Non-Homothetic Preferences and Labor Heterogeneity: The Effects of Income Inequality on Trade Patterns

This paper builds a two-country-two-sector trade model with a monopolistically competitive sector and non-homothetic preferences. It assumes the existence of two types of goods: necessities (which are homogeneous) and luxuries (which are differentiated) and heterogeneous labor. The implications of income inequality on trade patterns are examined. It also considers the effects of redistributive policies on the production structure and welfare of countries and concludes that: First, in autarky, the more unequal country produces a larger number of varieties; Second, the opening to trade will unambiguously increase the number of varieties consumed by any country, and hence, welfare; Third, the more equal country benefits more from trade liberalization. Fourth, a redistributive policy may harm some consumers not only by diminishing disposable income, but also by diminishing the number of varieties produced.Income inequality; monopolistic competition; non-homothetic preferences; labor heterogeneity

Competing Communications Networks and International Trade

This paper investigates the effects of competing communication networks on trade patterns in a Chamberlinian-Ricardian model of monopolistically competitive firms with a continuum of industries that require communication services in production. We conclude that intraindustry trade between different networks is determined by the relative size of networks and technological differences, and that a network will not have an incentive to expand indefi- nitely, despite network externalities.

A Simple Model of Trade with Heterogeneous Firms and Trade Policy

This paper builds a Ricardian-Chamberlinian two-country model with heterogeneous firms in a monopolistically competitive sector in which every new entrant faces increasing fixed costs of production. There are efficiency gaps between countries in marginal and fixed costs and a country unilaterally imposes an import tariff. It is shown that an increase in tariff increases the number of firms of the tariff imposing country while decreases the number of firms of the tariff-imposed country, possibly reverting the position of net exporter of varieties. A tariff is detrimental to the tariff-imposed country. A small tariff may be beneficial to the tariff-imposing country.

Non-Homothetic Preferences and Labor Heterogeneity: The Effects of Income Inequality on Trade Patterns

This paper builds a two-country-two-sector trade model with a monopolistically competitive sector and non-homothetic preferences. It assumes the existence of two types of goods: necessities (which are homogeneous) and luxuries (which are differentiated) and heterogeneous labor. The implications of income inequality on trade patterns are examined. It also considers the effects of redistributive policies on the production structure and welfare of countries and concludes that: First, in autarky, the more unequal country produces a larger number of varieties; Second, the opening to trade will unambiguously increase the number of varieties consumed by any country, and hence, welfare; Third, the more equal country benefits more from trade liberalization. Fourth, a redistributive policy may harm some consumers not only by diminishing disposable income, but also by diminishing the number of varieties produced

Non-Homothetic Preferences and Labor Heterogeneity: The Effects of Income Inequality on Trade Patterns

This paper builds a two-country-two-sector trade model with a monopolistically competitive sector and non-homothetic preferences. It assumes the existence of two types of goods: necessities (which are homogeneous) and luxuries (which are differentiated) and heterogeneous labor. The implications of income inequality on trade patterns are examined. It also considers the effects of redistributive policies on the production structure and welfare of countries and concludes that: First, in autarky, the more unequal country produces a larger number of varieties; Second, the opening to trade will unambiguously increase the number of varieties consumed by any country, and hence, welfare; Third, the more equal country benefits more from trade liberalization. Fourth, a redistributive policy may harm some consumers not only by diminishing disposable income, but also by diminishing the number of varieties produced

Time Zones, Shift Working and Outsourcing through Communications Networks.

We build a trade model with two countries located in different time zones, a monopolistically competitive sector in which production requires differentiated goods produced using day and night labor, and shift working disutility. Consumers choose between working at a day shift or a night shift and firms may choose to “virtually” outsource foreign day time labor by using communications services. We found that the higher the disutility of working at night is, the smaller is the number of varieties produced. Trade is beneficial only under certain concavity and cost conditions. The higher the disutility of working at night, the larger can be the gains from trade

Time Zones, Shift Working and Outsourcing through Communications Networks.

We build a trade model with two countries located in different time zones, a monopolistically competitive sector in which production requires differentiated goods produced using day and night labor, and shift working disutility. Consumers choose between working at a day shift or a night shift and firms may choose to “virtually” outsource foreign day time labor by using communications services. We found that the higher the disutility of working at night is, the smaller is the number of varieties produced. Trade is beneficial only under certain concavity and cost conditions. The higher the disutility of working at night, the larger can be the gains from trade

Competing Communications Networks and International Trade

This paper investigates the effects of competing communication networks on trade patterns in a Chamberlinian-Ricardian model of monopolistically competitive firms with a continuum of industries that require communication services in production. We conclude that intraindustry trade between different networks is determined by the relative size of networks and technological differences, and that a network will not have an incentive to expand indefi- nitely, despite network externalities

A Simple Model of Trade with Heterogeneous Firms and Trade Policy

This paper builds a Ricardian-Chamberlinian two-country model with heterogeneous firms in a monopolistically competitive sector in which every new entrant faces increasing fixed costs of production. There are efficiency gaps between countries in marginal and fixed costs and a country unilaterally imposes an import tariff. It is shown that an increase in tariff increases the number of firms of the tariff imposing country while decreases the number of firms of the tariff-imposed country, possibly reverting the position of net exporter of varieties. A tariff is detrimental to the tariff-imposed country. A small tariff may be beneficial to the tariff-imposing country

Time Zones, Shift Working and International Outsourcing

We build a trade model with two identical countries located in different time zones and a monopolistically competitive sector of which production requires differentiated goods produced in two successive stages. We introduce shift working disutility and allow consumers to choose between day and night shifts. Shift working disutility raises the cost of night production and firms can reduce costs by “virtually” outsourcing foreign labor. We found that firms only outsource if relative costs of outsourcing are low and shift disutility is high. When outsourcing occurs under free trade, it generates the highest level of welfare among production modes. An intermediate range of shift working disutility can generate the lowest level of welfare and be not affected by the reduction of outsourcing costs