The economic effects of the fair tax: analysis of results of a dynamic CGE model of the US economy

By replacing the current income tax with a national sales tax, the FairTax proposal would end the double taxation of saving inherent in the existing tax code and, by doing so, raise output, employment, investment and capital stock relative to the benchmark economy. While these positive effects would be felt almost immediately, the FairTax is very much an investment in the future. Its full benefits would be realized only after the economy achieved a new “steady state,” some 20–25 years into implementation. Only by that point, will the effects on growth have been fully absorbed into the economy and the wellbeing of most households across most income groups improved. The policy choice, then, is between the status quo, and a new policy that would inflict some short-run pain as the price of a permanently expanded economy

Simulating corporate income tax reform proposals with a dynamic CGE model

Opinion leaders and policy makers in the United States have turned their focus to the corporate income tax, which now has the highest statutory rate in the developed world. Using a dynamic computable general equilibrium model (the “NCPA-DCGE Model”), we simulate alternative policies for reducing the U.S. corporate income tax. We find that reductions in the corporate income tax rate result in significant positive impacts on output, investment, capital formation, employment, and household well-being (for almost all deciles). All of the hypothesized reforms also result in a more-streamlined public sector. These results are plausible insofar as the DCGE model from which they are obtained is parameterized by plausible elasticity assumptions, and incorporates the adjustments in prices, output, employment and investment that result from changes in tax policy

SUPPRESSION OR AUGMENTATION OF THE ANTIHAPTEN RESPONSE IN MICE BY ANTIBODIES OF DIFFERENT SPECIFICITIES

We have measured the production by (C57 x CBA)F1 mice of hapten-binding antibody in response to a standard dose of 50 µg of alum-precipitated NIP12-CG and the influence on this response of the prior administration of hyperimmune antisera raised against the homologous conjugate, the carrier globulin alone, the hapten conjugated to a non-cross-reactive carrier (NIP4-OA), or a related hapten (NP) coupled to CG. The homologous antiserum was strongly immunosuppressive; a dose capable of binding about 1% of the administered hapten caused significant suppression. High doses of anticarrier serum caused significant but modest suppression (about 50%); low doses had no effect. High doses of the serum prepared against NIP4-OA suppressed the 19 day response by more than 97%, while 100–1,000 times lower doses caused the response to be elevated to about double the control level. The antibodies responsible for immunosuppression could be removed from this serum, as could the NIP-binding antibodies, by absorption with NIP coupled through ethylenediamine to insoluble Sepharose. The ability of this serum to augment the response was not reduced by such absorption. Augmenting antibodies could be removed by absorption with HOP-BSA-Sepharose. Thus, immunosuppression and augmentation are functions of two different populations of antibody. The former are specific hapten-binding antibodies, the latter seem to be directed against new antigenic determinants created by coupling any of the family of haptens through lysine to protein carriers. In support of this contention, it was observed that rabbit antiserum to NP-CG, after absorption with CG-Sepharose, augmented the response of mice to standard immunization with NIP12-CG. Female mice produced significantly more NIP-binding antibody than did males

Fiscal policy, growth and income distribution in the UK

Income and income inequality increased substantially in the UK during the industrial revolution. Income inequality was the highest around 1880. This triggered enactments of more egalitarian tax and transfer system, which halved income inequality by the 1960s. Inequality has risen again with fiscal system reforms in the last five decades. By analysing solutions of a dynamic computable general equilibrium (DCGE) model we show how policies could be designed for the optimal equitable paths of UK economy in the 21st century

Where is planning to be found? Material practices and the multiple spaces of planning

A range of new spaces of English planning have emerged in recent years. One new space of clear import is the sub-region. In this paper we seek to gain a better understanding of why sub-regional spaces emerge, how they are used and how planning functions through them. Drawing upon an analysis of three English regions and interviews with actors the paper identifies four types of sub-regional planning that highlight the relationship between accountable, legally sanctioned territorial spaces on the one hand and more informal, open and strategic sub-regional spaces on the other. Sub-regional planning provides an important if not critical strategic parallel to regulatory planning though the relationship between the two is characterised by complexity, contestation, experimentation and impermanence. Among other issues raised by this contemporary reworking of planning is the emergence of an accountability gap through the uncoupling of formal democratic processes embedded within territories and the more diffuse practices of strategic plan making. This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from SAGE via http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0263774X1561417

Fiscal Policy, Growth and Income Distribution in the UK

Income and income inequality increased substantially in the UK during the industrial revolution. Income inequality was the highest around 1880.This triggered enactments of more egalitarian tax and transfer system, which halved income inequality by the 1960s. Inequality has risen again with fiscal system reforms in the last five decades. By analysing solutions of a dynamic computable general equilibrium (DCGE) model we show how policies could be designed for the optimal equitable paths of UK economy in the 21st century

What ‘should’ urban policy do? a further response to Graham Haughton, Iain Deas and Stephen Hincks

Making an impact: reply to Overman Graham Haughton, Iain Deas, Stephen Hincks What ‘should’ urban policy do? A further response to Graham Haughton, Iain Deas, and Stephen Hincks Henry Overma

The distributional effects of the Trump and Clinton tax proposals

Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump, the Democratic and Republican candidates for President of the U.S. in 2016, proposed several changes in the federal tax code. Hillary Clinton would add a personal income tax surcharge of 4% on high annual incomes, limit the tax benefits of non-charitable deductions, set a minimum tax rate of 30% on taxpayers earning more than one million dollars a year, increase the tax rates on capital gains for taxpayers in the top tax bracket, and expand the base of the estate tax. Donald Trump would reduce the number of personal income tax rates, increase the standard personal deduction, cut all taxes on business income to no more than 15%, and abolish the inheritance tax. Using a tax calculator model, we estimate the static effects of these very different changes. Over a ten-year period, Clinton’s proposals would raise federal tax revenue by a total of $816 billion, an increase of 1.9$9.8 trillion. Clinton’s higher taxes would reduce incomes and revenue somewhat, while Trump’s tax cuts would potentially boost output substantially. Using an extended simulation model, we find that 86% of the incremental tax burden of Clinton’s tax increases would fall on those in the top tenth of the income distribution. Most other taxpayers would see only minor changes in their tax burdens, and the revenue and redistributive effects of her proposed changes are relatively modest. Meanwhile, 70% of Trump’s tax cuts would go to those in the top decile, and the effects are large, with gains of over $15,000 annually per person for this group, compared to gains of less than$500 per person for the poorest 40% of the population. On tax policy, the two candidates propose strikingly different policies