Stories Told and Untold: Confidentiality Laws and the Master Narrative of Child Welfare

In most states, child welfare hearings and records are sealed or confidential. This means that by law, court hearings and records may not be observed. The same laws and court rules also preclude those who are authorized to enter and watch from discussing anything learned or observed in a closed courtroom or from a sealed court record with anyone not involved in the case. It is the restriction on speech—on telling stories about child welfare—with which this Article is concerned. The master narrative of child welfare depicts foster care as a haven for child-victims savagely brutalized by “deviant,” “monstrous” parents. Notwithstanding this shared public understanding, however, most children in foster care have experienced, or are alleged to have experienced, neglect—deprivation of food, clothing, shelter, education, or another necessity of life—not physical abuse. There is also a growing understanding that some children in foster care ought not to be there at all. In addition, research and experience indicate that many maltreated children would be better off if simply left at home—with those responsible for the maltreatment—rather than placed in foster care. This Article argues that confidentiality laws perpetuate the inaccurate master narrative, and preclude other stories from informing or influencing that narrative. Stated simply, laws prohibiting the discussion of child welfare cases silence a vast number of stories. By their terms, these laws define the stories that may not be told, and the putative storytellers who may not speak, while designating as acceptable other stories and other voices. The unchallenged dominance of the inaccurate, law-sanctioned narrative affects even those involved in child welfare as a profession, and by affecting their worldview, diminishes the quality of care provided to children. The laws that require silence outside the courtroom permit the acceptance of pervasive dysfunction in child welfare, and affect the administration of justice inside the courtroom

Telling (Dangerous) Stories: A Narrative Account of a Youth Coach's Experience of an Unfounded Allegation of Child Abuse

This paper (re)tells the story of a sports coach who was accused of emotional abuse of a child athlete and, following an investigation by his club, cleared of the allegation. Accounts of such allegations are rare and no research to date has explored coaches’ lived experiences of this. Such stories are ‘dangerous’ and remain largely unrecognised and undebated as they represent a challenge to the meta-narrative of child protection. Using the stance of a ‘storyteller’, the coach-participant’s story is presented as a monologue crafted using his words and embellished with literary techniques. The story is purposefully largely left open for interpretation in an attempt to encourage readers to engage cognitively and emotionally with it. Telling such a ‘dangerous’ story aims to add to the narrative repertoires available to those working in this field and expand understandings of child protection in sport.</p

Role of Status in Group Processes

[Excerpt] This chapter organizes the other chapters of the volume around a fundamental status-affirmation principle, namely, that status differentials generate corresponding differences in performance expectations which, in turn, produce behaviors that affirm performance expectations. The chapters in this volume elaborate that proposition by showing how information exchange, patterns of privilege, and the accuracy of power perceptions reflect or strengthen the status-affirmation process. Several chapters also suggest conditions that forestall or weaken this process such as claims to expertise and communication styles. Other chapters can be construed as offering applications of the status-affirmation principle to the performance of corporate project teams and to the relationships between standard and nonstandard employees in the workplace. Overall, the chapters reflect the strength and vitality of the tradition of work on group processes

Does competition enhance performance or cheating? A laboratory experiment

In this paper we experimentally test whether competing for a desired reward does not only affect individuals’ performance, but also their tendency to cheat. Recent doping scandals in sports as well as forgery and plagiarism scandals in academia have been partially explained by „competitive pressures“, which suggests a link between competition and cheating. In our experiment subjects conduct a task where they have the possibility to make use of illegitimate tools to better their results. We find that women react much stronger to competitive pressure by increasing their cheating activity while there is no overall sex difference in cheating. However, the effect of competition on women’s cheating behavior is entirely due to the fact that women, on average, are doing worse with respect to the assigned task. Indeed we find that it is the ability of an individual to conduct a particular task and not sex that crucially affects the reaction to competition. Poor performers significantly increase their cheating behavior under competition which may be a face-saving strategy or an attempt to retain a chance of winning.competition, tournament, piece rate, cheating, experiment

Does competition enhance performance or cheating? A laboratory experiment

In this paper we experimentally test whether competing for a desired reward does not only affect individuals’ performance, but also their tendency to cheat. Recent doping scandals in sports as well as forgery and plagiarism scandals in academia have been partially explained by „competitive pressures“, which suggests a link between competition and cheating. In our experiment subjects conduct a task where they have the possibility to make use of illegitimate tools to better their results. We find that women react much stronger to competitive pressure by increasing their cheating activity while there is no overall sex difference in cheating. However, the effect of competition on women’s cheating behavior is entirely due to the fact that women, on average, are doing worse with respect to the assigned task. Indeed we find that it is the ability of an individual to conduct a particular task and not sex that crucially affects the reaction to competition. Poor performers significantly increase their cheating behavior under competition which may be a face-saving strategy or an attempt to retain a chance of winning.competition; tournament; piece rate; cheating; experiment

The role of lockups in takeover contests

This paper examines breakup fees and stock lockups as devices for prospective target firms to encourage bidder participation in takeover contest. We show that, unless bidding costs for the first bidder are too high, breakup fees provide for the socially desirable degree of competition and ensure the efficient allocation of the target to the highest valued buyer in a takeover auction. In contrast, stock lockups permit the target firm to subsidize entry of a new bidder at the expense of an incumbent bidder. Stock lockups induce too much competition when offered to a second bidder and too little competition when offered to a first bidder. Despite their socially wasteful properties, target management would favor stock lockups as they induce takeover competition at least cost to the target

Does Competition Enhance Performance or Cheating? A Laboratory Experiment

In this paper we experimentally test whether competing for a desired reward does not only affect individuals’ performance, but also their tendency to cheat. Recent doping scandals in sports as well as forgery and plagiarism scandals in academia have been partially explained by “competitive pressures”, which suggests a link between competition and cheating. In our experiment subjects conduct a task where they have the possibility to make use of illegitimate tools to better their results. We find that women react much stronger to competitive pressure by increasing their cheating activity while there is no overall sex difference in cheating. However, the effect of competition on women’s cheating behavior is entirely due to the fact that women, on average, are doing worse with respect to the assigned task. Indeed we find that it is the ability of an individual to conduct a particular task and not sex that crucially affects the reaction to competition. Poor performers significantly increase their cheating behavior under competition which may be a face-saving strategy or an attempt to retain a chance of winning.cheating, piece rate, tournament, competition, experiment

Does Sarbanes-Oxley Protect Whistleblowers? The Recent Experience of Companies and Whistleblowing Workers Under SOX

The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) attempts to prevent fraud in the business activities of public companies. SOX includes regulations designed to protect whistleblowing employees that may be triggered if workers allege fraudulent activity by their employers, and, in response, their employers retaliate. This Essay discusses the strength of the whistleblowing protection provided by SOX, the conduct covered by the SOX whistleblower provisions, and specifically the application of the law by the court