890 research outputs found
Denis Moreau, Les voies du salut: un essai philosophique [The Ways of Salvation: A Philosophical Essay]. Bayard, 2010
Données nouvelles sur la composition et la structure du grand massif péridotitique du Sud de la Nouvelle-Calédonie
Sur la fréquence des sulfures métalliques dans les massifs péridotitiques de la Nouvelle-Calédonie
Essai de résolution structurale d'un appareil ultramafique d'âge alpin : les massifs de Nouvelle-Calédonie : implications concernant la structure de l'arc mélanésien
Trinity: Mysterianism and the Problem of Meaninglessness
The problem of the Trinity is often framed as a paradox between some propositions central to the doctrine of the Trinity that seem to be logically in tension with each other. However, a problem of Paradox presupposes that we have a sufficient understanding of the meanings of the propositions (otherwise we wouldn’t even have any appearance of conflict between these meanings). My claim in this paper is that the main problem of the Trinity is more radical than a problem of Paradox: it’s rather a problem of Meaninglessness, in the sense that the difficult challenge is to grasp a meaning for the central propositions of the doctrine (not to render logically compatible some meanings clearly grasped). I show how we can respond to the problem of Meaninglessness and how, once we have solved it, there is no need to try and dissolve the appearance of contradiction which constitutes the problem of Paradox. As far as the problem of Paradox goes, the solution adopted here is therefore a form of Mysterianism
The Dynamic Strategy of Common Sense Against Radical Revisionism
Common-sense philosophers typically maintain that common-sense propositions have a certain kind of epistemic privilege that allows them to evade the threats of skepticism or radical revisionism. But why do they have this special privilege? In response to this question, the “Common-Sense Tradition” contains many different strands of arguments. In this paper, I will develop a strategy that combines two of these strands of arguments. First, the “Dynamic Argument” (or the “starting-point argument”), inspired by Thomas Reid and Charles S. Peirce (but which will be strengthened with the help of Gilbert Harman’s epistemology of belief revision). Second, G.E. Moore’s “greater certainty argument” (interpreted along the lines of Soames’ and Pollock’s construal). This combined strategy, I will argue, is the strong core of Common-Sense Philosophy, and relies on extremely modest and widely held assumptions
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