Foundations of a Theory of Social Forms

In the early transition era in Russia entry barriers for commercial banks were about absent. It resulted in the mushrooming of hundreds of small, poorly-endowed and inexperienced banks. In this paper we address the question whether the claimed benefits of low entry barriers - competition and market dynamics - have resulted. We use a sample of commercial saving banks for the 1994-97 period. We conclude that there were important mobility barriers and that the removal of entry barriers did not lead to intensified competition.forms;foundation of organization theory;identity;populations

The fog of change: opacity and asperity in organizations

Initial architectural change in organizations often induces other subsequent changes, generating lengthy cascades of changes in subordinate units. This article extends a formal model of cascading organizational change by examining the implications for organizational change of the limited foresight of those who initiate such change about unit interconnections (structural opacity) and the normative restrictiveness imposed on architectural features by organizational culture (cultural asperity). Opacity leads actors to underestimate the lengths of periods of reorganization and the associated costs of change, thereby prompting them unwittingly to undertake changes with adverse consequences. Increased opacity and asperity lengthen the total time that the organization spends reorganizing and the associated opportunity costs; and the expected effect of an architectural change on mortality hazards increases with the intricacy of the organizational design, structural opacity, and the asperity of organizational culture. We illustrate the theory with an interpretation of the 1995 collapse of Baring Brothers Bank

Foundations of a Theory of Social Forms

In the early transition era in Russia entry barriers for commercial banks were about absent. It resulted in the mushrooming of hundreds of small, poorly-endowed and inexperienced banks. In this paper we address the question whether the claimed benefits of low entry barriers - competition and market dynamics - have resulted. We use a sample of commercial saving banks for the 1994-97 period. We conclude that there were important mobility barriers and that the removal of entry barriers did not lead to intensified competition

The logics of organization theory: Audiences, codes and ecologies

Building theories of organizations is challenging: theories are partial and "folk" categories are fuzzy. The commonly used tools--first-order logic and its foundational set theory--are ill-suited for handling these complications. Here, three leading authorities rethink organization theory. Logics of Organization Theory sets forth and applies a new language for theory building based on a nonmonotonic logic and fuzzy set theory. In doing so, not only does it mark a major advance in organizational theory, but it also draws lessons for theory building elsewhere in the social sciences. Organizational research typically analyzes organizations in categories such as "bank," "hospital," or "university." These categories have been treated as crisp analytical constructs designed by researchers. But sociologists increasingly view categories as constructed by audiences. This book builds on cognitive psychology and anthropology to develop an audience-based theory of organizational categories. It applies this framework and the new language of theory building to organizational ecology. It reconstructs and integrates four central theory fragments, and in so doing reveals unexpected connections and new insights

Foundations of a theory of social forms

Sociologists frequently invoke the concept of form when analyzing organizations, collective action, art, music, culture and other phenomena. Nonetheless, the form concept has not received careful theoretical analysis, either generally or in specific context. Using the tools of formal logic and set theory, we propose a language for defining social forms that is sufficiently general to incorporate feature-based, position-based and boundary-based approaches to defining forms. We focus on organizational forms although we intend our conceptualization to be general. We define forms as a type of socially coded identity. We define identity in terms of social codes that specify the properties that an entity can legitimately possess. These codes can be enforced by insiders or outsiders. We claim that one knows that a social code exists when one observes that departures from the codes after periods of conformity cause a devaluation of the entity by relevant insiders and/or outsiders. This construction allows us to define a population as the set of entities with a common minimal external identity in a bounded system in a period of time. The minimal property ensures that we localize to the most specific socially enforced identities. The reliance on identities instead of forms allows us to define populations that never achieve form status and to extend population definitions back to the period of early legitimation. Research design implications follow

The evolution of inertia

This article examines some evolutionary consequences of architectural inertia in organizations. The main theorem holds that selection favors architectural inertia in the sense that the median level of inertia in a closed population of organizations increases over time. The other key theorems hold that the selection intensity favoring architectural inertia increases with the levels of intricacy and structural opacity and decreases with cultural asperity

Cascading organizational change

This article develops a formal theory of the structural aspects of organizational change. It concentrates on changes in an organization's architecture, depicted as a code system. It models the common process whereby an initial architectural change prompts other changes in the organization, generating a cascade of changes that represents the full reorganization. The main argument ties centrality of the organizational unit initiating a change to the total time that the organization spends reorganizing and to the associated opportunity costs. The central theorem holds that the expected deleterious effect of a change in architecture on the mortality hazard increases with viscosity and the intricacy of the organizational design