Insights into the accuracy of social scientists' forecasts of societal change

How well can social scientists predict societal change, and what processes underlie their predictions? To answer these questions, we ran two forecasting tournaments testing the accuracy of predictions of societal change in domains commonly studied in the social sciences: ideological preferences, political polarization, life satisfaction, sentiment on social media, and gender–career and racial bias. After we provided them with historical trend data on the relevant domain, social scientists submitted pre-registered monthly forecasts for a year (Tournament 1; N = 86 teams and 359 forecasts), with an opportunity to update forecasts on the basis of new data six months later (Tournament 2; N = 120 teams and 546 forecasts). Benchmarking forecasting accuracy revealed that social scientists’ forecasts were on average no more accurate than those of simple statistical models (historical means, random walks or linear regressions) or the aggregate forecasts of a sample from the general public (N = 802). However, scientists were more accurate if they had scientific expertise in a prediction domain, were interdisciplinary, used simpler models and based predictions on prior data

MORAL HEROES 1 Groups Create Moral Superheroes to Defend Sacred Values

Abstract Groups of people with a common moral cause create moral superheroes (e.g., Nelson Mandela, the Dalai Lama, Osama Bin Laden). These heroes serve as mascots, symbolizing the group's objectives and modeling self-sacrifice. Taking a social functionalist perspective, I describe how seemingly nonsensical group practices of sacralizing objects or rituals serve an adaptive function by helping adherents identify one another. Groups with both ideologically right-leaning and leftleaning ideologies rely on sacredness for this purpose. For example, the Right sacralizes traditional marriage whereas the Left sacralizes the environment. I then describe one method by which groups transform relatively ordinary persons into self-sacrificial mascots for these sacred values. In particular, I examine whether moral heroes tend to talk about generous self-sacrifice for the group's sacred values, and how this verbal expression feeds into moral hero manufacturing processes. Along with gossip, ingroup favoritism, and altruistic punishment, hero creation may be an evolved moral "technology" that helps humans form large, powerful groups of non-kin

MORAL HEROES 1 Groups Create Moral Superheroes to Defend Sacred Values

Abstract What role do moral heroes (e.g., Nelson Mandela, the Dalai Lama, Osama Bin Laden) play in ideological movements? One possibility is that they function as leaders and agents, making key decisions. In this chapter, I examine an alternative possibility-that moralistic groups help create moral superheroes out of relatively ordinary individuals to serve as mascots, symbolizing the group's objectives and modeling self-sacrifice. Taking a social functionalist perspective, I describe the motive behind this practice. As symbols of self-sacrifice for the group's sacred values, moral heroes help bind together adherents into powerful collectives. Seemingly nonsensical group practices of sacralizing objects or rituals serve an adaptive function by helping adherents identify one another. Both ideologically right-leaning and left-leaning groups rely on sacredness for this purpose. I then describe a mechanism by which moral heroes come to represent self-sacrifice for these sacred values -the inspiring, prosocial speech. Along with gossip, ingroup favoritism, and altruistic punishment, hero creation may be an evolved moral "technology" that helps humans form large, powerful groups of non-kin

Agency in moral action : mapping the moral self

By telling us who we are as well as how to think and act, our self-definitions regulate interpersonal relationships and moral functioning. Aspects of the self-understanding of individuals were examined so as to give a fuller account of moral functioning than those posited by extant rationality-based models. Self-content refers to the seven different domains of life posited by William James (1890): physical, active, social, psychological, agency, continuity, and distinctness. Previous attempts to map self-understanding to moral action have generally produced weak and inconsistent findings. A new model was developed, which attempted to correct some lingering conceptual and methodological issues. Participants were 99 university students, who were recruited through 30 student clubs--a heterogeneous sample with a variety of life orientations. Moral behavior was operationalized as an aggregate of three measures: (a) self-reported altruism, (b) self-reported ecological behaviors, and (c) a behavioral measure of honesty. Participants also responded to an individual self-understanding interview. These interviews were coded for individuals’ construal of and emphasis on the seven different aspects of their existence. Associations between these aspects of self-understanding and moral behavior were explored. Results indicate that the new model is predictive of moral action; the present study is the first to demonstrate a significant association between a self-content scheme (namely, agency) and moral action. Individuals that tended to implicate deliberate and volitional efforts of the self in causing some kind of change tended to engage in moral behavior more so than those that took a more deterministic stance. This finding is supportive of Blasi’s (1984) theory of the moral self. Discussion focuses on the nature of moral identity and its central role in a comprehensive understanding of moral functioning.Arts, Faculty ofPsychology, Department ofGraduat

Are politically diverse Thanksgiving dinners shorter than politically uniform ones?

Americans on the political left and right are engaged in a Culture War with one another, one that is often characterized by mutual fear, antipathy, and avoidance. Are there safe havens from the socially straining effects of this Culture War, times and places where Americans of different political stripes gather and put aside their political differences? Previous research (Chen & Rohla, 2018) implied that there might not be insofar as even intimate family gatherings seem to be subject to Culture War tensions. They found that politically diverse Thanksgiving Dinners were 35-70 minutes shorter than politically uniform ones, representing a 14-27% reduction in overall dinner duration. Noting analytical and methodological limitations in the prior analysis, we conducted two pre-registered studies to test whether diverse dinners are shorter than uniform ones and to attempt to conceptually replicate and extend this prior analysis. Individual analyses yielded mixed results, with null models generally supported but effect estimates generally overlapping with those of Chen and Rohla (2018). A mega-analysis found that, when controlling for various covariates, politically diverse dinners were 24 minutes shorter than politically uniform ones, 95% confidence interval = [9, 39], representing a 6% decrease in the total dinner time [2%-10%]. This final result successfully replicates Chen and Rohla (2018) both in terms of effect overlap and direct-and-significance criteria while nonetheless favoring the conclusion that politics is not straining family ties as much as previously thought

Developmental Trajectories of Agency and Communion in Moral Motivation

How does moral motivation develop across the life span? Previous research has indicated that moral exemplars have integrated the typically oppositional motives of agency and communion. The present research maps developmental trajectories in these motives that may lead to this end-point integration. Participants were 140 Canadians comprising four age groups (childhood, adolescence, emerging adulthood, and mid-adulthood). Agentic and communal motivation was assessed in an interview that asked participants about aspects of their lives and prompted for the instrumental–terminal framing of their motives. Results indicated that agency was the dominant instrumental motive for all ages. In terms of terminal values, agency was the dominant motive early in development; however, the effect progressively weakened and, by mid-adulthood, had dissipated. The pattern of instrumental agency for communal goals increased across the age groups, implying that replacing agency with communion as the characteristic terminal motive represents an important goal for moral development

Impressive Words: Linguistic Predictors of Public Approval of the U.S. Congress

What type of language makes the most positive impression within a professional setting? Is competent/agentic language or warm/communal language more effective at eliciting social approval? We examined this basic social cognitive question in a real world context using a big data approach—the recent record-low levels of public approval of the U.S. Congress. Using Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC), we text analyzed all 123+ million words spoken by members of the U.S. House of Representatives during floor debates between 1996-2014 and compared their usage of various classes of words to their public approval ratings over the same time period. We found that neither agentic nor communal language positively predicted public approval. However, this may be because communion combines two disparate social motives (belonging and helping). A follow-up analysis found that the helping form of communion positively predicted public approval, and did so more strongly than did agentic language. Next, we conducted an exploratory analysis, examining which of the 63 standard LIWC categories predict public approval. We found that the public approval of Congress was highest when politicians used tentative language, expressed both positive emotion and anxiety, and used human words, numbers, prepositions, numbers, and avoided conjunctions and the use of second-person pronouns. These results highlight the widespread primacy of warmth over competence as the primary dimensions of social cognition

Moral Actor, Selfish Agent

Abstract People are motivated to behave selfishly while appearing moral. This tension gives rise to two divergently motivated selves. The actor-the watched self-tends to be moral; the agent-the self as executor-tends to be selfish. Three studies present direct evidence of the actor and agent's distinct motives. To recruit the self-as-actor, we asked people to rate the importance of various goals. To recruit the self-as-agent, we asked people to describe their goals verbally. In Study 1, actors claimed their goals were equally about helping the self and others (viz. moral); agents claimed their goals were primarily about helping the self (viz. selfish). This disparity was evident in both individualist and collectivist cultures, attesting to the universality of the selfish agent. Study 2 compared actors and agents' motives to those of people role-playing highly prosocial or selfish exemplars. In content (Study 2a) and in the impressions they made on an outside observer (Study 2b), actors' motives were similar to those of the prosocial role-players, whereas agents' motives were similar to those of the selfish role-players. And Study 3 accounted for the difference between the actor and agent: Participants claimed that their agent's motives were the more realistic and their actor's motives the more idealistic of the two. The selfish agent/moral actor duality may account for why implicit and explicit measures of the same construct diverge, and why feeling watched brings out the better angels of human nature

A decline in prosocial language helps explain public disapproval of the US Congress

Talking about helping others makes a person seem warm and leads to social approval. This work examines the real world consequences of this basic, social-cognitive phenomenon by examining whether record-low levels of public approval of the US Congress may, in part, be a product of declining use of prosocial language during Congressional debates. A text analysis of all 124 million words spoken in the House of Representatives between 1996 and 2014 found that declining levels of prosocial language strongly predicted public disapproval of Congress 6 mo later. Warm, prosocial language still predicted public approval when removing the effects of societal and global factors (e.g., the September 11 attacks) and Congressional efficacy (e.g., passing bills), suggesting that prosocial language has an independent, direct effect on social approval