When Well-Being Trumps Liberty: Political Theory, Jurisprudence, and Children\u27s Rights

Compared to most adults, children are dependent and vulnerable and therefore require special protection. Efforts to safeguard their well-being often collide with one or more of the liberty guarantees of the First Amendment. Professor Etzioni fears that current jurisprudence has tipped the balance too far towards individual liberty, making it difficult to extend children the legal protection they need. Drawing on a theoretical account of constitutionalism as well as existing case law, the author argues that mainstream jurisprudence is up to the task of balancing the well-being of children against the liberty of adults. The Supreme Court\u27s recent decision in United States v. American Library Association, Inc., upholding the Children\u27s Internet Protection Act, broke little new ground but rather applied existing constitutional standards to reach a sound result

Should Public Law Accommodate the Claims of Conscience?

In the end, it seems to me, the matter boils down to a single issue. Many individuals consider themselves bound by two sources of authority, public law and conscience, whose demands do not always coincide. Is the state prepared to take cognizance of this fact, and if so, how should it respond? Unlike other regimes, liberal democracies should not find these questions unduly challenging. To be a liberal state is to recognize limits on the legitimate scope of public authority; to be a liberal democracy is to recognize limits on the authority of the people and on the writ of law enacted by majorities. And it was the clash between civil law and religion that gave rise to the idea of limited public authority. The claims of conscience found, and continue to find, their place within the space this limitation opened up

Why Liberal Tolerance, Rightly Understood, Is Coherent and Defensible

One of the most familiar criticisms of liberal democracy is that it cannot defend itself against its enemies while remaining true to its principles. This criticism is odd as well as unjust because theorists regarded as arch-liberals offer compelling reasons to reject it. .

Promoting tolerance for the twenty-first century

Polis : Revista de Estudos Jurídico-Políticos. - ISSN 0872-8208. - N. 6 (1998). - p. 65-70

Why The Ministerial Exception Is Consistent With Smith—And Why It Makes Sense

This conference puts on the table two linked questions: Can Hosanna-Tabor be reconciled with Employment Division v. Smith and, if so, on what basis? Let me say straightway that I have at most an amateur’s understanding of constitutional law and jurisprudence. I bring to our questions some intuitions about the best framework for thinking about them, and whatever light my home discipline of political theory can shed on them. I have also benefitted enormously from Christopher Lund’s splendid law review article on the topic of this conference