A synthesizing framework for technology and content choices for information exchange

In this paper, we develop a synthesizing framework for information exchange. In particular, we identify the drivers of both the content of information exchange as well as the choice of the technology used to facilitate information exchange across multiple organizations. Our first driver is the inter-organizational architecture. Unlike the general architectures developed by Williamson [11] and Adler [1], we focus specifically on the effect of architectures on information exchange. We classify the existing architectures in three dimensions, namely, customization, information sharing or trading and closed or open networks. Such a classification enables us to identify particular architectural characteristics that affect content and technology choices. Our second driver refers to the characteristics of the information, the system, the network and the regulatory environment that affect the credibility and usefulness of information exchange for the participants. Our third driver is the incentive structure in the architecture. Only the information that is deemed to be mutually beneficial by all participants will get exchanged. The incentive structure highlights the cost-benefit trade-offs of individual participants. We also place all the five papers accepted for this special issue within this synthesizing framework. Such positioning allows us to identify potential areas for future research and exploration. © Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2006

Just in time or just in case? An explanatory model with informational and incentive effects

There is extensive literature on the benefits of manufacturing control arising from minimal inventory policies of just in time (JIT). Operations management literature has focused on controlling set-up, lead and changeover times to streamline the operations and achieve low optimal inventory levels. Our paper first expands these models to include information and incentive effects. We then develop a model in which JIT focuses attention on process imbalances and derive the compensation contract that induces managers to be more creative in managing the process. We show that the loss of controllability decreases the benefits of JIT and increase the benefits of traditional buffer inventory. If, as on 11 September 2001, the loss or gain of controllability occurs quickly and unexpectedly, organizations need to develop the agility to switch between minimal inventory and buffer inventory systems