Evolutionary Game Theory and Thorstein Veblen’s Evolutionary Economics: Is EGT Veblenian?

This essay provides an approach to the analysis of the link between Thorstein Veblen's evolutionary approach and evolutionary game theory (EGT). We shed some light on the potential contribution of Veblen's theory of socioeconomic evolution to the discussion on the application of EGT to social environments. We also investigate to what extent elements of EGT can be used to formalize some of the basic evolutionary principles proposed by Veblen. The methodological imperatives laid down by Veblen, defining an evolutionary approach, are presented. We provide an analytical framework that allows the evaluation of EGT in terms of Veblen's evolutionary approach. To better understand the main principles and rationale behind EGT and how it can be applied as a tool for analyzing issues on the diversity, interaction, and evolution of social systems, we discuss this nontraditional approach and its basic concepts. Finally, the main characteristics of EGT are contrasted with Veblen's principles.Evolution; Evolutionary Economics; Evolutionary; Game Theory; Games

Subject-specific Performance Information can worsen the Tragedy of the Commons: Experimental Evidence

The main aim of this article is to investigate the behavioral consequences of the provision of subject-specific information in the group effort levels chosen by players in an experimental CPR game. We examine two basic treatments, one with incomplete information and the other with complete information. In the former, subjects are informed only about their own individual payoffs and the aggregate extraction effort level of the group, and in the latter they are also informed about the individual effort levels and payoffs of each subject. Given this setting, the basic question we attempt to answer is: Will the provision of subject-specific performance information (i.e. individual’s effort levels and payoffs) improve or worsen the tragedy of the commons (i.e. an exploitation effort level greater than the socially optimum level)? In order to motivate our hypotheses and explain our experimental results at the individual level, we make use of the theory of learning in games, which goes beyond standard non-cooperative game theory, allowing us to explore the three basic benchmarks in the commons context: Nash equilibrium, Pareto efficient, and open access outcomes. We use several learning and imitation theoretical models that are based on contrasting assumptions about the level of rationality and the information available to subjects, namely: best response, imitate the average, mix of best response and imitate the average, imitate the best and follow the exemplary learning rules. Finally, in order to econometrically test the hypotheses formulated from the theoretical predictions we use a random-effects model to assess the explanatory power of the different selected behavioral learning and imitation rules.Common Property Resources, Information, Learning and Imitation, Experimental Economics.

On the Enforcement of Territorial Use Rights Regulations: A Game Theoretic Approach

Territorial Use Rights (commonly known as TURFs in the literature) consists in the allocation of fishing rights to individuals and/or groups to fish in certain geographical locations. A requisite for these communities to be granted fishing rights is the formulation of a management and exploitation plan (MEP). While thus far the literature on TURFs has been centred on the biological and technical aspects of it, to our knowledge there is no work squarely dealing with the issue of enforcement of the MEP that the community, once granted the fishing use rights, have to comply with. We formally explore this issue from an economic perspective by formulating a static game of norm compliance in a regime of common property resource exploitation. The key characteristic of this game is a monitoring and sanctioning mechanism, where fishermen monitor and sanction one another. We found that in the absence of any endogenous regulation from the part of the fishing community, TURFs can not avoid the economic overexploitation of the fishery. We discuss the importance of economic incentives (and disincentives) in the formulation of endogenous regulations aimed at ensuring compliance of the MEP. Our results on the relevance of economic incentives in the context of a TURF regulation can also be used to highlight the importance of less conventional enforcement tools.Territorial Use Rights, Enforcement, Game Theory, Chile

Whistleblowing Behavior in Organizations

We develop a game theoretical model of whistleblowing behavior in organizations, focusing speci�fically on the role of incentives aimed at encouraging this type of behavior. We also analyze the potential impacts of whistleblowing behavior on the persistence of corruption. First, we present a static game consisting of two employees with three available strategies: honest, corrupt and whistleblowing behavior. Later, we examine the pure and mixed Nash equilibrium strategies of the game. Second, we use the concept of replicator dynamics to formally explore the local asymptotic stability of whistleblowing behavior within organizations. Our main results show that whistleblowing as a mechanism to control wrongdoing is only relevant under the existence of external monitoring (if the probability of detecting wrongdoing with an external mechanism is close to zero, then in the long term, all employees will begin to behave corruptly). We also show that whistleblowers reduce the minimum wages required to avoid corruption within an organization, making it less costly for an organization to combat corruption. Finally, we claim that whistleblowing strategies seem to be less attractive for activities with very high bribery in comparison to the rewards for whistleblowers, for example, this could be the case of manufacturing or retail, but not for �nancial services in general

Whistleblowing Behavior in Organizations

We develop a game theoretical model of whistleblowing behavior in organizations, focusing speci�fically on the role of incentives aimed at encouraging this type of behavior. We also analyze the potential impacts of whistleblowing behavior on the persistence of corruption. First, we present a static game consisting of two employees with three available strategies: honest, corrupt and whistleblowing behavior. Later, we examine the pure and mixed Nash equilibrium strategies of the game. Second, we use the concept of replicator dynamics to formally explore the local asymptotic stability of whistleblowing behavior within organizations. Our main results show that whistleblowing as a mechanism to control wrongdoing is only relevant under the existence of external monitoring (if the probability of detecting wrongdoing with an external mechanism is close to zero, then in the long term, all employees will begin to behave corruptly). We also show that whistleblowers reduce the minimum wages required to avoid corruption within an organization, making it less costly for an organization to combat corruption. Finally, we claim that whistleblowing strategies seem to be less attractive for activities with very high bribery in comparison to the rewards for whistleblowers, for example, this could be the case of manufacturing or retail, but not for �nancial services in general

The Optimal Pricing of Pollution When Enforcement is Costly

We consider the pricing of a uniformly mixed pollutant when enforcement is costly with a model of optimal, possibly firm-specific, emissions taxes and their enforcement. We argue that optimality requires an enforcement strategy that induces full compliance by every firm. This holds whether or not regulators have complete information about firms’ abatement costs, the costs of monitoring them for compliance, or the costs of collecting penalties from noncompliant firms. Moreover, ignoring several unrealistic special cases, optimality requires discriminatory emissions taxes except when regulators are unable to observe firms’ abatement costs, the costs of monitoring individual firms, or any firm-specific characteristic that is known to be jointly distributed with either the firms’ abatement costs or their monitoring costs. In many pollution control settings, especially those that have been subject to various forms of environmental regulation in the past, regulators are not likely to be so ill-informed about individual firms. In these settings, policies that set or generate a uniform pollution price like conventional designs involving uniform taxes and competitive emission trading with freely-allocated or auctioned permits will not be efficient.Compliance, Enforcement, Emissions Taxes, Monitoring, Asymmetric Information, Uncertainty

Aportación a la Geología de la región de Barbastro

Se da a conocer el resultado de un estudio microtectónico en los materiales evaporíticos del anticlinal de Barbastro con lo que se pone de manifiesto que este accidente es consecuencia de dos mecanismos de deformación no sincrónicos: una compresión primero y movimientos halocinéticos locales posteriores.Asimismo, se da una hipótesis sobre la posible distribución en profundidad del frente del manto de Gavarnie y su relación con el anticlinal

Aportación a la Geología de la región de Barbastro

Se da a conocer el resultado de un estudio microtectónico en los materiales evaporíticos del anticlinal de Barbastro con lo que se pone de manifiesto que este accidente es consecuencia de dos mecanismos de deformación no sincrónicos: una compresión primero y movimientos halocinéticos locales posteriores.Asimismo, se da una hipótesis sobre la posible distribución en profundidad del frente del manto de Gavarnie y su relación con el anticlinal

SPECIFIC INHIBITION OF LYMPHOID COMPLEMENT RECEPTORS BY ANTI-H-2 SERA: EVIDENCE FOR A NEW H-2 LINKED POLYMORPHISM

Certain anti-H-2 sera contain an antibody-like activity which specifically inhibits EAC rosette formation by lymphoid (and not myeloid) cells of certain mouse strains. Studies in congenic recombinant mouse strains strongly indicate that at least part of the control of susceptibility to inhibition by these antisera is mediated by H-2 linked genes, mapping in the I-C subregion or the S region. The strain distribution of the trait CRIS indicates that certain H-2 identical mice behave differently from one another, pointing toward a component of non-H-2 modulation of the H-2 linked gene (or to a previously unsuspected H-2 difference). Positive sera were usually raised across differences in the D end of the H-2 complex. The complex implications of this system must be considered in the light of known S region involvement in complement metabolism.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/73055/1/j.1744-313X.1975.tb00549.x.pd

Presencia de estratificación cruzada Hummocky en depósitos lacustres del Terciario de la Depresión del Ebro

En algunos depósitos carbonatado-terrígenos del Terciario lacustre de la Depresión del Ebro se han reconocido estructuras sedimentarias generadas por olas entre las que se han identificado ripples de oscilación así como estratificaciones cruzadas «Hummocky» y «Swaley» que evidencian etapas de alta energía. Las investigaciones realizadas ponen de manifiesto que las facies de «ripples» y «hummocky» pudieron originarse entre profundidades de 1 y 7 m bajo la acción de vientos de 50 km/h como mínimo. Los materiales estudiados son afectados por fallas sin sedimentarias con superficies lístricas de 1,5 m de salto. Las capas con HCS fosilizan estas fallas o están cerca de los estratos que las recubren. Por tanto, en la génesis de las facies de HCS se puede considerar la posible acción de «tsunamis» lacustres conectados con la inestabilidad sin sedimentaria provocada por las fallas antes mencionadas