Presumptions and the Distribution of Argumentative Burdens in Acts of Proposing and Accusing

This paper joins the voices warning against hasty transference of legal concepts of presumption to other kinds of argumentation, especially to deliberation about future acts and policies. Comparison of the pragmatics which respectively constitute the illocutionary acts of ACCUSING and PROPOSING reveals striking differences in the ways presumptions prompt accusers and proposers to undertake probative responsibilities and, also, points to corresponding differences in their probative duties. This comparison highlights significant contrasts between the way presumptions figure in legal reasoning as opposed to deliberation; the comparison also raises theoretically important questions about the norms governing persuasive argumentation. This paper is based on a broadly Gricean account of speech acts

The epistemic relevance of social considerations in ordinary day-to-day presumptions

The involvement of social considerations in our ordinary conception of presumption and corresponding plain practice of presuming things raises doubts as to whether they afford epistemically satisfying bases for rational argumentation. To some (e.g., Nicholas Rescher) this involvement illuminates important modes of discursive inquiry; to others (e.g., Douglas Walton and David Godden) it points to the need for theoretically based reform or regulation of our ordinary practices. This paper attempts to clarify and defend the epistemic value of ordinary presumptions

Dialectical tier argumentation as structured by proposing and advising

This paper discusses the parameters of an arguer\u27s duties on the dialectical tier of argument appraisal. Argumentative burdens incurred in making proposals will be compared with probative obligations which may be taken on in advising. The burdens t ypically incurred in these two kinds of illocutionary acts are strikingly different; accordingly, the arguer\u27s obligation to response to objections would be circumscribed differently depending on which speech acts initiates the dialogue. This claim has i mplications for how we delimit a good case for deliberative propositions. It also casts light on manifest rationality and the role of rhetorical art in argumentation

Two views of the Necessity to Manifest Rationality in Argumentation

This paper contrasts two views of the necessity to manifest the rational adequacy of argumentation. The view advanced by Ralph Johnson’s program for informal logic will be compared to one based on an account of obligations incurred in speech acts. Both views hold that arguers are commonly obliged to make it apparent that they are offering adequate support for their positions, but they differ in their accounts of the nature and scope of those obligations

Presuming and Presumption in Everyday Argumentation: A response to Godden and Walton

In response to critique by Godden and Walton, this essay delineates the role of moral motivation in the commitment structure of ordinary presumptive inferences. It defends the capacity of ordinary presumptions to support discursive structures within which everyday argumentation can address defeasible claims and enable alignments and realignments in probative obligations, i.e., burdens of proof