El valor añadido y los retos de las clases prácticas en inglés

Des de l'any acadèmic 2010-2011, la Universitat Pompeu Fabra ofereix assignatures en anglès des del primer any del Grau. En aquest article es tractarà de ressaltar el valor afegit que aquestes poden comportar, així com els reptes que es plantegen. Per a efectuar aquest balanç, es partirà de l'experiència sumada en l'ensenyament de les classes pràctiques de l'assignatura "Llibertats i Drets Fonamentals"

European Economic Governance and Parliamentary Involvement:Some Shortcomings of the Article 13 Conference and a Solution

This paper is devoted to the analysis of the Interparliamentary Conference on Stability, Economic Coordination and Governance created in 2013. It first studies the conditions of its emergence and shows how some of the arrangements in place at that point, particularly in terms of closer cooperation among a limited number of national parliaments, did not last over time. Next, it demonstrates the existence of several factors that question the long-term effectiveness of this Conference, at least in terms of its contribution to more democratic accountability within the European Union. On this basis, the paper calls for the creation of a new, more institutionalized and strongly empowered arena for interparliamentary cooperation in the field of economic governance that would not, however, take the form of a second European parliamentary chamber.Cet article est dédié à l’analyse de la Conférence Interparlementaire sur la Stabilité, la Coordination Économique et la Gouvernance créée en 2013. Il étudie tout d’abord les conditions d’émergence de cette Conférence et démontre comment certains arrangements alors en place, par exemple quant à l’existence d’une coopération plus étroite entre un nombre réduit de parlements nationaux, n’ont pas perduré. Il s’agit ensuite de démontrer que l’efficience à long terme de cette Conférence, en tant que vecteur contribuant à une meilleure légitimité démocratique au sein de l’Union Européenne tout du moins, n’est en rien assurée. Partant de ce constat, cet article appelle donc plutôt à la création d’une nouvelle arène pour la coopération interparlementaire dans le domaine de la gouvernance économique, une arène qui serait nouvelle, davantage institutionnalisée et aurait davantage de pouvoirs mais ne prendrait toutefois pas la forme d’une second chambre européenne

Guaranteeing the ECB's democratic accountability in the post-Banking Union era: An ever more difficult task?

Following the Great Financial Crisis, the European Central Bank’s functions have been significantly altered. It is now involved in the functioning of a variety of European Union bodies and agencies, new powers in the field of banking supervision have been attributed to it and it has resorted to unconventional monetary policy. Such a concentration of powers arguably gives rise to issues of accountability and institutional balance within the European Union: (i) the resulting institutional framework is particularly complex and difficult to understand; (ii) the numerous functions the European Central Bank assumes makes it increasingly difficult to identify in which arena(s) it should be held to account for which action; and (iii) its role in the different bodies or agencies may vary in theory and in practice, which, in turn, influences the degree to which the European Central Bank should be held to account. This article aims at showing to what extent the European Central Bank’s role has multiplied and diversified with a view to assess how it is held to account in those different instances, and what the consequences are for the European Central Bank’s democratic accountability, primarily towards the European Parliament, as well as towards the Council of the European Union and national parliaments where applicable

The European Parliament in the post-crisis era: an institution empowered on paper only?

Following the adoption of Eurocrisis Law, the European Parliament (EP) has been strongly empowered in the Economic and Monetary Union. It may intervene mostly in three ways: by the means of control mechanisms around Euro summits, during Economic Dialogues and in the framework of the European Parliamentary Week and the Interparliamentary conference on Stability, Economic Coordination and Governance. An analysis of the practice reveals however that thus far this empowerment has remained largely theoretical; The EP could still better exploit the potential of its newly attributed capacities.The reform proposals currently under discussion were found to bear some potential if adequately used, despite being (still) of a soft nature like the ones currently existing

Parliaments, Public Opinion and Parliamentary Elections in Europe

The contributions collected in this Max Weber Working Papers Special Issue were first delivered at a conference held at the European University Institute and jointly organised by the Max Weber Programme for Postdoctoral Studies and the Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies in March 2015 on \u2018Parliaments and parliamentary elections in Europe\u2019. Following the transformations undertaken by the European and national parliaments after the Treaty of Lisbon, the 2014 European elections, the unprecedented politicization and the challenges posed to representative democracy by the Eurozone crisis, the Special Issue aims to investigate three intertwined themes. (I) Parliamentary representation: European and national at the same time?; (II) national parliaments in EU policymaking; and (III) dynamics of Euroscepticism and its effects on law-making. In particular the papers deal with the ability of parliaments to democratically represent people in the European Union today and to affect the European integration process, with the asymmetric involvement of national parliaments in the EU, their dynamics of cooperation as well as between them and the European Parliament, and finally, with the implications on EU democratic legitimacy of recent developments regarding parliamentary input provided at a very early stage of the European policymaking. Other issues, such as transposition and the representation of eurosceptics in the European Parliament are also dealt with

The ‘Banking Dialogue’ as a model to improve parliamentary involvement in the Monetary Dialogue?

The newly established European Banking Union has introduced a unique accountability framework of the European Central Bank vis-a-vis the European Parliament (EP), but also vis-a-vis national parliaments, in the form of Banking Dialogue. The ECB was thus far held to account for its monetary policy actions by the EP in the framework of the long-existing Monetary Dialogue. However, some shortcomings have become apparent in this procedure, especially with the economic crisis. Beyond this, the recent attribution of new competences to the ECB calls for a reflection as to the accountability mechanisms in place to control its actions. Based on an empirical and normative analysis of both types of dialogues, we contend that the Banking Dialogue could serve as a model to reform the Monetary Dialogue to enhance the legitimacy of the ECB's actions and of the EU as a whole

The French and the Italian Parliaments in EU Affairs Post-Lisbon: True Empowerment or Cosmetic Change?

The role of national parliaments in EU decision-making has generally been considered marginal since national parliaments participate indirectly through national executives. The Lisbon Treaty, however, triggered important developments in this regard. Direct involvement of national parliaments through the Early Warning System and Political Dialogue has prompted internal reforms. This article argues that, because of the new procedures provided for by the Lisbon Treaty and the direct relationship between the Commission and national parliaments, certain legislatures such as the French and Italian have become stronger in their involvement in EU affairs. However, seven years of practice post-Lisbon show that the innovations brought about by the new Treaty have fallen short of fully satisfying national parliaments\u2019 thirst for active engagement. We also observe that changes at the national level have only been implemented progressively and have not yet been exploited to their full potential

The Commission and the challenges of differentiation post-Brexit: its role and the new inter-institutional balance

Over the last few years the process of European integration has been challenged by several crises. The prompt responses given to them often led the governments of the Member States rather than by EU institutions to take the lead, as for the political directions the integration should follow especially. Those unprecedented crises, and amongst them certainly is Brexit, have for the first time, to such a great extent, put on the table the question of differentiation within the EU, between Eurozone and non-Eurozone countries and, relatedly, between debtor and creditor countries; between Member States that favour more collaboration on the side of migration and the system of migration quotas and those refusing it; between exiting and remaining in the EU. Who can (and arguably should) lead the EU in the hard times of the quests for more differentiation and, as some argue, in coping with the threat of disintegration? Could the European Commission play this role, in the post-Brexit context, as it did in previous stages of the process of integration and if so, how? Drawing on the Commission’s White Paper on the future of Europe and its 5 scenarios for the EU 27 – “Carrying on”, “Nothing but the single market”, “Those who want more do more”, “Doing less more efficiently”, “Doing much more together” – the paper focuses on the role the Commission could play under the scenario of an increased differentiated integration within the EU-post Brexit. On the basis of the role fulfilled by the Commission over the first 60 years of European integration, the paper deals first with the potential the Commission has to cope with the challenge of differentiation. It then assesses what the effects of a leading role of the Commission would be on the interinstitutional balance within the EU