The epistemic relevance of social considerations in ordinary day-to-day presumptions

The involvement of social considerations in our ordinary conception of presumption and corresponding plain practice of presuming things raises doubts as to whether they afford epistemically satisfying bases for rational argumentation. To some (e.g., Nicholas Rescher) this involvement illuminates important modes of discursive inquiry; to others (e.g., Douglas Walton and David Godden) it points to the need for theoretically based reform or regulation of our ordinary practices. This paper attempts to clarify and defend the epistemic value of ordinary presumptions

Dialectical tier argumentation as structured by proposing and advising

This paper discusses the parameters of an arguer\u27s duties on the dialectical tier of argument appraisal. Argumentative burdens incurred in making proposals will be compared with probative obligations which may be taken on in advising. The burdens t ypically incurred in these two kinds of illocutionary acts are strikingly different; accordingly, the arguer\u27s obligation to response to objections would be circumscribed differently depending on which speech acts initiates the dialogue. This claim has i mplications for how we delimit a good case for deliberative propositions. It also casts light on manifest rationality and the role of rhetorical art in argumentation

Presuming and Presumption in Everyday Argumentation: A response to Godden and Walton

In response to critique by Godden and Walton, this essay delineates the role of moral motivation in the commitment structure of ordinary presumptive inferences. It defends the capacity of ordinary presumptions to support discursive structures within which everyday argumentation can address defeasible claims and enable alignments and realignments in probative obligations, i.e., burdens of proof

Two views of the Necessity to Manifest Rationality in Argumentation

This paper contrasts two views of the necessity to manifest the rational adequacy of argumentation. The view advanced by Ralph Johnson’s program for informal logic will be compared to one based on an account of obligations incurred in speech acts. Both views hold that arguers are commonly obliged to make it apparent that they are offering adequate support for their positions, but they differ in their accounts of the nature and scope of those obligations

Commentary on: Lilian Bermejo-Luque\u27s Assessing presumptions in argumentation: Being a sound presumpion vs. being presumably the case

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A Pragmatic Paradox Inherent in Expert Reports Addressed to Lay Citizens

This paper addresses a problem inherent in reporting as a mode of communication between experts and lay citizens. The potential utility of such reports is obvious, but we commonly encounter critically debilitating frustration as experts, trained to address and to be accountable to other experts, attempt to report to citizens engaged in public decision making with proper regard for their own autonomy. We may move toward some resolution to these frustrations if we better understand the obligations inherent in the ordinary communicative act of reporting, which by its nature involves a delegation of responsibility