Philanthropic Foundations and Transnational Activist Networks: Ford and the Inter-American Institute of Human Rights

Foundations provide key funds for nongovernmental organizations. We know little about what they do for transnational activism or the mechanisms via which they seek/achieve influence. We carve a middle ground between those who see donors as supporting actors in transnational advocacy networks (TANs) and those who think they distort activism through impersonal market forces. Our negotiation-oriented approach looks at the micro-dynamics of donor–grantee relations. We argue that influence is a function of donors’ organizational characteristics. Only some, especially foundations, have the vision/means to shape grantees. However, internal complexity can cause coordination problems, complicating influence. Additionally, if many donors exist, recipients’ leverage increases. It does so too if their expertise is in short supply. Using archival evidence, we reconstruct how Ford tried to shape the Inter-American Human Rights Institute, a pillar of the region's human rights regime, and the factors conditioning success. For Ford, the Institute could play a role in a fledging TAN, but only if it downplayed its emphasis on research and directly engaged activists. Coupled with analyses of USAID’s relationship with the Institute and Ford's relationship with Americas Watch, we shed light on the activities of an important class of donor and illuminate foundations’ role in the development of TANs

Philanthropic foundations and transnational activist networks: Ford and the Inter-American Institute of Human Rights

Foundations are a major source of funds for NGOs. We know little about what they do for transnational activism or the mechanisms via which they seek/achieve influence. We carve a middle-ground between those who see donors as supporting actors in transnational advocacy networks (TANs), and those who think they distort activism through impersonal market forces. Our negotiation-oriented approach looks at the micro-dynamics of donor-grantee relations. We argue that influence is a function of donors’ organizational characteristics. Only some, especially foundations, have the vision/means to shape grantees. But internal complexity can cause coordination problems that complicate influence. Additionally, if many donors exist, recipients’ leverage increases. It does so too if their expertise is in short supply. Using archival evidence, we reconstruct how Ford tried to shape the Inter-American Human Rights Institute, a pillar of the region's human rights regime, and the factors conditioning success. For Ford, the Institute could play a key role in a fledging TAN, but only if it downplayed its emphasis on research and directly engaged activists. Coupled with analyses of USAID’s relationship with the Institute and Ford’s relationship with Americas Watch, we shed light on the activities of an important class of donor and illuminate foundations’ role in the development of TANs

Defending the European court of human rights : experimental evidence from Britain

First published online: 28 May 2020As nationalist sentiments gain traction globally, the attitudinal and institutional foundations of the international liberal order face new challenges. One manifestation of this trend is the growing backlash against international courts. Defenders of the liberal order struggle to articulate compelling reasons for why states, and their citizens, should continue delegating authority to international institutions. This article probes the effectiveness of arguments that emphasise the appropriateness and benefits of cooperation in containing preferences for backlash among the mass public. We rely on IR theories that explain why elites create international institutions to derive three sets of arguments that could be deployed to boost support for international courts. We then use experimental methods to test their impact on support for backlash against the European Court of Human Rights in Britain (ECtHR). First, in line with principal-agent models of delegation, we find that information about the court's reliability as an 'agent' boosts support for the ECtHR, but less so information that signals Britain's status as a principal. Second, in line with constructivist approaches, associating support for the court with the position of an in-group state like Denmark, and opposition with an out-group state like Russia, also elicits more positive attitudes. This finding points to the importance of 'blame by association' and cues of in/out-group identity in building support for cooperation. The effect is stronger when we increase social pressure by providing information about social attitudes towards Denmark and Russia in Britain, where the public overwhelmingly trusts the Danes and distrusts the Russians. Finally, in contrast to Liberal explanations for the creation of the ECtHR, the study finds no evidence that highlighting the court's mission to promote democracy and international peace contains backlash. We show that the positive effects of the first two arguments are not driven by pre-treatment attitudes such as political sophistication, patriotism, internationalism, institutional trust or political preferences

Witch hunts? Electoral cycles and corruption lawsuits in Argentina

Courts prosecuting corruption serve a critical horizontal accountability function, but they can also play a role in moments of vertical accountability when voters have the opportunity to sanction corrupt candidates. This article documents the strategic use of corruption lawsuits, demonstrating the presence of an electoral cycle in the filing of new corruption accusations against politicians. Using an original dataset of daily corruption complaints filed in federal courts against members of Argentina’s main political coalitions between 2013 and 2021, we document an increase in corruption accusations against and by politicians in the periods immediately preceding an election. A second dataset of daily media coverage of corruption accusations in two leading newspapers suggests that corruption is indeed more salient prior to elections, offering politicians a temporal focal point to prepare and launch especially impactful lawsuits. Our findings shed new light on the use of courts as a tool for accountability as well as on debates about the so-called ‘lawfare’ in Latin America

Replication data for: The Conditionality of Vote Buying Norms: Experimental Evidence from Latin America

Anti-vote buying campaigns led by NGOs and political elites denounce the practice as a crass economic transaction detrimental to democracy. Do potential clients stigmatize vote buying to the same degree, or does the mass public have a more conditional view of the acceptability of vote buying? We theorize that normative evaluations of vote buying vary based on individuals’ understanding of the transaction itself and abstract societal costs associated with the practice. We assess this perspective using survey experiments conducted in several Latin American countries that present hypothetical vote buying situations for evaluation by respondents, varying the socioeconomic status of the hypothetical client and the client’s political predispositions. We find that the disapproval of vote buying is highly conditional on the attributes of the hypothetical client and that evaluations of vote buying depend on conceptions of the concrete benefits and abstract costs of vote buying as a part of electoral politics

Carrots and sticks: Experimental evidence of vote-buying and voter intimidation in Guatemala

How do parties target intimidation and vote-buying during elections? Parties prefer the use of carrots over sticks because they are in the business of getting voters to like them and expect higher legitimacy costs if observers expose intimidation. However, their brokers sometimes choose intimidation because it is cheaper and possibly more effective than vote-buying. Specifically, we contend that brokers use intimidation when the cost of buying votes is prohibitively high; in interactions with voters among whom the commitment problem inherent to clientelistic transactions is difficult to overcome; and in contexts where the risk of being denounced for violence is lower. We probe our hypotheses about the different profile of voters targeted with vote-buying and intimidation using two list experiments included in an original survey conducted during the 2011 Guatemalan general elections. The list experiments were designed to overcome the social desirability bias associated with direct questions about illegal or stigmatized behaviors. Our quantitative analysis is supplemented by interviews with politicians from various parties. The analysis largely confirms our expectations about the diametrically opposed logics of vote-buying and intimidation targeting, and illuminates how both are key components of politics in a country with weak parties and high levels of violence.National Democratic Institute - Guatemala; Centre for Social Conflict and Cohesion Studies [CONICYT/FONDAP/15130009]; Chilean Fund for Scientific and Technological Development FONDECYT project [1161262]This item from the UA Faculty Publications collection is made available by the University of Arizona with support from the University of Arizona Libraries. If you have questions, please contact us at [email protected]

Vote buying and social desirability bias: Experimental evidence from Nicaragua

Abstract: Qualitative studies of vote buying generally find the practice to be common in many countries, but quantitative studies using surveys often find little evidence of vote buying. We argue that social desirability bias accounts for this empirical discrepancy and employ a survey-based list experiment to minimize the problem. We conducted a nationally representative survey after the 2008 Nicaraguan municipal elections where we asked about vote buying behavior by campaigns using a list experiment and using the questions traditionally used by studies of vote buying. Our list experiment estimated that 24 % of registered voters in Nicaragua were offered a gift or service in exchange for their vote, whereas only 2 % reported the behavior when asked directly. We then demonstrate that the social desirability bias is non-random and that the analysis based on traditional obtrusive measures of vote buying is unreliable. We also provide systematic evidence that shows the importance of monitoring strategies by parties in determining who is targeted for vote buying