Book reviews

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/45784/1/11153_2004_Article_BF00140614.pd

Hick and Radhakrishnan on Religious Diversity: Back to the Kantian Noumenon

We shall examine some conceptual tensions in Hick’s ‘pluralism’ in the light of S. Radhakrishnan’s reformulation of classical Advaita. Hick himself often quoted Radhakrishnan’s translations from the Hindu scriptures in support of his own claims about divine ineffability, transformative experience and religious pluralism. However, while Hick developed these themes partly through an adaptation of Kantian epistemology, Radhakrishnan derived them ultimately from Śaṁkara (c.800 CE), and these two distinctive points of origin lead to somewhat different types of reconstruction of the diversity of world religions. Our argument will highlight the point that Radhakrishnan is not a ‘pluralist’ in terms of Hick’s understanding of the Real. The Advaitin ultimate, while it too like Hick’s Real cannot be encapsulated by human categories, is, however, not strongly ineffable, because some substantive descriptions, according to the Advaitic tradition, are more accurate than others. Our comparative analysis will reveal that they differ because they are located in two somewhat divergent metaphysical schemes. In turn, we will be able to revisit, through this dialogue between Hick and Radhakrishnan, the intensely vexed question of whether Hick’s version of pluralism is in fact a form of covert exclusivism.This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11841-015-0459-

The Problem of Religious Evil: Does Belief in God Cause Evil?

Daniel Kodaj has recently developed a pro-atheistic argument that he calls "the problem of religious evil." This first premise of this argument is "belief in God causes evil." Although this idea that belief in God causes evil is widely accepted, certainly in the secular West, it is sufficiently problematic as to be unsuitable as a basis for an argument for atheism, as Kodaj seeks to use it. In this paper I shall highlight the problems inherent in it in three ways: by considering whether it is reasonable to say that "belief in God" causes evil; whether it is reasonable to say that belief in God "causes" evil; and whether it is reasonable to say that belief in God causes "evil." In each case I will argue that it is problematic to make such claims, and accordingly I will conclude that the premise "belief in God causes evil" is unacceptable as it stands, and consequently is unable to ground Kodaj's pro-atheistic argument

Normative objections to Atheism

[Excerpt] What might a normative objection to atheism be? There are a number of possibilities. One kind of normative objection to atheism would consist of arguments against atheism that take normativity in general or some particular kind of normativity or even particular normative facts as their starting point. Such arguments would try to show that atheism cannot adequately explain this starting point, or at least show that atheism seems less probable on the basis of these features. In many cases such argument would be combined with arguments that the features in question can be explained if theism is true. What are commonly called moral arguments for theism would be arguments of this kind. (In general any positive argument for theism can also be construed as an objection to atheism, although there could be objections to atheism that are not arguments for theism.) A second possible thing one might mean by a normative objection to atheism would be an argument that atheism is itself practically bad in some way. Perhaps atheism is bad for the atheist, or perhaps atheism produces bad consequences for others. A good example, which will be discussed later, might be Immanuel Kant’s well‐known argument that atheism leads to a kind of moral despair, which is incompatible with the moral faith needed to live as one ought. Another example could be the common claim that atheism undermines moral character in some way, and thus that atheists are more likely to be morally inferior in some respect. Interestingly, there is quite a bit of empirical support for something in the neighborhood of this claim. A good deal of research shows that serious religious believers, who regularly attend a church, synagogue, or mosque, are significantly more likely to help others in a variety of ways. Religious people on average give more to charity than non‐religious people, and they also give more of their time to helping others. This is true not just of gifts made to religious institutions. Religious people are also more likely than non‐believers to give to non‐religious charities.1 However, since these are obviously empirical claims and not deeply philosophical, I shall not give these findings any further consideration. It is clearly not possible in a single article to give a comprehensive treatment of such arguments. What I shall attempt to do in this chapter is describe a number of arguments of both of these two kinds that I regard as among the more promising ones, analyzing both their strengths and possible weak points