Metamorphosis of Subarachnoid Hemorrhage Research: from Delayed Vasospasm to Early Brain Injury

Delayed vasospasm that develops 3–7 days after aneurysmal subarachnoid hemorrhage (SAH) has traditionally been considered the most important determinant of delayed ischemic injury and poor outcome. Consequently, most therapies against delayed ischemic injury are directed towards reducing the incidence of vasospasm. The clinical trials based on this strategy, however, have so far claimed limited success; the incidence of vasospasm is reduced without reduction in delayed ischemic injury or improvement in the long-term outcome. This fact has shifted research interest to the early brain injury (first 72 h) evoked by SAH. In recent years, several pathological mechanisms that activate within minutes after the initial bleed and lead to early brain injury are identified. In addition, it is found that many of these mechanisms evolve with time and participate in the pathogenesis of delayed ischemic injury and poor outcome. Therefore, a therapy or therapies focused on these early mechanisms may not only prevent the early brain injury but may also help reduce the intensity of later developing neurological complications. This manuscript reviews the pathological mechanisms of early brain injury after SAH and summarizes the status of current therapies

Loss of Control Increases Belief in Precognition and Belief in Precognition Increases Control

Every year thousands of dollars are spent on psychics who claim to "know" the future. The present research questions why, despite no evidence that humans are able to psychically predict the future, do people persist in holding irrational beliefs about precognition? We argue that believing the future is predictable increases one's own perceived ability to exert control over future events. As a result, belief in precognition should be particularly strong when people most desire control-that is, when they lack it. In Experiment 1(N = 87), people who were experimentally induced to feel low in control reported greater belief in precognition than people who felt high in control. Experiment 2 (N = 53) investigated whether belief in precognition increases perceived control. Consistent with this notion, providing scientific evidence that precognition is possible increased feelings of control relative to providing scientific evidence that precognition was not possible. Experiment 3 (N = 132) revealed that when control is low, believing in precognition helps people to feel in control once more. Prediction therefore acts as a compensatory mechanism in times of low control. The present research provides new insights into the psychological functions of seemingly irrational beliefs, like belief in psychic abilities