The effect of time constraint on anticipation, decision making, and option generation in complex and dynamic environments

Researchers interested in performance in complex and dynamic situations have focused on how individuals predict their opponent(s) potential courses of action (i.e., during assessment) and generate potential options about how to respond (i.e., during intervention). When generating predictive options, previous research supports the use of cognitive mechanisms that are consistent with long-term working memory (LTWM) theory (Ericsson and Kintsch in Phychol Rev 102(2):211–245, 1995; Ward et al. in J Cogn Eng Decis Mak 7:231–254, 2013). However, when generating options about how to respond, the extant research supports the use of the take-the-first (TTF) heuristic (Johnson and Raab in Organ Behav Hum Decis Process 91:215–229, 2003). While these models provide possible explanations about how options are generated in situ, often under time pressure, few researchers have tested the claims of these models experimentally by explicitly manipulating time pressure. The current research investigates the effect of time constraint on option-generation behavior during the assessment and intervention phases of decision making by employing a modified version of an established option-generation task in soccer. The results provide additional support for the use of LTWM mechanisms during assessment across both time conditions. During the intervention phase, option-generation behavior appeared consistent with TTF, but only in the non-time-constrained condition. Counter to our expectations, the implementation of time constraint resulted in a shift toward the use of LTWM-type mechanisms during the intervention phase. Modifications to the cognitive-process level descriptions of decision making during intervention are proposed, and implications for training during both phases of decision making are discussed

Conscious thought beats deliberation without attention in diagnostic decision-making: at least when you are an expert

Contrary to what common sense makes us believe, deliberation without attention has recently been suggested to produce better decisions in complex situations than deliberation with attention. Based on differences between cognitive processes of experts and novices, we hypothesized that experts make in fact better decisions after consciously thinking about complex problems whereas novices may benefit from deliberation-without-attention. These hypotheses were confirmed in a study among doctors and medical students. They diagnosed complex and routine problems under three conditions, an immediate-decision condition and two delayed conditions: conscious thought and deliberation-without-attention. Doctors did better with conscious deliberation when problems were complex, whereas reasoning mode did not matter in simple problems. In contrast, deliberation-without-attention improved novices’ decisions, but only in simple problems. Experts benefit from consciously thinking about complex problems; for novices thinking does not help in those cases

Conscious versus unconscious thinking in the medical domain: the deliberation-without-attention effect examined

Previous studies have shown that with important decisions, unconscious thought has surprisingly led to better choices than conscious thought. The present study challenges this so-called ‘deliberation-without-attention effect’ in the medical domain. In a computerized study, physicians and medical students were asked, after either conscious or unconscious thought, to estimate the 5-year survival probabilities of four fictitious patients with varying medical characteristics. We assumed that experienced physicians would outperform students as a result of their superior knowledge. The central question was whether unconscious thought in this task would lead to better performance in experts or novices, in line with the deliberation-without-attention effect. We created four fictitious male 60-year-old patients, each of whom with signs and symptoms related to likely prognosis, from 12 (Complex) or 4 (Simple) categories. This manipulation resulted in objectively different life expectancies for these patients. Participants (86 experienced physicians and 57 medical students) were randomly allocated to the Simple or Complex condition. Statements were randomly presented for 8 s. Next, each participant assessed the life expectancies after either conscious or unconscious thought. As expected, experienced physicians were better in assessing life expectancies than medical students. No significant differences were found in performance between conscious and unconscious thought, nor did we detect a significant interaction between expertise level and mode of thought. In a medical decision task, unconscious thought did not lead to better performance of experienced physicians or medical students than conscious thought. Our findings do not support the deliberation-without-attention effect

The Problem of Interrogation-Induced False Confession: Sources of Failure in Prevention and Detection

Interrogation-induced false confessions are a systemic feature of American criminal justice. In the last few decades, scholars have assembled evidence of instances of false confessions that resulted in wrongful convictions. Despite procedural safeguards and a constitutional prohibition against legally coercive interrogation techniques, American law enforcement continues to elicit false confessions. In particular, American law enforcement interrogation techniques display two problematic features that have the potential to increase the occurrence of false confessions: (1) an assumption of guilt that promotes the misclassification of innocent suspects as likely guilty; and (2) the still-coercive nature of interrogation tactics that include strong incentives promoting confession as the mechanism to achieve the best legal outcomes and that contaminate the content of the confessions they elicit. In this article, we address two questions: (1) Why do false confessions occur, and what can be done to prevent them?; and (2) Why do false confessions remain undetected once elicited, and what be done to more successfully identify them when they do occur? We particularly emphasize the role of failures of relevant knowledge and understanding among those who elicit and misjudge false confessions