A Theory of Regret and Information

Following Quiguin (1994), we propose a general model of preferences that accounts for individuals\' regret concerns. By confronting the commonly-accepted additive and multiplicative regret utility functions to this model, we establish certain characteristics that these utility functions require to be in conformity with our preferences model. Equally, as regret is intrinsically related to the concept of information about the foregone alternatives, we generalize our framework so that it can accomodate any information structure. We show that the less informative that structure is, the higher the utility of a regretful individual. This result means that an individual prefers not to be exposed to ex post information about the foregone alternatives. We also focus on information value, and consider two cases. That of flexibility, where information arrives before the choice and can be used to determine the optimal strategy; that of non-flexibility, where information arrives after the choice. We show that information value is negative when there is no flexibility, and that it can also be negative when there is flexibility., information, choice under uncertainty, bivariate risk aversion

Regret aversion and information aversion

Regret is a negative and counterfactual emotion that occurs when a decision maker believes her past decision, if changed, would achieve a better outcome. Regret is intrinsically related to the comparison of the chosen alternative outcome with the foregone alternative outcomes. The result of this comparison is influenced by the decision maker’s information about the foregone alternative outcomes (feedback structure). In this paper, we use Gabillon (2020)’s model, which generalizes regret theory to any feedback structure. We show that a regretful decision maker exhibits information aversion. The anticipation of learning about the payoffs of the foregone alternatives decreases her expected utility. We use the concept of statistical sufficiency in order to classify the feedback structures according to their informational content. We show that the less informative the feedback structure is, the higher the utility of a regretful decision maker

Optimal regulation of a fully insured deposit banking system

We analyze risk sensitive incentive compatible deposit insurance in the presence of private information when the market value of deposit insurance can be determined using Merton's (1997) formula. We show that, under the assumption that transferring funds from taxpayers to financial institutions has a social cost, the optimal regulation combines different levels of capital requirements combined with decreasing premia on deposit insurance. On the other hand, it is never efficient to require the banks to hold riskless assets, so that narrow banking is not efficient. Finally, chartering banks is necessary in order to decrease the cost of asymmetric information.Regulation,mechanism design,deposit insurance pricing,capital requirements

One Theory For Two Risk Premia

Generally, in the standard presentation of the expected utility model, the risk premium represents how much a risk-averse decision maker is ready to pay to have a risk eliminated. Here, however, we introduce a different risk premium: how much should a risk (which could be the return on a financial asset) yield to be acceptable to a risk-averse decision maker. Although our risk premium is derived from the Pratt bid price, it should not be confused with it: the Pratt bid price represents the monetary compensation of a risk. The standard risk premium refers to risk-avoidance; our risk premium, however, refers to risk-taking. We then reanalyse the main results concerning risk aversion under expected utility using this risk premium tool and deduce its main properties.choices under uncertainty, expected utility, risk aversion, risk premium.

Corporate risk management and information disclosure

International audienc

International Bordeaux Workshop in Quantitative Finance, Risk, and Decision Theory

PRODUCTION DANS DES COLLOQUES / CONGRÈS, SÉMINAIRES DE RECHERCHE / Autres produits présentés dans des colloques

A theory of regret and information

Cahier du GREThA n°2011-1

One theory for two different risk premia

International audienc

Regret and information: A theory

International audienc