Control Rights in Public-Private Partnership

This paper develops a theory of the allocation of authority between two parties that produce impure public goods. We show that the optimal allocation depends on technological factors, the parties' valuations of the goods produced, and the degree of impurity of these goods. When the degree of impurity is large, control rights should be given to the main investor, irrespective of preference considerations. There are some situations in which this allocation is optimal even if the degree of impurity is very low as long as one party's investment is more important than the other party's. If the parties' investments are of similar importance and the degree of impurity is large, shared authority is optimal with a greater share going to the low-valuation party. If the importance of the parties' investments is similar but the degree of impurity is neither large nor small, the low-valuation party should receive sole authority. We apply our results to a number of situations, including schools and child custody.

Control Rights in Complex Partnerships

This paper develops a theory of the allocation of authority between two players who are in a “complex” partnership, that is, a partnership which produces impure public goods. We show that the optimal allocation depends on technological factors, the parties’ valuations of the goods produced, and the degree of impurity of these goods. When the degree of impurity is large, control rights should be given to the main investor, irrespective of preference considerations. There are some situations in which this allocation is optimal even if the degree of impurity is very low as long as one party’s investment is more important than the other party’s. If the parties’ investments are of similar importance and the degree of impurity is large, shared authority is optimal with a greater share going to the low-valuation party. If the importance of the parties’ investments is similar but the degree of impurity is neither large nor small, the low-valuation party should receive sole authority. We analyze an extension in which side payments are infeasible. We check for robustness of our results in several dimensions, such as allowing for multiple parties or for joint authority, apply our results to interpret a number of complex partnerships, including those involving schools and child custody. JEL Codes: D02 ; D23 ; H41 ; L31Impure Public Goods ; Contractual Incompleteness ; Allocation of Authority ; Investment Incentives

An Economic Model of Child Custody

This paper develops a model of child custody based on an incomplete-contract approach to the allocation of property rights. Because of the presence of transaction costs in marriage, altruistic parents cannot contract upon the investments they make into their children, but can reduce the resulting inefficiencies by determining ex ante the parent who would be allocated custody in case they divorce. We show that: (i) the optimal allocation of custodial rights depends on both preferences and technological factors; (ii) custodial rights can be allocated either to the parent who values the benefits from child welfare more or, vice-versa, to the parent with the lowest valuation; (iii) if one parent�s investment is significantly more important than the other parent�s investment, then sole custody is preferred to joint custody and it should be allocated to the parent whose investment is relatively more important; and (iv) if the importance of the parents� investments is sufficiently similar and if the differences in parents� valuations of child quality are large, then joint custody is optimal with the low-valuation parent receiving a relatively greater share, because the other parent would invest in the child anyway while the low-valuation parent would be endowed with greater bargaining power. The implications of these results are then interpreted in the context of current custody laws, discussed in relation to empirical estimates of some of the parameters underlying the optimal custody rule, and used to question the skepticism surrounding prenuptial contracts.

Can Anyone be "The" One? Evidence on Mate Selection from Speed Dating

Marriage data show a strong degree of positive assortative mating along a variety of attributes. But since marriage is an equilibrium outcome, it is unclear whether positive sorting is the result of preferences rather than opportunities. We assess the relative importance of preferences and opportunities in dating behaviour, using unique data from a large commercial speed dating agency. While the speed dating design gives us a direct observation of individual preferences, the random allocation of participants across events generates an exogenous source of variation in opportunities and allows us to identify the role of opportunities separately from that of preferences. We find that both women and men equally value physical attributes, such as age and weight, and that there is positive sorting along age, height, and education. The role of individual preferences, however, is outplayed by that of opportunities. Along some attributes (such as occupation, height and smoking) opportunities explain almost all the estimated variation in demand. Along other attributes (such as age), the role of preferences is more substantial, but never dominant. Despite this, preferences have a part when we observe a match, i.e., when two individuals propose to one another.

Job changes and hours changes: understanding the path of labor supply adjustment

We use British panel data to investigate single women’s labor supply changes in response to three reforms that affected individuals’ work incentives. We use these reforms to identify changes in labor supply. There is evidence of small hours of work effects for two of such reforms. A third reform in 1999 instead led to a significant increase in single mothers’ hours of work. The mechanism by which the labor supply adjustments were made occurred largely through job changes rather than hours changes with the same employer. This is little overall effect of the reforms on wages

Job changes, hours changes, and the path of labour supply adjustment

This paper uses the first twelve waves of the British Household Panel Survey covering the period 1991-2002 to investigate single women’s labour supply changes in response to three tax and benefit policy reforms that occurred in the 1990s. We find evidence of small labour supply effects for two of such reforms. A third reform in 1999 instead led to a significant increase in single mothers’ hours of work. This increase was primarily driven by women who changed job, suggesting that labour supply adjustments within a job are harder than across jobs. The presence of hours inflexibility within jobs and labour supply adjustments through job mobility are strongly confirmed when we look at hours changes by stated labour supply preferences. Finally, we find little overall effect on wages

Dating Preferences and Meeting Opportunities in Mate Choice Decisions

Much empirical evidence shows that female and male partners look alike along a variety of attributes. It is however unclear how this positive sorting comes about, because marriage is an equilibrium outcome arising from a process that entails searching, meeting and choosing one another. This study takes advantage of a unique data set to shed light on the forces driving choices at the earliest stage of a relationship. Both women and men value physical attributes, such as age and weight, and reveal that their dating choices are assortative along several traits. Importantly, meeting opportunities are found to have a substantial role in determining dating proposals.

The renewed case for farmers' cooperatives: Diagnostics and implications from Ghana

This study presents a stylized but insightful diagnostic of the problems limiting collective action in Ghanaian farmer-based organizations (FBOs). In our analysis, we use a structure-conduct-performance framework, econometrics, and new primary data for 500 FBOs collected through surveys and games. We find that most Ghanaian FBOs are inactive, failing to mobilize their members into any sort of collective action. To understand why this is so, we postulate that in rural Ghana, four typologies can be used to classify FBOs and to distinguish them on the basis of their membership structure and rules of conduct. We then show that FBOs fail to mobilize collective action whenever their structure and conduct are not aligned. In particular, misalignment leads mainly to problems of access to external credit and to a lesser extent to problems of internal cohesion. To maximize collective action, this study recommends the diversification of policy through recognizing the four different types of FBOs, each facing particular and to some extent opposing problems.Collective action, Cooperatives, econometrics, games,

Structural classification of quasi-one-dimensional ternary nitrides

This review focuses on the crystal structural features of ternary (mixed-metal) quasi-one-dimensional nitrides i.e., nitrides containing (cation-³⁻) coordination polyhedra sharing either corners, edges, or faces, arranged in linear chains, and intercalated by a counter ion. The current relevance of these nitrides, and of quasi-one-dimensional compounds in general, lies in the fact that they are closely related to the pure one-dimensional systems (i.e., nanowires), which are vastly researched for their amazing properties closely related to their low dimensionality. A number of these properties were firstly discovered in quasi-one-dimensional compounds, highlighting the importance of expanding knowledge and research in this area. Furthermore, unlike oxides, nitrides and other non-oxide compounds are less developed, hence more difficult to categorise into structural classes that can then be related to other classes of compounds, leading to a fuller picture of structure–properties relationship. Within this context, this review aims to categorise and describe a number of ternary (mixed-metal) quasi-one-dimensional nitrides according to their structural features, specifically, the polyhedra forming the one-dimensional chains