'obligations' they express and the 'incentives' designed to enforce them.In this paper we run a public good experiment to test whether or not obligations have any independent effect on cooperation in social dilemmas.The results show that, for given marginal incentives, different levels of minimum contribution required by obligation determine significantly different levels of average contributions.Moreover, unexpected changes in the minimum contribution set up by obligation have asymmetric dynamic effects on the levels of cooperation: a reduction does not alter the descending trend of cooperation, whereas an increase induces a temporary re-start in the average level of cooperation.Nonetheless, obligations per se cannot sustain cooperation over time.Incentives;Obligations;Public Good Game;Social Dilemma

The timing and funding of CHAPS sterling payments

Real-time gross settlement (RTGS) systems such as CHAPS Sterling require large amounts of liquidity to support payment activity. To meet their liquidity needs, RTGS participants borrow from the central bank or rely on incoming payments from other participants. Both options can prove costly -- the latter in particular if participants delay outgoing payments until incoming ones arrive. This article presents an empirical analysis of the timing and funding of payments in CHAPS. The authors seek to identify the factors driving the intraday profile of payment activity and the extent to which incoming funds are used as a funding source, a process known as liquidity recycling. They show that the level of liquidity recycling in CHAPS is high and stable throughout the day, and attribute this result to several features of the system. First, the settlement of time-critical payments provides liquidity to the system early in the settlement day; this liquidity can be recycled for the funding of less urgent payments. Second, CHAPS throughput guidelines provide a centralised coordination mechanism, in effect limiting any tendency toward payment delay. Third, the relatively small direct membership of CHAPS facilitates coordination between members, for example, through the use of bilateral net sender limits. Coordination encourages banks to maintain a relatively constant flux of payments throughout the day. The authors also argue that the high level of recycling helps to reduce liquidity risk, and that the relatively smooth intraday distribution of payments serves to mitigate operational risk associated with highly concentrated payment activity. They note, however, that the benefits of liquidity recycling are not evenly distributed between members of CHAPS.Payment systems ; Bank liquidity ; Risk ; Electronic funds transfers

Math empowerment: a multidisciplinary example to engage primary school students in learning mathematics

This paper describes an educational project conducted in a primary school in Italy (Scuola Primaria Alessandro Manzoni at Mulazzano, near to Milan). The school requested our collaboration to help improve upon the results achieved on the National Tests for Mathematics, in which students, aged 7, registered performances lower than the national average the past year. From January to June, 2016, we supported teachers, providing them with information, tools and methods to increase their pupils’ curiosity and passion for mathematics. Mixing our different experiences and competences (instructional design and gamification, information technologies and psychology) we have tried to provide a broader spectrum of parameters, tools and keys to understand how to achieve an inclusive approach that is ‘personalised’ to each student. This collaboration with teachers and students allowed us to draw interesting observations about learning styles, pointing out the negative impact that standardized processes and instruments can have on the self‐esteem and, consequently, on student performance. The goal of this programme was to find the right learning levers to intrigue and excite students in mathematical concepts and their applications. Our hypothesis is that, by considering the learning of mathematics as a continuous process, in which students develop freely through their own experiments, observations, involvement and curiosity, students can achieve improved results on the National Tests (INVALSI). This paper includes results of a survey conducted by children ‐’About Me and Mathematics‘