Entre Ilustración y Romanticismo: Fichte y el legado de Rousseau

In the present paper I intend to investigate Fichte’s use of the idea of Anerkennung, or recognition –the end that our amour-propre leads us to seek – in his positive account of how humans can realize, all at once, virtue, freedom, and rationality. In other words, I will examine how Fichte appropriates Rousseau's complex theory of amour-propre and human recognition. My claim is that even though Fichte underestimates the dangers to human well-being posed by our drive to be recognized by others, he can be credited with discovering in that same human need a potential for avoiding those dangers that Rousseau was only dimly aware of

Entre Ilustración y Romanticismo: Fichte y el legado de Rousseau

In the present paper I intend to investigate Fichte’s use of the idea of Anerkennung, or recognition –the end that our amour-propre leads us to seek – in his positive account of how humans can realize, all at once, virtue, freedom, and rationality. In other words, I will examine how Fichte appropriates Rousseau's complex theory of amour-propre and human recognition. My claim is that even though Fichte underestimates the dangers to human well-being posed by our drive to be recognized by others, he can be credited with discovering in that same human need a potential for avoiding those dangers that Rousseau was only dimly aware of

Moral Sentiments, Institutions, and Civil Society: Exploiting Family Resemblances between Smith and Hegel to Resolve Some Conceptual Issues in Sen’s Recent Contributions to the Theory of Justice

In his Idea of Justice, Amartya Sen compares the two basic approaches to evaluate institutions, transcendental institutionalism and realization-focused comparisons. Referring to Smith's Impartial Spectator, he argues in favour of the latter and proposes the principle of Open Impartiality. However, this cannot solve the tension between universalism and contextualization of values that Sen therefore inherits from Smith. Based on recent Hegel scholarship, we argue that some of the difficulties can be resolved, considering the role Smith played in the development of Hegel's thinking. Hegel's concept of recognition plays an essential role in establishing the possibility of impartiality both on the level of consciousness and on the level of institutional intersubjectivity. Hegel's critique of Kants formalist ethics (also considered as transcendental institutionalism by Sen), his analysis of the civil society in the Philosophy of Right, especially his focus on associations and estates, can serve as a model for making Sen's focus on public discourse theoretically more concise and pragmatically feasible. Hegel shows that universalistic attitudes can only emerge in specific institutional contexts

Marx, Hegel e o valor dos ideais “burgueses”

Translation of Neuhouser, F. (2018). Marx and Hegel on the Value of ‘Bourgeois’ Ideals. In: Kandiyali, J. (Eds.) Reassessing Marx’s Social and Political Philosophy. New York: Routledge, pp. 149-162. Translated by Felipe Taufer    Tradução de Neuhouser, F. (2018). Marx and Hegel on the Value of ‘Bourgeois’ Ideals. In: Kandiyali, J. (Eds.) Reassessing Marx’s Social and Political Philosophy. New York: Routledge, pp. 149-162. Traduzido por Felipe Taufer (Doutorando em Filosofia no Programa de Pós-Graduação da Universidade de Caxias do Sul)   Precedido por: Liberdade, crítica e patologias sociais: Frederick Neuhouser e os compromissos normativos do “jovem Marx”. Apresentação à tradução de “Marx, Hegel e o valor dos ideais ‘burgueses’”, de Frederick Neuhouser, por Felipe Taufe

Rawls and Rousseau: 'amour-propre' and the strains of commitment

In this paper I try to illuminate the Rawlsian architectonic through an interpretation of what Rawls’ Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy say about Rousseau. I argue that Rawls’ emphasis there when discussing Rousseau on interpreting amour-propre so as to make it compatible with a life in at least some societies draws attention to, and helps explicate, an analogous feature of his own work, the strains of commitment broadly conceived. Both are centrally connected with protecting a sense of self which is vital for one’s own agency. This allows us to appreciate better than much of the literature presently does the requirement for Rawls that justice and the good are congruent, that a society of justice does not disfigure citizens’ ability to live out lives relatively unmarked by relations of domination. Some comments on G. A. Cohen’s critiques of Rawls are made