Table_1_Subsidies and allocation: A legacy of distortion and intergenerational loss.DOCX

One of the greatest threats to the conservation of transboundary stocks is the failure of Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs) to equitably allocate future fishing opportunities. Across RFMOs, catch history remains the principal criterion for catch allocations, despite being recognized as a critical barrier to governance stability. This paper examines if and how subsidies have driven catch histories, thereby perpetuating the legacy of unfair resource competition between distant water fishing nations (DWFNs) and coastal States, and how this affects ongoing allocation negotiations in the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC). Using limited publicly available data on subsidies to Indian Ocean tuna fleets, we show that subsidies have inflated catch histories of many DWFN's. As long as historical catch remains the key allocation criterion, future fishing opportunities will continue to be skewed in favor of DWFNs, in turn marginalizing half of the IOTC member States, which collectively account for a paltry 4% of the current catch. Without better transparency in past subsidies data, accounting for this distortion will be difficult. We provide alternative allocation options for consideration, with our analysis showing that re-attributing DWFN catch to the coastal State in whose waters it was caught may begin to alleviate this historical injustice.</p

Mean level of subsidies received by host countries over the period of their respective agreements, as well as mean fee paid by the industry per tonne of tuna over the 2008–2012 period.

a<p>Liners usually pay lower fees than purse-seiners. Although purse-seiners catches are higher than that of liners, both gear types were given the same weight here.</p

Baseline data and estimate of the ‘total fee/gross revenue’ ratio for the mixed agreement with Mauritania over the 2008–2010 period (details are shown in the appended Dataset S1; ‘Calculations Mauritania’ spreadsheet).

a<p>‘Total fee’ was calculated by multiplying the fee per unit of fishing capacity (in 2012 EUR/GT) by the amount of capacity (GT) reported to have been used in each fishing category <a href="http://www.plosone.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pone.0079899#pone.0079899-Anon1" target="_blank">[61]</a>.</p

Number of agreements and authorized capacity.

<p>Trends of A) the number of EU public fishing agreements signed with developing countries in Africa and Oceania, and B) authorized capacity of the tuna fleet (dark grey) and other fleets (light grey; mostly demersal fishing, but also includes some non-tuna pelagic fishing with various types of lines and nets), from 1980 to 2012, by month. The implementation of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) and its three reforms (the third one being ongoing) are indicated by black arrows.</p

Extent of publicly funded EU fishing agreements with developing countries.

<p>Distribution of the twenty public agreements that the EU has signed with developing countries throughout Africa and Oceania in the 1980s (red), 1990s (yellow) and 2000s (green). EU vessels also have the possibility to freely fish in EU waters (represented by grey areas, including overseas territories with the exception of the Chagos Archipelago, in cross-hatch, which is now fully protected). Some of these agreements have been cancelled (Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Senegal; highlighted with black crosses) or are currently being renegotiated (Mauritania, Mauritius, Micronesia, Morocco, Solomon Islands; highlighted with black squares). Situation as of December 2012.</p

Cost of tuna agreements for the industry.

<p>Ratio of fees paid by the industry relative to landed value for the tuna component of all agreements. This figure only includes agreements for which there were tuna quotas. The solid line represents the median, while the grey area represents the limit beyond which a point is considered to be an outlier [data points below quartile₁−1.5*(quartile₃–quartile₂), or above quartile₃+1.5*(quartile₃–quartile₂). The ‘smooth.spline’ function in R was used <a href="http://www.plosone.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pone.0079899#pone.0079899-Ripley1" target="_blank">[82]</a>, with a smoothing window ‘spar’ set to 0.5]. Note that for 2012, we considered the ex-vessel price of tuna to be 2,000 EUR/t, based on historical trends and various sources of information. This graph is based on 218 ‘country/year’ datapoints. Note that liners usually pay lower fees and also have lower catches than purse-seiners; however, both gear types were given the same weight here (the difference between weighted and non-weighted results was minimal). The implementation of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) and its three reforms (the third one being ongoing) are indicated by black arrows.</p