Textile Materials in Liquid Filtration Practices: Current Status and Perspectives in Water and Wastewater Treatment

Filtration is considered the keystone of water and wastewater treatment and is used for various purposes, such as sludge dewatering and concentrating any solution. Moreover, as an advanced filtration technology, membranes can remove materials ranging from large visible particles to molecular and ionic chemical species. Proper selection of filter media/membrane material in filtration processes is often the most important consideration for assuring efficient separation. Filter media can be classified by their materials of construction, such as cotton, wool, linen, glass fiber, porous carbon, metals, and rayons. Recently, new polymeric materials have been used both individually and/or blended in filtration processes for the treatment of waters and wastewaters. The purpose of this chapter is to bring an overview on the textile-originated filter materials in filtration applications from conventional filtration to advanced membrane processes. Although many researches on filter media are available, very few researches have been carried out on the cutting-edge technologies about using filter materials on filtration processes from classical to advanced membrane processes. Therefore, in this part of the book, following major and minor titles are stated truly on the aforementioned new technologies and linked with conventional methods in water and wastewater treatment applications

A Review of State-of-the-Art Technologies in Dye-Containing Wastewater Treatment – The Textile Industry Case

Recently, new single or hybrid/combined processes have attracted much attention for treatment of textile and dyeing wastewaters. These processes which may be termed as “state of the art technologies” are membrane separation processes, ultrasonic, photochemical and electrochemical processes. Although the conventional methods still have been tried with some new materials such as, new adsorbents or coagulants, employing the new generation methods such as, electrocagulation-electrooxidation, sonooxidation or photo oxidation are gaining in popularity when the treatment of textile wastewaters is discussed. The purpose of the book chapter is to bring an overview on the new treatment methods for textile wastewaters, one of the most important source of environmental pollution. Despite the fact that there is no uniform standard currently, many countries have legalized some strict discharging standards and scientists and researchers face new technologies including electrical, sonic, magnetic, optical and thermal methods. Although many researches on treatment of synthetic or real wastewaters with various methods are available, very few researches have been carried out on the cutting-edge technologies. Moreover, there are a lot of review article or book chapters on textile wastewater treatment processes individually based on each conventional process such as coagulation, adsorption, chemical oxidation, and biological decolorization. Therefore, in this part of the book, following major and minor titles are stated truly on the aforementioned new technologies. Besides, these parts are not only about cutting-edge technologies, but also related with conventional methods and their new applications in colored wastewater treatment area briefly

Regional Water and Land Use Planning – Systematic Planning Support

Groundwater over-pumping by manipulating water meters may constraint the efficient use of the resource, leading to the potential aquifers’ deterioration. Well designed institutional arrangements might be effective at reducing over-exploitation. The objective of this research was to shed light on the design of various incentive schemes to face groundwater over-pumping ranging from individual water use-based incentive schemes, where individual withdrawals are the users’ private information, to total water use-based incentive schemes, where the aggregate withdrawal is publicly observable. For the latter setting, two schemes were proposed. The first one is within the framework of moral hazard in teams, where the Water Authority administers monetary incentives that do not balance the budget, restoring thereby the full-information outcome. The second scheme promotes a cooperative management governed by a collective responsibility rule that induces peer monitoring by members. We show that groundwater overuse is more likely when monitoring costs are high, punishments are weak and cooperatives are large. We also show how the cooperative size and punishments are determined endogenously by constraints on monitoring. We extend the basic analysis to study collusion in monitoring between cooperative members and compare different monitoring structures. The results confirm that well-designed incentives and institutions can reduce groundwater over-exploitation, and that constraints on monitoring costs affect institutional design.</jats:p

Regional Water and Land Use Planning – Systematic Planning Support

Groundwater over-pumping by manipulating water meters may constraint the efficient use of the resource, leading to the potential aquifers’ deterioration. Well designed institutional arrangements might be effective at reducing over-exploitation. The objective of this research was to shed light on the design of various incentive schemes to face groundwater over-pumping ranging from individual water use-based incentive schemes, where individual withdrawals are the users’ private information, to total water use-based incentive schemes, where the aggregate withdrawal is publicly observable. For the latter setting, two schemes were proposed. The first one is within the framework of moral hazard in teams, where the Water Authority administers monetary incentives that do not balance the budget, restoring thereby the full-information outcome. The second scheme promotes a cooperative management governed by a collective responsibility rule that induces peer monitoring by members. We show that groundwater overuse is more likely when monitoring costs are high, punishments are weak and cooperatives are large. We also show how the cooperative size and punishments are determined endogenously by constraints on monitoring. We extend the basic analysis to study collusion in monitoring between cooperative members and compare different monitoring structures. The results confirm that well-designed incentives and institutions can reduce groundwater over-exploitation, and that constraints on monitoring costs affect institutional design.</jats:p