81 research outputs found

    Epicureanism and Skepticism about Practical Reason

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    Epicureans believe that death cannot harm the one who dies because they hold the existence condition, which states that a subject is able to be harmed only while they exist. I show that on one reading of this condition death can, in fact, make the deceased worse off because it is satisfied by the deprivation account of death’s badness. I argue that the most plausible Epicurean view holds the antimodal existence condition, according to which no merely possible state of affairs can be good or bad relative to the subject who dies. I go on to show how this condition, as well as any other condition that denies the deprivation account, results in skepticism about practical reason. Thus, the Epicurean faces a dilemma. Either our practical reasoning is hopelessly mistaken or death can make us worse off. Given that our practical reasoning seems at least mildly reliable, we should conclude that death can make us worse off

    Comparing Information Assurance Awareness Training for End-Users: A Content Analysis Examination of Air Force and Defense Information Systems Agency User Training Modules

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    Today, the threats to information security and assurance are great. While there are many avenues for IT professionals to safeguard against these threats, many times these defenses prove useless against typical system users. Mandated by laws and regulations, all government agencies and most private companies have established information assurance (IA) awareness programs, most of which include user training. Much has been given in the existing literature to laying out the guidance for the roles and responsibilities of IT professionals and higher level managers, but less is specified for everyday users of information systems. This thesis attempts to determine the content necessary to educate system users of their roles and responsibilities for IA. Using the NIST Special Publication 800-50 as a guide, categories of threats and knowledge areas are established and the literature is analyzed and separated into the categories. The thesis closes with a comparison of the IA awareness training modules of the United State\u27s Air Force and Defense Information Systems Agency and a discussion of areas of further research concerning IA awareness training

    The utilization of red blood cells in diets for swine and poultry

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    The purpose of this research was to determine if increasing levels of RBC would affect growth performance and carcass characteristics of finishing pigs and growth performance of broilers. Three experiments were conducted to determine the effect of incremental levels of red blood cells (RBC; 0 to 4% and 0 to 2%), and thus increasing levels of dietary Leu on growth performance and linear carcass measurements of finishing pigs. Our results suggest that feeding 3 or 4% RBC causes a decrease in growth performance. However, feeding 1 or 2% RBC in the diets of finishing pigs had no detrimental effects on growth performance. Three experiments were conducted to determine the effect of incremental levels of RBC (0, 0.5, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7%) on growth performance of broilers fed diets with supplemental L-Arg and L-Ile (adequate) and diets with no supplemental L-Arg and L-Ile (deficient). The results of this research indicate that up to 6% RBC can be added to a broiler diet without affecting growth performance as long as the diet is supplemented with L-Arg and L-Ile. Furthermore, up to 3% RBC can be added to broiler diets without supplemental Arg and Ile with no detrimental effects on growth performance. Broilers respond quite differently in growth performance to increasing levels of RBC compared with finishing pigs

    Artifactual normativity

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    A central tension shaping metaethical inquiry is that normativity appears to be subjective yet real, where it’s difficult to reconcile these aspects. On the one hand, normativity pertains to our actions and attitudes. On the other, normativity appears to be real in a way that precludes it from being a mere figment of those actions and attitudes. In this paper, I argue that normativity is indeed both subjective and real. I do so by way of treating it as a special sort of artifact, where artifacts are mind-dependent yet nevertheless can carve at the joints of reality. In particular, I argue that the properties of being a reason and being valuable for are grounded in attitudes yet are still absolutely structural

    Janus-Faced Grounding

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    A common view in the metaphysics of ground is that all grounding facts are grounded. This generates an infinite regress of ever more grounding of grounding facts, but most grounding theorists take the regress to be harmless. However, in this paper, I argue that the regress is in fact vicious, therefore some grounding facts are ungrounded. Since the regress appears to fall out of two plausible principles of fundamentality, I offer a new interpretation of them that allows for ungrounded grounding facts

    Permanent Value

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    Temporal nihilism is the view that our lives won’t matter after we die. According to the standard interpretation, this is because our lives won’t make a permanent difference. Many who consider the view thus reject it by denying that our lives need to have an eternal impact. However, in this paper, I develop a different formulation of temporal nihilism revolving around the persistence of personal value itself. According to this stronger version, we do not have personal value after death, so our past life no longer has wellbeing after we die. The standard objections to the standard interpretation don’t apply to this more nihilistic nihilism. I offer a new response according to which personal value persists after death because the person continues to exist

    Value After Death

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    Does our life have value for us after we die? Despite the importance of such a question, many would find it absurd, even incoherent. Once we are dead, the thought goes, we are no longer around to have any wellbeing at all. However, in this paper I argue that this common thought is mistaken. In order to make sense of some of our most central normative thoughts and practices, we must hold that a person can have wellbeing after they die. I provide two arguments for this claim on the basis of postmortem harms and benefits as well as the lasting significance of death. I suggest two ways of underwriting posthumous wellbeing
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