The Social Structure of the Market for Force

Over the past two decades, governments have increasingly contracted private military and security companies (PMSCs) to support military operations in conflicts. However, many observers have argued that such companies are ‘greedy market actors’ or ‘reckless mercenaries’ and their level of performance very poor. A minority has defended them as security professionals. If market competition is present, the level of performance is high and positive contributions to the client’s military operation can be expected. However, neither PMSC opponents nor proponents can account for the variance in the level of performance in three crucial cases – Sierra Leone, Iraq, and Afghanistan. This article argues that different market structures explain this variance. At least three ideal configurations exist: collaborative, competitive, and rival structures. These structures influence the level of performance. PMSC performance levels are expected to decrease from the first configuration, being positive, to the last, being negative

Switchable nanometer contacts: Ultrathin Ag nanostructures on Si(100)

The fabrication and characterization of metallic nanometer-sized gaps suitable for conductivity measurements of single molecules were studied. Controlled gap formation by electromigration (EM) is demonstrated in contiguous and ultrathin Ag structures wetting the Si(100) substrate. The gaps obtained are in the range of nanometers or even subnanometers, as revealed by lateral conductivity measurements and scanning tunneling microscopy carried out under ultrahigh vacuum conditions. Annealing to 300 K closes the gap by enabling surface diffusion of Ag, and another cycle of opening by EM at 80 K can be performed. The functionality of the contacts is demonstrated by insertion of ferrocenedithiol molecules into the gap. © 2006 American Institute of Physics