Does strengthening Collective Action Clauses (CACs) help?

Does improving creditor coordination by strengthening CACs lead to efficiency gains in the functioning of sovereign bond markets? We address this question in a model featuring both debtor moral hazard and creditor coordination under incomplete information. Conditional on default, we characterize the interim efficient CAC threshold and show that strengthening CACs away from unanimity results in interim welfare gains. However, once the impact of strengthening CACs on debtor’s incentives are taken into account, we demonstrate the robust possibility of a conflict between ex ante and interim efficiency. We calibrate our model to quantify such a welfare trade-o¤ and discuss the policy implications of our results.Sovereign Debt, Coordination, Moral Hazard, Collective Action Clauses, Ex Ante, Ex Post, Efficiency

Liquidity, moral hazard and bank crises

Bank crises, by interrupting liquidity provision, have been viewed as resulting in welfare losses. In a model of banking with moral hazard, we show that second best bank contracts that improve on autarky ex ante require costly crises to occur with positive probability at the interim stage. When bank payo§s are partially appropriable, either directly via imposition of Önes or indirectly by the use of bank equity as a collateral, we argue that an appropriately designed ex-ante regime of policy intervention involving conditional monitoring can prevent bank crises

Does strengthening Collective Action Clauses (CACs) help?

Does improving creditor coordination by strengthening CACs lead to efficiency gains in the functioning of sovereign bond markets? We address this question in a model featuring both debtor moral hazard and creditor coordination under incomplete information. Conditional on default, we characterize the interim effi cient CAC threshold and show that strengthening CACs away from unanimity results in interim welfare gains. However, once the impact of strengthening CACs on debtor's incentives are taken into account, we demonstrate the robust possibility of a conflict between ex ante and interim effi ciency. We calibrate our model to quantify such a welfare trade-off and discuss the policy implications of our results

Optimal Sovereign Debt Write-downs

At present, the enhanced HIPC initiative and the Gleneagles Proposal for debt write-downs by the G8 are the main mechanisms used to reduce indebtedness of low-income countries. In these countries where poor governance is a key issue, it is naïve to believe that the Millennium Development Goals can be achieved if the current debt relief mechanisms fail to address such problem. In this paper, we develop a model of sovereign debt write-downs, where governance problems reflect domestic distributive conflict between two classes in the society and intertemporal conflict. The main policy issue is how to design the optimal form of debt write-downs and the conditionality requirements attached to it with such governance problems in mind. To deal with the domestic distributive conflict, it is crucial that the conditionality requirements target both provision of public goods and private consumption level of the poor citizens. Addressing the intertemporal conflict problem requires the use of long-run conditionality requirements. Against such a benchmark, we then evaluate the efficacy of the current debt relief initiatives and discuss some policy implications.Debt Relief, Conditionality, HIPC Initiative.

Why did (not) the East Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Intra-Elite Conflict and Risk Sharing

The process of enfranchisement is studied in a model of intra-elite conflict over the sharing of social surplus. The relative bargaining power of each elite, function of the surplus each elite is able to appropriate if the bargaining breaks down, is uncertain ex-ante. Accordingly, two competing elites can decide to enfranchise a weak but numerically large non-elite group in order to insure against future imbalances in relative bargaining power. The enfranchisement decision requires the non-elite group to be relatively weak and imperfectly informed about intra-elite bargaining power. Our results are robust to public good provision following enfranchisement when there is preference heterogeneity over the location of the public good across the different elites. A comparative analysis of the Indian Democracy is provided.

Technology, Organisation and Productivity Performance in Services: Lessons from Britain and the United States, 1870-1990

We document comparative productivity performance since 1870, showing the importance of services for US overtaking of Britain. The transition in market services from customised, low-volume, high-margin business organised on a network basis to standardised, high-volume, low-margin business with hierarchical management, is identified as a key factor. A model of the interaction between technology, organisation and economic performance is then provided, focusing on the transition from networks to hierarchies. We show that different technologies and organisational forms can co-exist efficiently and that technological change can cause difficulties of adjustment if it is not suited to the social capabilities of the society.productivity, services, technology, organisation, hierarchies, netwworks

Does Strengthening Collective Action Clauses (CACs) Help?

We study the effect of strengthening CACs in a debt rollover model of a sovereign debt crisis. Conditional on default, there are multiple equilibria: the impact of strengthening CACs depends critically on the prevailing equilibrium. For a subset of equilibria, (i) given a fixed number of creditors, we derive an optimal CAC threshold and (ii) given a fixed CAC threshold, as the number of creditors becomes larger, we show a convergence to efficient information aggregation. Moreover, strengthening CACs may actually increase the ex ante probability of adverse shock. Our analysis makes the case for a formal sovereign bankruptcy procedure.Sovereign Debt, Bargaining, Coordination, Moral Hazard, Collective Action Clauses.

Does strengthening Collective Action Clauses (CACs) help?

In a model with both issues of sovereign debtor moral hazard and creditor coordination under incomplete information, we show that the resulting conflict between ex ante and interim efficiency limits the welfare impact of strengthening CACs. Conditional on default, we show that an interim efficient CAC threshold exists and improving creditor coordination results in welfare gains. However, when ex ante efficiency requires the sovereign debtor to choose actions that reduce the probability of default, improved creditor coordination reduces ex ante efficiency and the interim efficient CAC threshold is higher than the ex ante efficient CAC threshold.Sovereign Debt ; Coordination ; Moral Hazard ; Collective Action Clauses ; Ex Ante ; Ex Post ; Efficiency

The Millenium Development Goals and Sovereign Debt Write-downs

Can sovereign debt write-downs be used to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)? This paper shows that transparency of domestic governance determines how a sovereign debt write-down is structured to attain the MDGs. When domestic governance is transparent, an unconditional debt write-down enhances non-elites’ welfare. Without such transparency, conditions that directly link the debt write-down to public goods that improve non-elites’ welfare are required. In the latter case, in a dynamic setting, the debt write-down also has to be directly linked to the amount of new debt issued. Using our formal analysis, we evaluate the efficacy of the current debt relief initiatives and discuss some policy implications.Debt Write-down, Representativeness, Transparency, Conditionality, Millennium Development Goals.