Lending to local governments: Risks and behaviour of Hungarian banks

Over the past one and a half years, the amount of credit granted by banks to Hungarian local governments has doubled, and the gap between their cash deficit and net additional indebtness has increased. This borrowing boom is not the result of a drastic change in the financial management of local governments, but stems primarily of the fear of statutory tightening of borrowing conditions and their propensity to hold reserves. As the current statutory regulation does not represent an effective restriction on debt, indebtedness in the sector is limited only by the market – i.e. banks’ lending propensity. Although it is not unprecedented in international practice that this kind of market coordination may – with minor fluctuations – be able to keep indebtedness at an acceptable level, the uncertainties in the financial management of local governments and the weak transparency related to their long-term or contingent liabilities mean that the conditions for this kind of coordination are not fully in place in Hungary. Our survey of banks underpins this assumption, revealing that due to the sharp competition between banks, local governments are in a strong bargaining position vis-a-vis credit institutions, as – due to the lack of information and a high level of uncertainty – credit institutions are limited in the use of more sophisticated risk assessment techniques generally used in the corporate sector, and thus their lending is based on the expected continuity of local government operations.banks, state and local borrowing, bankruptcy; liquidation.

Decline in corporate lending in Hungary and across the Central and East European region during the crisis

Escalation of the global financial crisis in autumn 2008 ended the economic boom in the Central and East European region, which had been financed by external funds and accompanied by dynamic expansion in credit. During the recession, corporate loan portfolios started to decline in nearly all countries in the region. The question arises as to what role banks played in this process: by restraining their credit supply, did they contribute to the deepening of the economic recession and to a slower-thannecessary recovery, or has the contraction in corporate lending resulted from shrinking corporate credit demand caused by the recession? The question is of particular relevance to Hungary, which recorded the steepest decline in corporate lending in the region. In this article, we look at 9 countries1 in Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic States to provide a comparative presentation of developments in corporate lending and interest rates across the region and explore the reasons behind the differences observed. Available information appears to support the assumption that in Hungary – as well as in the Baltic States – the tightening of credit supply may have contributed more to the decline in corporate lending than in other countries of the region. This can be attributed primarily to Hungary’s reliance on external funds and vulnerability. At the same time, these results should be interpreted with the utmost caution for a variety of reasons. On the one hand, caution is called for because of the weakness of the analytical framework applied, as well as due to the limited reliability of the underlying data. On the other hand, the CEE region is far from homogeneous: the economic structure and development path of individual countries reveal more differences than similarities, rendering the comparison of certain aspects of the developments rather difficult.corporate lending, banking, CEE region, lending surveys, credit conditions, parent banks, corporate loan demand

Carbon Intensity of Banks’ Loan Portfolio : A Good Basis for Comparison in Case of LowIncome Countries?

In recent years, more and more credit institutions have been publishing the financed carbon footprint of their loan portfolio, enabling comparisons across institutions, for which investors and supervisors tend to use the carbon intensity of portfolios expressed as a proportion of the financed carbon footprint-to-total loan volumes. In this article, it is argued that such comparisons are unfair to low-income countries with low price levels, as they show the same activity as being more “carbon- intensive” in a low-income country than in a high-income country. The magnitude of such distortions can be significant, amounting to as much as 3 to 7-fold just within the European Union itself. As differences resulting from price levels do not actually represent differences in the carbon intensity of individual countries’ real economy and are also not an “own choice” of these countries (but rather a consequence of the Balassa-Samuelson effect), it is argued that the comparison of carbon intensity of different banks’ loan portfolios should be conducted using purchasing power parity adjustments – if not necessarily for investors, at least in the practice of financial supervisory authorities

A banki hitelportfóliók karbonintenzitása az alacsonyabb jövedelmű országokban – jó alap az összehasonlításra?

Az utóbbi években egyre több hitelintézet teszi közzé az általa finanszírozott karbonemissziót. Ezek intézmények közötti összehasonlítására a befektetők és a felügyeleti hatóságok is leginkább a hitelvolumen-arányos (fajlagos) karbonintenzitást használják. A cikk amellett érvel, hogy ezekben az összehasonlításokban az alacsonyabb jövedelmű és árszintű országok a módszertan sajátosságaiból adódóan hátrányt szenvednek, mivel ez a módszer fajlagosan „karbonintenzívebbnek” mutatja ugyanazt a tevékenységet egy alacsonyabb jövedelmű és árszínvonalú országban, mint egy magasabb jövedelmű és árszínvonalú országban. Ezek a különbségek igen jelentősek, csak az EU-n belül akár 3–7 szeresek is lehetnek. Mivel az árszínvonalból eredő különbségek nem jelentenek valós eltérést az egyes országok reálgazdasági tevékenységének karbonintenzitása között, ráadásul ezek a különbségek nem az országok saját választásainak eredményeként alakulnak ki (hanem a Balassa– Samuelson-hatás miatt), ezért amellett érvelünk, hogy a banki hitelportfóliók karbonlábnyomának összehasonlítása során szükség lenne a vásárlóerő-paritással történő kiigazításukra – ha nem is feltétlenül a befektetői, de legalább is a felügyeleti gyakorlatban mindenképpen

Toolkit for stimulating corporate lending

Following the 2009 recession, a turnaround in corporate lending has not occurred in Hungary. Therefore, the risk of the phenomenon known in the literature as a creditless recovery has risen significantly. Based on empirical analyses, a creditless recovery leads to a slower and protracted economic recovery. Moreover, the escalating sovereign debt crisis in the peripheral euro area and banking regulatory responses in the EU may lead to more pronounced credit supply constraints by European banks, which could negatively affect the subsidiaries in the CEE region. The MNB staff has written numerous internal reports on the reasons behind the subdued lending and policy recommendations for reversing this trend. In this paper, we summarize the findings of this background research and review the state’s possible intervention alternatives to boosting corporate lending on both the supply and demand side. We think that the most effective way of intervention is that the public sector assumes partial credit risk from the banking sector, since a contraction in corporate lending can be attributed to credit supply constraints stemming from strong risk aversion by banks, making interest rates cuts ineffective in stimulating demand for loans. At the same time, it is important to note that state interventions involve substantial fiscal costs; simple, cost-free solutions do not exist among the options. Partial credit risk assumption is not an exemption either, as it translates into government expenditures quickly due to loan losses

Toolkit for stimulating corporate lending

Following the 2009 recession, a turnaround in corporate lending has not occurred in Hungary. Therefore, the risk of the phenomenon known in the literature as a creditless recovery has risen significantly. Based on empirical analyses, a creditless recovery leads to a slower and protracted economic recovery. Moreover, the escalating sovereign debt crisis in the peripheral euro area and banking regulatory responses in the EU may lead to more pronounced credit supply constraints by European banks, which could negatively affect the subsidiaries in the CEE region. The MNB staff has written numerous internal reports on the reasons behind the subdued lending and policy recommendations for reversing this trend. In this paper, we summarize the findings of this background research and review the state’s possible intervention alternatives to boosting corporate lending on both the supply and demand side. We think that the most effective way of intervention is that the public sector assumes partial credit risk from the banking sector, since a contraction in corporate lending can be attributed to credit supply constraints stemming from strong risk aversion by banks, making interest rates cuts ineffective in stimulating demand for loans. At the same time, it is important to note that state interventions involve substantial fiscal costs; simple, cost-free solutions do not exist among the options. Partial credit risk assumption is not an exemption either, as it translates into government expenditures quickly due to loan losses

Toolkit for stimulating corporate lending

Following the 2009 recession, a turnaround in corporate lending has not occurred in Hungary. Therefore, the risk of the phenomenon known in the literature as a creditless recovery has risen significantly. Based on empirical analyses, a creditless recovery leads to a slower and protracted economic recovery. Moreover, the escalating sovereign debt crisis in the peripheral euro area and banking regulatory responses in the EU may lead to more pronounced credit supply constraints by European banks, which could negatively affect the subsidiaries in the CEE region. The MNB staff has written numerous internal reports on the reasons behind the subdued lending and policy recommendations for reversing this trend. In this paper, we summarize the findings of this background research and review the state’s possible intervention alternatives to boosting corporate lending on both the supply and demand side. We think that the most effective way of intervention is that the public sector assumes partial credit risk from the banking sector, since a contraction in corporate lending can be attributed to credit supply constraints stemming from strong risk aversion by banks, making interest rates cuts ineffective in stimulating demand for loans. At the same time, it is important to note that state interventions involve substantial fiscal costs; simple, cost-free solutions do not exist among the options. Partial credit risk assumption is not an exemption either, as it translates into government expenditures quickly due to loan losses

Are Default Rate Time Series Stationary? : A Practical Approach for Banking Experts

As the IFRS 9 accounting standard requires banks to recognise impairments based on a forward-looking expected loss concept, banks must estimate the quantitative relationship between default rates and macroeconomic indicators (GDP, unemployment, etc.). In such models, the stationarity of the (usually short) default rate time series is often the most critical issue. In this article, we provide practical advice for banking experts on how (under which circumstances) they can still use short default rate time series in OLS regressions even if those fail regular stationarity tests. We argue that if margin of conservativism is requested for the underlying default rate projections, then applying (seemingly) non-stationary default rate time series in OLS models might not necessarily be problematic